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IN THE SQQ~EME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC ) 
PetitionerIAppellant ) 
v. . 
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF ) 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; ) 
ELMER R. CURRIE; RICHARD A. ) 
PIAZZA and TODD TONDEE 
Respondents 1 
1 
And ) 
) 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE 1 
GROWTH; NORBERT and BEVERLY ) 
TWILLMAN; SUSAN MELKA; 
BILL and SILVIA LAMPARD; DAVID ) 
and BARBARA WARDSWORTH and ) 
HEATHER BOWLBY ) 
Intervenors/Respondents 
Supreme Court Case 35730 
Kootenai Co. Case CV08- 163 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of  the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of  
Kootenai. 
HONORABLE JOHN PATRICK LUSTER PRESIDING 
District Judge 
Attomev for Petitioner/Ap~ellant Attorney for Respondents 
Kristen Thompson 
78 S W  Fifth Ave. Ste 150 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Attomev for IntervenorsIRespondents 
Patrick M. Braden 
Kootenai County Legal Services 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16 
Scott W. Reed 
PO Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Date: 1/2/2009 
Time: 10:51 AM 
icial District Court - Kootenai Count 
ROA Report 
User: MCCORD 
Page 1 of 3 Case: CV-2006-0006587 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, eta1 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Gus Johnson, Elmer R Currie, Katie 
Brodie 
Date Code User Judge 
NCOT VlCTORlN 
- 
New Case Filed - All Other Cases 
- - - -  
John P. Luster 
VlCTORlN Filing: R1C - Appeals And Transfers Magistrate John P. Luster 
To District Other Cv/sp Appeals Paid by: Glen 
Walker Receipt number: 071 1836 Dated: 
9/1/2006 Amount: $53.00 (Check) 
NOTC JSHAFFER Notice of Estimate of Transcript and Agency John P. Luster 
Record 
NOTC BOOTH Notice of Settlement and Filing of Agency Record John P. Luster 
and Transcript 
NOTC BOOTH Notice of Settlement and filing of Agency Record John P. Luster 
and Transcript 
MOTN VlCTORlN Motion for Extension to Lodge Agency Record John P. Luster 
and Transcript and Request for Hearing 
STlP MCCOY Stipulation for Extension to Lodge Agency John P. Luster 
Record and Transcript 
ORDR BOOTH Order Granting Extension to Lodge Agency John P. Luster 
Record and Transcript 
NOTC 
HRSC 
REMPFER 
BOOTH 
Notice of lodging of transcript and agency record John P. Luster 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Review 02/09/2007 John P. Luster 
08:OO AM) 
Order Setting Briefing schedule on Petition for John P. Luster 
Judicial Review and Notice of Hearing 
ORDR BOOTH 
STlP Stipulation for Extension to Settle Record and John P. Luster 
Transcript 
MOTN WATKINS Motion For Order For Mediation and Request For John P. Luster 
Hearing 
MOTN WATKINS Motion For Extension To Settle Record and John P. Luster 
Transcript and Request For Hearing 
ORDR WATKINS Order Granting Motion For Extension To Settle John P. Luster 
Record and Transcript 
HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/12/2006 03:30 John P. Luster 
PM) 
NOHG 
NOTC 
VlCTORlN 
REMPFER 
Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
Notice of settlement and filing of agency record John P. Luster 
and transcript on appeal 
FILE JANUSCH New File Created John P. Luster 
******* FILE 2*************************************** 
Box with Trancripts filed 11 11 3/06*********** 
Hearing result for Judicial Review held on John P. Luster 
02/09/2007 08:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 
HRVC 
HRSC 
ORDR 
HRVC 
BOOTH 
Hearing Scheduled (Appeal Hearing 03/28/2007 John P. Luster 
03:30 PM) 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
Amended Order Setting Briefing Schedule on John P. Luster 
Petition for Judicial Review and Notice of Hearing 
Hearing result for Appeal Hearing held on John P. Luster 
03/28/2007 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Date: 1 /2/2009 
Time: 10:51 AM 
~ i r w i c i a l  District Court - Kootanai Count 
ROA Report 
User: MCCORD 
Page 2 of 3 Case: CV-2006-0006587 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, etal. 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Gus Johnson, Elmer R Currie, Katie 
Brodie 
Date Code User Judge 
HRSC BOOTH 
-- - - 
Hearing Scheduled (Appeal Hearing 03/02/2007 John P. Luster 
08:OO AM) 
BOOTH 
SRIGGS 
WATKINS 
Amended Notice of Hearing John P. Luster 
BRlE 
HELD 
Appellant's Brief John P. Luster 
Hearing result for Motion held on 12/12/2006 John P. Luster 
03:30 PM: Motion Held for mediation 
Order granting motion for mediation John P. Luster ORDR 
FlLE 
BOOTH 
JANUSCH New File Created 
.......................... 
John P. Luster FILE 3******************* 
BRlE 
MOTN 
STlP 
ORDR 
HRVC 
SRIGGS 
ZLATI C H 
ZLATlCH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
Respondent's Brief John P. Luster 
Motion for stay of appeal John P. Luster 
Stipulation to stay appeal John P. Luster 
Order Granting Motion to Stay Appeal John P. Luster 
Hearing result for Appeal Hearing held on John P. Luster 
03/02/2007 08:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 
HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/21/2007 03:OO John P. Luster 
PM) 
AFFD MCCOY Affidavit of Kacey L. Wall in Support of Motion for John P. Luster 
Ex-Parte Order and Order to Show Cause and 
Motion to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement 
AFFD 
MOTN 
MCCOY 
MCCOY 
Supplemental Affidavit of Kacey L. Wall John P. Luster 
Motion for Ex-Parte Order and Order to Show John P. Luster 
Cause 
Motion to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement John P. Luster MOTN 
ORDR 
H RVC 
MCCOY 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
Order denying ex parte application John P. Luster 
Hearing result for Motion held on 05/21/2007 John P. Luster 
03:OO PM: Hearing Vacated to enforce post 
settlement agreement 
STlP 
AFFD 
AFFD 
PETN 
Stipulation John P. Luster MCCORD 
MCCORD 
MCCORD 
MCCORD 
Affidavit of Summer Skalak John P. Luster 
Affidavit of Robin Eldridge John P. Luster 
emergency Petition for writ of 
mandamus/prohibition 
John P. Luster 
MlSC Repondent's Objection to Petitioner's Emergency John P. Luster 
Petition for Writ of Mandamus/Prohibition and 
Motion to Dismiss Same 
HULL 
MlSC HULL Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Objection to John P. Luster 
Emergency Petition For Writ of 
MandamusIProhibition 
FlLE MCCORD New File Created 
****************** file 
John P. Luster 
SUBC MCCOY Notice of Substitution Of Counsel - Patrick John P. Luster 
Braden in for John Cafferty 
Date: 1/2/2009 
Time: 10:51 AM 
dicial District Court - Kootenai Coun 
ROA Report a User: MCCORD 
Page 3 of 3 Case: CV-2006-0006587 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, etal. 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Gus Johnson, Elmer R Currie, Katie 
Brodie 
Date Code User Judge 
MOTN 
STlP 
ORDR 
HRSC 
NOHG 
NOAP 
MOTN 
STlP 
ORDR 
NOTE 
REVR 
WATKINS 
WATKINS 
BARKER 
BOOTH 
LSMITH 
PARKER 
MCCORD 
MCCORD 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
INMAN 
MEYER 
Motion For Stay Of Appeal 
Stipulation To Stay Appeal 
Order Granting Motion To Stay Appeal 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/22/2008 08:OO 
AM) to enforce mediation agreement 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Notice Of Appearance/Kristen R Thompson for 
Plaintiff Kirk-Hughes Development LLC 
Motion to consolidate 
Stipulation to consolidate 
Order to consolidate - into CV08-163 
NO FURTHER PLEADINGS TO BE FILED IN 
THIS FILE - USE CV08-163 
Hearing result for Status Conference held on 
0512212008 03:OO PM: Interim Hearing Held + 
MTN TO WITHDRAW BY KC WALL AND MTN 
LIMITED ADMISSIONS ROBERT FRElLlCH 
Reviewed And Retained - File in Judge Luster's 
office for review 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
Date: 1/2/2009 
Time: 01 :35 PM 
Page 1 of 5 
f i r e i c i a l  District Court - Kootenai Count 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2008-0000163 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, etal. 
User: MCCORD 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, Richard A Piazza, W Todd Todd Tondee 
Date Code User Judge 
1 /9/2008 NCOC MCCORD New Case Filed - Other Claims Lansing L. Haynes 
MCCORD Filing: R2 - Appeals And Transfers For Judicial Lansing L. Haynes 
Review To The District Court Paid by: Kristen 
Thompson Receipt number: 0777491 Dated: 
1/9/2008 Amount: $78.00 (Combination) For: 
[NON El 
SUM1 KSMITH Summons Issued Lansing L. Haynes 
111 612008 MOTN BAXLEY Motion for Extension of Tie for Preparation of Lansing L. Haynes 
Agency Record and Transcript 
AFFD BAXLEY 
1 12412008 MOTN MCCORD 
STlP MCCORD 
1 /29/2008 ORDR BOOTH 
ADMR BOOTH 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
MCCORD 
MCCORD 
1 13 112008 BRIE 
2/1/2008 FILE 
BRIE MCCORD 
2/8/2008 NLTR LUNNEN 
211 412008 MEMO BAXLEY 
AFFD BAXLEY 
2/20/2008 MlSC MCCORD 
2/25/2008 NOTC LUNNEN 
2/26/2008 HRSC BOOTH 
2/27/2008 HRSC BOOTH 
3/4/2008 HRSC BOOTH 
Affidavit of Sandi Gilbertson in Support of Motion Lansing L. Haynes 
for Extension of Time for Preparation of Agency 
Record and Transcript 
Motion to consolidate Lansing L. Haynes 
Stipulation to consolidate Lansing L. Haynes 
Order to Consolidate - with CV06-6587 - ALL John P. Luster 
FILING IN THIS CASE 
Administrative assignment of Judge John P. Luster 
Order Assigning Judge on Disqualification John P. Luster 
Without Cause 
Order Assigning Judge on Disqualification John P. Luster 
Without Cause - John Patrick Luster 
Appellant's Brief in support of motion to enforce John P. Luster 
mediation agreement 
New File Created John P. Luster 
****************** FlLE 2 EXPANDO******************** 
expando contains appellant's supplemental brief 
appellant's supplemental Brief in support of John P. Luster 
motion to enforce mediation 
Notice of Lodging Of Agency Record And John P. Luster 
Transcript 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Enforce John P. Luster 
Mediation Agreement 
Affidavit of Elmer R Currie In Opposition to John P. Luster 
Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement 
appellant's reply to resp's memorandum in John P. Luster 
opposition to motion to enforce mediation 
agreement 
Notice Of Settlement And Filing Of Agency John P. Luster 
Record And Transcript 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider John P. Luster 
05/21/2008 03:OO PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Appeal Hearing 05/22/2008 John P. Luster 
03:OO PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Review 06/04/2008 John P. Luster 
03:OO PM) 
Date: 1 /2/2009 ~ i r e i c i a l  District Court - Koatenai Count 
ROA Report 
User: MCCORD 
1 Time: 01:35 PM 
Page 2 of 5 Case: CV-2008-0000163 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, etal. 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, Richard A Piazza, W Todd Todd Tondee 
Date Code User Judae 
3/4/2008 ORDR BOOTH 
ORDR BOOTH 
MCCOY 
Order denying appellant's motion to enforce John P. Luster 
mediation agreement 
Order setting briefing schedule on peittion for John P. Luster 
judicial review and notice of hearing 
Filing: J5 - Special Motions Petition For John P. Luster 
lntervention Paid by: Scott Reed Receipt 
number: 0787692 Dated: 3/21/2008 Amount: 
$61 .OO (Check) For: [NONE] 
Motion to Intervene as of Right, Motion for John P. Luster 
Permissive lntervention - Scott Reed OBO 
Applicant 
MOTN MCCOY 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion to lntervene John P. Luster 
as of Right, Motion for Permissive lntervention 
MEMS MCCOY 
3/24/2008 HRSC BOOTH 
AFFD THOMPSON 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Intervene John P. Luster 
04/21/2008 03:OO PM) 
Affidavit of Beverly Twillmann in support of John P. Luster 
motion to intervene as of right and of motion for 
permisssive intervention 
Notice Of Hearing on Motion to lntervene as of John P. Luster 
Right of Motion for Permissive lntevention of 
Applicants Neighbor's for Responsible Growth, et 
al 
3/25/2008 NOTH PARKER 
4/1/2008 TRAN BOOTH Transcript Filed - 212218 proceeding - Reporter John P. Luster 
Anne MacManus 
4/2/2008 HRVC Hearing result for Motion to Intervene held on John P. Luster 
04/21/2008 03:OO PM: Hearing Vacated 
BOOTH 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Intervene John P. Luster 
0511 312008 03:OO PM) 
HRSC BOOTH 
HRSC 
HRVC 
BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Intervene John P. Luster 
04/21/2008 03:OO PM) 
BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Intervene held on John P. Luster 
05/13/2008 03:OO PM: Hearing Vacated 
4/3/2008 MlSC 
4/4/2008 MlSC 
MCCOY 
BAXLEY 
Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Brief John P. Luster 
Appellant's Opposition To Motion To lntervene As John P. Luster 
Of Right, Motion For Permissive lntervention 
411 112008 MlSC THOMPSON Brief Of Intervenors In Support Of Motion To John P. Luster 
lntervene 
411 512008 ABRF 
411 612008 NOTC 
THOMPSON 
KSMITH 
KSMITH 
Appellant's Brief John P. Luster 
Notice of Hearing 06/04/2008 @ 3:00 John P. Luster 
Objection to Reply Brief of Appelant and Motion John P. Luster 
to Strike 
Memorandum In Support Of Objection to Reply John P. Luster 
Brief of Appellant and Motion to Strike 
MEMS KSMITH 
Date: 11212009 
Time: 01 :35 PM 
icial District Court - Kootenai Count 
"'." ROA Report 
User: MCCORD 
Page 3 of 5 Case: CV-2008-0000163 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, etal. 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, Richard A Piazza, W Todd Todd Tondee 
Date Code User Judge 
4/21 I2008 DCHH BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Intervene held on John P. Luster 
04/21/2008 03:OO PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
4/22/2008 MOTN PARKER Appellant's Motion Requesting Reconsideration John P. Luster 
of Order and, in the Alernative, Certification of the 
Court's Decision 
NOTH PARKER Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
MOTN PARKER Appellant's Motion for Appeal of Commissioners' John P. Luster 
Decision on PUD Application 054-05 
NOTH PARKER Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
NOTC BOOTH Notice Of Hearing - Motion to Reconsider John P. Luster 
4/23/2008 ANHR VICTORIN Amended Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
MlSC SHEDLOCK Appellant's Opposition To County's Objection To John P. Luster 
Reply Brief & To County's Motion To Strike Brief 
4/24/2008 AFlS MCCORD Affidavit in Support of Motion to Withdraw John P. Luster 
MNWD MCCORD Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Attorney as John P. Luster 
appellant 
51812008 ORDR BOOTH Order denying appellant's motion to enforce John P. Luster 
mediation agreement 
ORDR BOOTH Order granting intervention John P. Luster 
NOTC BOOTH Notice of Hearing 512118 - KC Wall Motion to John P. ~ " s te r  
Withdraw 
511 212008 BRIE SHEDLOCK Brief Of Respondents John P. Luster 
511 312008 BRIE BAXLEY Brief of Intervenors/Respondents John P. Luster 
511 512008 MEMO BAXLEY Memorandum In Opposition To Appellant's John P. Luster 
Motion Requesting Reconsideration and In The 
Alternative Certification of the Court's Decision 
NOTC BAXLEY Notice RE Opposition to Appellant's Motion For John P. Luster 
Appeal Of Commissioners' Decision and PUD 
Application 054-05 
MOTN PARKER Motion for Limited Admission John P. Luster 
MlSC PARKER Consent to be Local Counsel John P. Luster 
MOTN BOOTH Motion for limited Admission - Freilich John P. Luster 
MlSC BOOTH Consent To Be Local Counsel John P. Luster 
511 912008 HRVC BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on John P. Luster 
05/21/2008 03:OO PM: Hearing Vacated + rntn 
to withdraw by Wall 
CONT BOOTH Hearing result for Appeal Hearing held on John P. Luster 
05/22/2008 03:OO PM: Continued 
HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference John P. Luster 
05/22/2008 03:OO PM) + MTN TO WITHDRAW 
BY KC WALL AND MTN LIMITED ADMISSIONS 
ROBERT FRElLlCH 
Date: 1 /2/2009 
Time: 01 :35 PM 
Page 4 of 5 
~ i r g d i c i a l  District Court - Kootenai Count 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2008-0000163 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, etal. 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, Richard A Piazza, W Todd Todd Tondee 
Date Code 
NOTH 
NOHG 
NOTH 
NOTH 
NOTC 
NOTC 
STlP 
INHD 
ORDR 
BRIE 
FILE 
NOTC 
NOTC 
ORDR 
DCHH 
811 412008 DEOP 
DEOP 
User: MCCORD 
User Judge 
MCCORD Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
LSMITH Second Amended Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
MCCORD Amended Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
MCCORD Amended Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
MCCORD Notice of status conference John P. Luster 
MCCORD Notice to vacate hearing John P. Luster 
MCCORD Stipulation to change hrg dates John P. Luster 
INMAN Hearing result for Status Conference held on John P. Luster 
05/22/2008 03:OO PM: Interim Hearing Held + 
MTN TO WITHDRAW BY KC WALL AND MTN 
LIMITED ADMISSIONS ROBERT FRElLlCH 
BOOTH Order allowing local counsel to withdraw as John P. Luster 
attorneys for appellant (KC Wall) 
MCCORD Appellant Kir-Hughes Development LLC's John P. Luster 
Consolidated Supplemental & Reply Brief 
JANUSCH New File Created***4************ John P. Luster 
ROBINSON Notice Of Special Appearance On Behalf of John P. Luster 
Intervenors Respondents 
PARKER Amended Notice of Special Appearance on John P. Luster 
Behalf of Intevenors/Respondents 
PARKER Response to Appellant Kirk-Hughes John P. Luster 
Development, LLC's Consolidated Supplemental 
& Reply Brief 
BOOTH Order (following status conference) John P. Luster 
BOOTH Hearing result for Judicial Review held on John P. Luster 
06/04/2008 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: MOTIONS PREVIOUSLY 
SCHEDULED 511 1 AND 22 - Over 100 pages 
BOOTH Memorandum opinion and order in re: appeal of John P. Luster 
decision by Kootenai County Board of County 
Commissioners 
BOOTH Amended Memorandum Opinion and order in re: John P. Luster 
appeal of decision by Kootenai County board of 
county commissioners 
VICTORIN Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court John P. Luster 
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via 
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 County District 
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by: 
Thompson, Kristen R. (attorney for Kirk Hughes 
Development LLC) Receipt number: 0814089 
Dated: 911 912008 Amount: $1 5.00 (Check) For: 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC (plaintiff) 
' Date: 1/2/2009 
Time: 01 :35 PM 
Page 5 of 5 
icial District Court - Kootenai Count 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2008-0000163 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, etal. 
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, Richard A Piazza, W Todd Todd Tondee 
Date Code User Judge 
User: MCCORD 
NOTC 
APSC 
10/29/2008 NOTC 
MOTN 
10/31/2008 ORDR 
NOTC 
1 1/21/2008 ORDR 
- - -  - 
VICTORIN Miscellaneous Payment: Supreme Court Appeal John P. Luster 
Fee (Please insert case #) Paid by: Kirk-Hughes 
DeveloprnentlCV08-163 Receipt number: 
0814096 Dated: 911 912008 Amount: $86.00 
(Check) 
JOKELA Notice of Appeal John P. Luster 
VICTORIN Appealed To The Supreme Court John P. Luster 
VICTORIN Notice of Address Change John P. Luster 
VICTORIN Motion for Limited Admission John P. Luster 
MCCORD Motion & Order Granting Extension of Time to John P. Luster 
File Clerk's Record Appeal 
CRUMPACKER Notice of Change of Address of Attorney for John P. Luster 
Appellant 
RICKARD Order Granting Motion For Association Of John P. Luster 
Foreign Counsel 
Clerk's Certificate on Appeal .................................................................................................................. A 
Notice of Appeal 
Filed September 1, 2006 ............................................................................................................ I 
Appellant's Brief 
Filed December 8, 2006 ............................................................................................................. 8 
Order Granting Motion for Mediation 
Filed December 2 1 ,  2008 ......................................................................................................... 156 
Respondent's Brief 
Filed January 19, 2007 ............................................................................................................. 159 
Motion for Stay of Appeal 
Filed January 23, 2007 ................................................................. : ................................... 349 
Stipulation to Stay Appeal 
Filed January 23, 2007 .......................................................................................................... 352 
Order Granting Motion to Stay Appeal 
Filed January 3 1 ,  2007 ............................................................................................................. 357 
Affidavit of Kacey Wall in Support of Motion for Ex-Parte Order & Order to Show Cause & Motion 
to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement 
Filed April 24, 2007 ................................................................................................................. 360 
Supplemental Affidavit of Kacey L. Wall 
Filed April 24, 2007 ................................................................................................................. 364 
Motion for Ex-Parte Order and Order to Show Cause 
Filed April 24, 2007 ................................................................................................................. 367 
Motion to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement 
Filed April 24, 2007 ................................................................................................................. 370 
Order Denying Ex-Parte Application 
Filed April 25, 2007 ................................................................................................................. 426 
Emergency Petition for Writ of MandamusIProhibition 
Filed July 6, 2007 ................................................................................................................ 429 
Affidavit of Robin Eldridge 
Filed July 6, 2007 ..................................................................................................................... 46 1 
Affidavit of Summer Skalak 
Filed July 6, 2007 ..................................................................................................................... 464 
Stipulation re. Stay 
Filed July 6, 2007 ..................................................................................................................... 468 
Table of Contents 
Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandani~~s/Prohibition &
Motion to Dismiss Same 
Filed July 9, 2007 ..................................................................................................................... 470 
Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Objection to Emergency Petition for Writ of 
MandamusIProhibition 
Filed July 12, 2007 ................................................................................................................... 473 
Motion for Stay of Appeal 
Filed October 18, 2007 ............................................................................................................. 477 
Stipulation to Stay Appeal . 
Filed October 18, 2007 ............................................................................................................. 480 
Order Granting Motion to Stay Appeal 
Filed October 19, 2007 ............................................................................................................. 482 
Notice of Appeal 
Filed January 9, 2008 ............................................................................................................... 485 
Appellant's Brief in Support of Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement 
Filed January 3 1, 2008 ............................................................................................................. 490 
Appellant's Supplemental Brief Support of Motion to Enforce Medication Agreement 
Filed February 1, 2008 ............................................................................................................. 597 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement 
Filed February 14, 2008 ........................................................................................................... 752 
Affidavit of Elmer R. Currie in Opposition to Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement 
Filed February 14, 2008 ........................................................................................................... 763 
Appellant's Reply to Respondents' Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's Motion to Enforce 
Mediation Agreement 
Filed February 20, 2008 ........................................................................................................... 769 
/ 
' Order Denying Appellant's Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement 
................................................................................................................. Filed March 4, 2008 8 14 
Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Brief 
Filed April 3, 2008 ................................................................................................................... 8 17 
Appellant's Opening Brief 
Filed April 15, 2008 ................................................................................................................. 844 
Objection to Reply Brief of Appellant & Motion to Strike 
Filed April 16, 2008 ................................................................................................................. 890 
Memorandum in Support of Objection to Reply Brief of Appellant & Motion to Strike 
Filed April 16, 2008 ................................................................................................................. 893 
Table of Contents 
Appellant's Motion Requesting Reconsideration of Order and, in the Alternative, Certification of the 
Court's Decision 
Filed April 22, 2008 ................................................................................................................. 900 
Appellant's Motion for Appeal of Commissioners' Decision on PUD Application 
Filed April 22, 2008 ................................................................................................................. 9 14 
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Filed April 23, 2008 ................................................................................................................. 9 18 
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Filed May 8, 2008 .................................................................................................................... 924 
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Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC's Consolidated Supplemental & Reply Brief 
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Commissioners 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2004 and 2005, Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC (KHD), purchased a total of five 
hundred seventy-eight (578) acres located in Kootenai County, Idaho, on the East Shore of Lake 
Coeur d'Alene, with the intent of developing a resort community called Chateau de Loire. Of these 
acres, one hundred eighty-four (184) are zoned for Restricted Residential uses and Three Hundred 
Ninety-Four (394) are zoned for Rural uses. These zoning designations, allowing for a subdivision 
totaling in excess of one thousand (1,000) units or for a Planned Unit Development (PUD), formed 
the basis for KHD's investment decision to purchase this project site (Site). The zoning designations 
allowed KHD to submit a PUD Application to the Kootenai County Building and Planning 
Department without having to request that the Site be rezoned. 
The Comprehensive Plan (Comp Plan) for the Site sets forth two (2) separate land use 
designations. More than one hundred (100) acres are designated as rural and approximately four 
hundred (400) acres are designated timber, surface-water overlay. Under the Comp Plan, the intent, 
goals and policies of the timber, surface-water overlay is to preserve existing timber production. 
(Record on Appeal (ROA), 1207, fiom Part 1, pg. 20 of County Comp Plan). It is important to note 
that the Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) acknowledges that for the past forty (40) to sixty 
(60) years there has been no timber or agricultural production on the Site; and more importantly, the 
BOCC specifically found that no actual timber or agricultural production is sustainable at the Site. 
Thls fact is confirmed by the Order of Decision that was handed down on August 24,2006, wherein 
the BOCC stated as follows: 
Economic Development: 
Housing construction and tourism have been a major part o f  the economic 
expansion of Kootenai County over the last 15 years. Continued growth to the 
area's economy and tax base will result.from this development (KHD) andjobs will 
be created zf it were to be approved. The .fornzer use of  the property was 
Agricultural. It does not appear to be a viable or sustainable use o f  the property 
1 
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however. It has not been used,fbr~furestry or mining tlses in the recent past. [ROA, 
19731 
KHD was encouraged by staff' to submit an application for a preliminary PUD prior to 
filing for a preliminary SubdivisionPlat Application. In April, 2005, KHD filed its PUD 
Application with the County. On May 4, 2005, it was logged in as PUD 054-05 after the County 
had performed its analysis and had ascertained that all necessary components were included in the 
Application. On June 6, 2005, the County Planner assigned to KHD's PUD Application followed 
standard procedure and sent letters to twelve (12) County Agencies requesting that they respond 
within thirty (30) days to Staff with regard to the Application and to provide KHD with copies of 
their comments. (ROA, 1291). 
The first hearing, for Preliminary PUD approval, was set for October 20, 2005. KHD, 
through general counsel Brian Bills, inquired from Staff whether KHD was lacking any information 
necessary to obtaining preliminary approval. The County, through Ms. Bowes, represented to Mr. 
Bills that all the necessary information had been received. However, one (1) hour prior to the 
October 20, 2005, hearing, Staff provided KHD with a report stating that additional information 
was, in fact, required. Despite the short notice, KHD attempted to address the issues raised by the 
report. At the conclusion of the hearing, Hearing Examiner Gary Young recommended that Staff 
provide KHD with a written list of deficiencies. (ROA, 1677). The BOCC adopted Mr. Young's 
recommendation. Staff, however, never submitted a written summation detailing any deficiencies 
in KHD's Application. 
KHD only had the Staff report (the one received just prior to hearing), along with a letter 
submitted to the Hearing Examiner, as a representation of what Staff considered the deficiencies 
in the Application to be (ROA, 1267-1268). KHD responded to those documents. (ROA, 0301- 
Throughout this Brief, "Staff' refers to the employees of the Kootenai County Building and Planning 
Department. 
2 
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0304). In addition, KHD subsequently addressed all seventeen (17) elements in Section IV of 
the Staff Report. (ROA, 0301-0304). After reviewing KHD's supplemental information, and an 
Idaho Department of Transportation's (ITD) letter, dated December, 2005, Staff scheduled a second 
hearing for February 16, 2006. Prior to the hearing, however, another Staff Report, dated February 
8, 2006, was submitted, which recommended that KHD's PUD Application be denied. The 
recommendation was apparently based on numerous statements made by Staff-statements which 
were subsequently retracted or modified at the direction of counsel for the County, John Cafferty. 
(ROA, 1193-1195). 
In a meeting to discuss the critical statements, it was revealed that Rand Wichrnan, former 
Director of Kootenai County Building and Planning Department, believed that deviations between 
KHD's proposed PUD and the Comp Plan were fatal to KHD's Application. When asked why this 
issue had not been raised over the course of the preceding eighteen (18) months, Mr. Wichman 
replied, "[yleah, sorry. I guess we made a mistake. It should have (been addressed)." (ROA, 1 193 
- 1 195). 
On February 16, 2006, a Hearing was held in fiont of Kootenai County Hearing Examiner, 
Gary Young, who sent to the Building and Planning Department a recommendation for approval of 
KHD's Preliminary PUD (3/9/06 HT, 0202:8-10, see also, 2/16/06 HT, 0197:24-0198:21).~ In his 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, Mr. Young expressly stated that KHD's "proposed 
conceptual PUD is in compliance with the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance . . . and is compatible 
with the goals and policies of the (Kootenai County) Comprehensive Plan . . ." (ROA, 1655, #6.1 & 
6.2). 
This Hearing Transcript contains testimony and discussion from six (6) meetings, to wit: two (2) 
Hearings before the County Hearing Examiner, one (1) Public Hearing and three (3) Deliberation Meetings 
by the Board of County Commissioners all pertaming the Case PUD-054-05. The references to the 
Transcript will be designated in the Brief as (10/20/05 HT, 0123:3-6) which indicates the date of the 
Transcript, page number and lines on that page. 
3 
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Prior to the next Hearing before the BOCC, the Planning Director, Mr. Wichman unilaterally 
contacted ITD, and inexplicably represented to ITD that the July 13, 2006, hearing was for final 
approval of KHDys Application. That representation was blatantly false. KHD did not know of this 
communication until it received the June 21,2006 letter fiom ITD, which included acknowledgment 
that ITD was under the impression that the PUD was up for final approval, to wit: "[tlhe purpose of 
this letter is to summarize the Idaho Transportation Department's (ITD) concerns related to the 
Chateau de Loire PUD, which, we understand, will be subject to a final approval hearing on July 13, 
2006." (ROA, 1369- 1370). 
After KHD became aware of ITDys confusion, Mr. Cafferty, was contacted. He 
acknowledged the problem and represented to KHD that he would have Mike Porcelli, (District 
Traffic Engineer for ITD with whom KHD had been working) the author of the ITD letter, present at 
the July 13,2006 Public Hearing to clarifL the issue. 
Notwithstanding this representation, Mr. Porcelli was not present at the Public Hearing. 
Instead, ITD was represented by Barbara Babic who appeared and read portions of the June 21, 
2006, letter into the Record. Ms. Babic, however, failed to read those portions of the letter wherein 
the engineer stated that it was his belief that the July 13,2006, Hearing was for final PUD approval3 
(7113105 Public Hearing Transcript, 0244:16 to 0249:6). Pursuant to request, ITD provided a 
clarification letter (ROA, 0028-0033), and despite the revealing and exculpatory nature of that letter, 
KHD's subsequent motion to have the letter admitted into the Record was denied at the July 27, 
2006 Deliberation Meeting on KHD's PUD Application. (7127106 HT, 0391: 18-0392: 14). It was 
also at the July 27,2006, meeting that Commissioner Currie made known that he had conducted his 
own traffic study of State Highway 97. (7127106 HT, 0394:8-0395:7). This was also the first time 
The omission of this language had an impact on the news media and the newspaper article published the 
day of the Hearing stated that KHD was not complying with ITD's requests and that ITD was 
recommending denial of M D ' s  PUD. This article further affected KHD's public support for the project 
because it represented to the public that KHD had misrepresented its relationship with ITD. 
4 V j k  
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it was noted on the Record that the BOCC did not trust ITD and that ITD had no credibility with 
BOCC. (7127106 HT, 039612-1 9). 
On July 27, 2006, at the final Hearing, the BOCC rejected the Hearing Examiner's 
recommendation to approve KHD'S PUD Application and voted to deny the Application. On 
August 24, 2006, the BOCC issued its Order of Decision denying KHD's Preliminary PUD 
Application for Chateau de Loire. 
The Order of Decision stated, in conclusion: 
Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this document, the 
Board of Commissioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, orders that the application for 
Case No. PUD-054-05, request by Kirk Hughes (sic) Development for a planned unit 
development known a Chateau de Loire be DENIED. There are no actions the 
Applicant could take to obtain a permit. (ROA, 1975, ORDER OF DECISION, 
emphasis in original). 
KHD then filed the Notice of Appeal that is currently before the Court. ROA, 8-24). 
5 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners' (BOCC) denial of the 
Chateau de Loire Planned Unit Development was clearly erroneous because it was not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the Record? 
2. Whether the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners' denial of the Chateau de 
Loire Planned Unit Development should be reversed because it was arbitrary and capricious? 
3. Whether the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners' denial of the Chateau de 
Loire Planned Unit Development should be reversed because Appellant's substantial rights were 
prejudiced by the denial? 
6 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
1. The Standard of Review in this matter is governed by the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act, Chapter 52 of the Idaho Code. The specific Statute for use in this case is found in 
the Idaho Code, Section 67-5279, and states in pertinent part: 
Section 67-5279. Scope of review - Type of relief 
(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight 
of the evidence on questions of fact. 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other 
provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless 
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
. . .  
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of thls section, agency 
action shall be affirmed unless substantial .rights of the appellant have been 
prejudiced. 
(emphasis added). 
2. The Court's review of a Board's Decision pursuant to this Statute is two-tiered. First 
it must be determined that the Board erred with regard to one of the subsections in Idaho Code 
Section 67-5279(3), supra. Secondly, it must be shown that a substantial right of the aggrieved 
party was prejudiced. Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 917 P.2d 409 (1996). The 
appellant in such a case must show that the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners erred 
in a manner pursuant to 67-5279(3) and then must show that one of its substantial rights has been 
prejudiced. See Pa~ette River Property Owners Association v. Board of Commissioners, 132 Idaho 
551,976 P.2d 477 (1 999). 
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3. A land use map is not the comprehensive plan, but only a subpart of one of twelve 
components which go into the making of a plan. See Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 693 
P.2d 1046 (1 984). 
4. A zoning ordinance does not have to be exactly as the Comprehensive Plan shows it 
to be because the issue of whether or not the Zoning Ordinance and Comprehensive Plan are in 
accordance with one another is a question of fact. The governing body must take into account those 
factors in the comprehensive plan in light of the present factual circumstances surrounding the 
request. See Love v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Binnham County, 108 Idaho 728, 701 P.2d 
1293 (1985). 
5. A Zoning Ordinance's land use designation does not have to be in strict 
conformance with the Comprehensive Plan's land use designation. See Balser v. Kootenai 
County Board of Commissioners, 1 10 Idaho 37,714 P.2d 6 (1 986). 
6. Land may be rezoned despite the fact that the resulting zoning designation would 
not be in compliance with the Comprehensive Plan. See Fernuson v. The Board of County 
Commissioners for Ada County, I 10 Idaho 785, 7 18 P.2d 1223 (1986). 
7. A Comprehensive Plan does not operate as legally controlling zoning law but 
rather serves to guide and advise the governmental agencies responsible for making zoning 
decisions. The Comprehensive Plan is intended merely as a guideline whose primary use is in 
guiding zoning decisions. See Urrutia v. Blaine County, Idaho, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 
(2000). 
8. The effect of denying a landowner the lawful use of its property while the 
property is not being taken for public use, as generally contemplated by eminent domain, is an 
unlawful taking. In those cases where the courts have held that a taking was appropriate, due 
compensation for the property taken is always required. See City of Coeur d'Alene vs. Simpson, 
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142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006); KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho, 577 P.3d, 56 
(2003); See also In re the Application for Zoning Change, 140 Idaho 5 12, 96 P.3d, 61 3 (2004). 
9. A regulatory taking can occur through a County's denial of a land use permit. See 
Denial Of A Wetland Permit As Basis For Landowners' Remlatory Taking Claim, 58 Am.Jur. 
Proof of Facts 3d, 8 1. 
10. Three factors are to be considered in analyzing a regulatory taking claim: (1) the 
character of the government action; (2) the economic impact of the regulation; and (3) the extent 
to which the regulation interferes with the reasonable investment backed expectations. See Penn 
Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 
63 1 (1 978). 
11. The Court does not address whether a physical appropriation advances a 
substantial government interest. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d, 51 7(2002). 
12. There is, and always has been, a strong public policy against unreasonable 
restraints on the alienation of property rights. See Barr Development, Inc. v. Utah Mortgage 
Loan Cow., 106 Idaho 46, 675 P.2d 25 (1983) (rejecting a "due on sale" clause as an 
unreasonable restraint and against public policy); See also Ohms v. Church of the Nazarene, 64 
Idaho 262, 130 P.2d 679 (1942) (construing a contract clause in light of the disfavor of 
restrictions upon alienation of real property). 
13. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution entitles a person to an 
impartial and disinterested tribunal. This requirement applies to the Court as well as to state 
administrative agencies charged with applying eligibility criteria for licenses. See Stivers v. 
Pierce, 71 F.3d 732 (gth Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). 
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14. Decisions by a zoning board applying general rules or specific polices to specific 
individuals, interests or situations are quasi-judicial and subject to due process constraints. See 
Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980). 
15. It is unconstitutional to take property without due compensation, and to do so is a 
violation of an individual's right to due process. See Furlong Companies, Inc. v. City of Kansas 
m ,  189 S.W.3d 157,170 (2006). 
16. Bias of a board member or a commissioner renders his participation in the due 
process hearing constitutionally unacceptable, and the reviewing Court must determine the effect 
of the conflicted vote in order to assure impartiaI decision-making and to avoid the appearance of 
impropriety. See FIoyd v. Board of Commissioners of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 52 
P.3d 863 (2002); Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780,86 P.3d 494 (2004). 
It is unconstitutional to take property without due compensation, and to do so is a 
violation of an individual's right to due process. See Furlong Companies, Inc. v. City of Kansas 
m ,  189 S.W.3d 157,170 (2006). 
17. For the Court's convenience, and to aid the Court in understanding the land use 
definitions that are at issue in this case, the following is a summary of important terms: 
A Restricted Residential Zone is a land use classification for a district suitable for one- or 
two-family homes. A Rural Zone is a land use classification for a district suitable for rural Idaho 
(residential and agricultural purposes such as farming or forestry). A Planned Unit Development is 
an integrated design used to develop a planned community through a combination of uses under a 
single ownership andlor control. Such uses include residential, commercial, recreational and 
industrial and provide the developer with flexibility and creativity in site and building design 
pursuant to various zoning ordinances and an approved Comprehensive Plan. A Subdivision is the 
division of land, a particular site such as the land at issue in this Appeal, into two (2) or more lots or 
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parcels by recording a deed or plan. A Plat is a map or drawing of a subdivision of land into lots, 
blocks and roads along with associated conveyances to be filed as a public document. (Kootenai 
County Ordinances Nos. 344 and 348, respectively). 
A Comprehensive Plan is a written guide which acts as an umbrella over the five (5) above- 
cited definitions; it is a Plan the County follows in the implementation of the regulations governing 
the development of a PUD or Subdivision. A Comp Plan is designed to allow for the consideration 
of "previous and existing conditions, trends, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future 
situations' for several elements or goals pertaining to planning components such as population, 
economic development, land use, natural resources, hazardous areas, public services, transportation, 
recreation, special areas, housing, community design and implementation." Bone v. City of 
Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 849, 693 P.2d 1046, 105 1 (1984); see also, IC 5 67-65 1 1. In trylng to 
resolve issues involving these planning components, as in the instant case, it is important to note that 
the component is not the Comprehensive Plan but only a subpart thereof whlch goes into making the 
Plan. Id. 
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ARGUMENT 
In the interest of efficiency and to avoid repeating facts, KHD is presenting its argument 
without setting out each Issue on Appeal separately because each Issue on Appeal is interrelated and 
should be considered together. The fact that there was substantial evidence in the record to support 
approval of KHD's PUD Application makes the BOCC's denial arbitrary, capricious and an abuse 
of discretion. Further, it is the denial of the Application that has caused KHD's current inability to 
use its property in an economically useful fashion and has prejudiced its right to not have that 
economic interest taken by administrative action. Finally, the improper denial of KHD's PUD 
Application has caused significant financial damage to KHD because of the delay it has caused in 
their development progress. 
Upon its review of an administrative agency decision, the Court may either remand the 
matter to the appropriate agency for further findings or substitute its judgment for that of the agency 
upon a determination that the findings, inferences, conclusions andlor decisions were: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence; or 
(e) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or 
clearly unwarranted exercise of di~cretion.~ 
The Court must also find that a substantial right of the Appellant has been prejudiced by the agency 
whose decision is being reviewed. [IC, Sec.67-5279(4)]. 
This Court must vacate and remand the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners' 
denial of KHD's Preliminary PUD because there is insufficient evidence in the Record to support 
IC. Sec.67-5279(3); Application of Havden Pines Water Co., 11 1 Idaho 331, 723 P.2d 875, citing 
Administrative Law and Procedure 819; see also, Bone v. Citv of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 693 P.2d 1046 
(1984); Ferrruson v. Board of Countv Commissioners, 110 Idaho 626, 651 P.2d 560 (Ct.App.1982); Love v. 
Board of Countv Commissioners of Binaham County, 108 Idaho 728,701 P.2d 1293 (1985). 
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such a denial, particularly afier one compares the BOCC's various arbitrary points for denying the 
PUD with facts contained in the Record. 
The BOCC, in its Final Decision and Order, made clear the issues that it believed supported 
denial of KHD's PUD Application: 
[Quoting the Hearing Examiner] "I see little difference between the recently 
approved Gozzer Ranch PUD and the Chateau de Loire PUD with regard to the 
impact to Highway 97 and the impact on the existing character of the area." The 
problem with this logic is that it leads to an entitlement mentality. To state what all 
parties know, each application is different and is decided on its own merits. 
Whether or not the Gozzer Ranch PUD should have been approved is not the issue 
before us. The issue before us now is whether or not this PUD fits within the 
character of the area and whether or not Highway '97 is capably of safely 
accommodating the proposal. (ROA, 197 1). 
Thus, the two issues are whether KHD's proposed PUD plan should be denied because: 
(1) it does not comply with the Comp Plan or fit in with the character of the area and, therefore, 
must be rejected; and (2) Highway 97 is incapable of supporting the increased traffic flow that 
would result. The following will make it clear that, under any legal analysis, neither of these 
reasons support the BOCC's denial, making the denial arbitrary and clearly erroneous. 
The BOCC's Order further states (ROA, 1959-1 975) that KHD's Proposed Conceptual 
PUD "is not in compliance with the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance No. 348 Section 15.09C, 
Required Findings for Approval because: 
1. KHD's proposed conceptual PUD is not compatible with the goals and policies of 
the Kootenai County 1994 Comprehensive Plan as Amended. 
2. The main transportation issue with KHD's Project is its location and access tied to 
State Highway 97 (SH-97) and the fact the Highway is a scenic route and near capacity. 
3. KHD's proposed uses and structures within the PUD are not compatible with the 
surrounding area. 
4. KHD's proposed development is not compatible with surrounding uses and natural 
characteristics of the area. 
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5 .  The services and facilities necessary to serve the KHD Project are located away fi-om 
the site. 
6. The Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) was not made aware of KHD's 
desire to perform on-site mining operations. 
7. There is no action KHD can take to obtain a Permit." 
(ROA, 1974- 1975). 
KHD will show that the BOCC's position on any of these points is not supported by the 
Record and that, therefore, its denial of KHD's Preliminary PUD was arbitrary and capricious. 
Specifically, the BOCC ignored the Record in as much as it was supplemented by the professionals 
working for the various agencies Staff desimated to review KHD's conceptual plans. Further, KHD 
will show that the professional comments and recommendations were, in fact, supportive of 
approval of the Application, and merely set forth some conditions to be met by KHD prior to final 
approval (which is standard). Additionally, the professional Hearing Examiner based his findings 
on those same comments and recommendations when he made his own recommendation that the 
Application be approved. Upon a careful examination of the Order of Decision handed down in this 
matter, and a comparison of that Decision to the Record, it will be clear to the Court that, the 
BOCC's decision was not supported by the facts of this case, the Record, or the law of the State of 
Idaho. 
I. KHD's PUD is compatible with the Kootenai County 1994 Comprehensive Plan as 
Amended. 
The BOCC's conclusion that KHD's proposed PUD is not compatible with the goals and 
policies of the Kootenai County 1994 Comprehensive Plan as Amended (Comp Plan) is not 
supported by the Record, is arbitrary and capricious and is inconsistent not with Idaho law, but also 
with BOCC's own prior decisions. In its Order, the BOCC reasoned that KHD's PUD is not 
compatible with the goals and policies of the Comp Plan because it is not compatible with the Plan's 
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Future Land Use Plan Map (ROA, 0274), which shows the Site having a land use designation of 
"timber." In fact, the Plan Map shows that the Site has a bifurcated designation pursuant to the 
Future Land Use Map of approximately four hundred and seventy-five (475) acres designated as 
timber and one hundred and three (1 03) acres designated as rural. 
As a component of the KHD PUD Application, KHD submitted a Comp Plan Analysis 
(ROA, 1083-1094) outlining the appropriateness of its PUD under the Comp Plan. In particular, 
Section 15.07A.3 of the Comp Plan states, "[tlhe plan must be compatible with the goals, policies 
and future land use map of the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan." , A  clear reading of the 
Comp Plan text and existing case law clearly requires a finding by this Court that the BOCC's 
determination of the lack of compatibility of KHD's PUD with the Comp Plan was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
For example, the BOCC used the language in Section 15.07.A.3 as grounds to determine that 
KHD's "application is not in compliance with the map." (ROA, 1974). The BOCC made this 
determination even after conceding that the language of the Plan was very general with regard to 
that map. The Plan specifically states, "[ilt should be understood the map is intentionally general. 
Designations should be given to broad areas, not specific sites. . . . Because of the nature of the 
map, pockets of different land uses may be hidden by broad designations." (ROA, 1974). 
Apparently, the BOCC arrived at its conclusion based on what Staff set forth in its February 
8, 2006, Report (ROA, 1204- 12 16), particularly the statement that "the single most relevant question 
is whether this project is appropriate for the location." (ROA, 1214). Staff argued that the area 
owned by KHD is for timber production as designated by the Plan which states, "[tlhe purpose of 
this designation (timber) is to preserve and protect existing productive timber lands. Timber lands 
are defined as areas where the primary use is timber production with dwellings incidental to the 
primary use." (ROA, 1207, from Part 1, pg.20, of the Comp Plan). Based on that argument, the 
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BOCC concluded the land cannot be used for a private resortlresidential community with only four 
hundred seventy-five (475) residential units even though the current zoning for the Site allows for 
over one thousand (1 000) homes. 
Such a conclusion is unquestionably arbitrary and capricious as the Record shows that over 
one-third (113) of the Site has already been clear-cut (long before KHD acquired the property) and 
used for grazing cattle. The golf course is proposed for this area, eliminating the need for any 
significant tree removal. (ROA, 274, Future Land Use Map). More importantly, the BOCC Staff 
&eJf acknowledges that there has been no timber production on the Site for as many as sixty (60) 
years and that timber production would not be sustainable on the property. (ROA, 1973, 1975). 
Given these contradictory positions, to rely on the Future Land Use Map timber designation as a 
basis for denying KHD's Application, is in no way supported by the Record. 
Land use map designations, in and of themselves, are not dispositive as to the determination 
of the compatibility of a PUD with a Comp Plan. The Kootenai County Comp Plan sets forth the 
goals and intentions of the Plan and its integration with the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance. 
Specifically, Part 1, page 20, of the Comp Plan states, "tlhe goals and policies of this plan shall be 
used as a guide for the Zoning Ordinance, which will be site specific, and will recognize any future 
pockets and give them appropriate zoning designations." In particular, the County Hearing 
Examiner, in his review of PUD-054-05, stated the following in his March 2,2006, Report in whch 
he recommended approval of PUD-054-05 to the BOCC: 
The proposed conceptual Planned Unit Development is compatible with the 
goals and policies of the Comprehensive Plan. . . . With regard to the 
compatibility of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan Map, there is sufficient 
verbiage in the Comprehensive Plan regarding the generality of the Land Use Map. 
Part 1, page 20 of the Comprehensive Plan states "It should be understood the map 
is intentionally general. Designations should be given to broad areas, not specific 
sites." Also, "Because of the nature of  the Future land use] map, pockets o f  
different land uses may be hidden by broad designations. " . . . It is the underlying 
zoning and the goals and policies of the Comprehensive Plan that should be key in 
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determining compatibility of the Planned Unit Development, not a Future Land 
Use Map that is very general and not intended to be a regulatory map. 
Furthermore, the recent adoption of Zoning Ordinance No. 348 found the 
ordinance (which includes the zone classification map) is in conformance with 
the Comprehensive Plan. 
(ROA, 1655, Italics original, other emphasis added). 
The Examiner's logic is correct as the Zoning Ordinance and the Comp Plan already 
conform to one another, thus there is no need to request a zone change and the PUD Application is 
in conformance both with the Plan and the Zoning Ordinance. The Hearing Examiner also relied on 
his finding that the goals and policies of a timber designation for the subject Site were impractical 
given the current and historical use of the land and the poor economic viability of timber production. 
(ROA, 1659-1716). The BOCC agreed with the Hearinn Examiner that the timber desimation is 
impractical and that timber production would not be a viable use of the land, but nonetheless went 
on to cite this issue as one of the two reasons given in denying KHD's PUD Application. 
The Hearing Examiner's determination is supported by Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 
844, 693 P.2d 1046 (1984), in which the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "[ilt is important to make the 
distinction between the city's comprehensive plan and its land use map." (u. at 849). KHD would 
propose that this reasoning is applicable to the present case, especially when one considers the Idaho 
Supreme Court's language: 
These plans are to consider "previous and existing conditions, trends, 
desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations for twelve different 
planning components . . . The land use map . . . is developed under the land use 
component mentioned above. Under the land use component, Sec. 67-6508(c) 
directs that a "map shall be prepared indicating suitable projected land uses for the 
jurisdiction." 
The land use map, then, is not the comprehensive plan, but only a subpart 
of one of twelve components which go into the making of a plan. 
(Id., emphasis added). 
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Love v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Binrsham County, 108 Idaho 728, 701 P.2d 1293 
(1 985), while following the holding in Bone, supra, expanded on the latitude a landowner had with 
regard to the parameters he must follow concerning the use of his property. The Court held that a 
zoning ordinance does not have to "be exactly as the Comprehensive Plan shows it to be." (Love, at 
730). Because the issue of whether or not the Zoning Ordinance and Comprehensive Plan are in 
accordance with one another is a question of fact, the governing body must take "into account those 
factors in the comprehensive plan in light of the later present factual circumstance surrounding the 
request." Id.; quoting b, supra, at 849-5 1. 
This is the exact stance KHD has taken with Staff and the BOCC. On several occasions, 
KHD attempted to show Staff and the BOCC that the Site for its Project cannot sustain the 
logging industry. The BOCC knows that there has been no timber production on the Site for as 
many as sixty (60) years. (ROA, 1973, 1975). Furthermore, Staff and the BOCC have been 
informed by KHD that the primary timber area of the Site is in the southwest block of the 
property, and approximately eighty percent (80%) of this block will remain undisturbed natural 
vegetation upon completion of the Project. (ROA, 1203). 
Interestingly, in the case of Balser v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, 110 
Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6 (1986), the BOCC was making an argument in direct contradiction to the 
argument it would now make. The Balsers first brought the case against the BOCC in this 
District Court because it denied their Application for a zoning change wherein the BOCC argued 
"that I.C., Sec. 67-651 1 does not require a zoning ordinance's land use designation to be in strict 
conformance with the corresponding land use designation of the comprehensive plan." Id., at 39. 
The District Court found for the Balsers; and on Appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and 
found for the ~ommissioners.' Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the Zoning 
Appellant knows that the present Commissioners were not on the Board twenty (20) years ago but the 
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Ordinance's land use designation of "agriculture" did not have to be in strict conformance with 
the Comprehensive Plan's land use designation of "industrial." Id. 
As in the Balser case, the land use designations in the instant case for the zoning 
ordinance and for the Comp Plan are different. The zoning ordinance land use is designated 
"rural" and "restricted residential" which allows KHD to move fonvard with its development of a 
golf resort. The Comp Plan land use is designated part timber, surface water overlay and part 
rural even though BOCC claims that the total acreage is timber and surface water overlay. These 
facts should not be in dispute, as the Comp Plan speaks for itself. As has been shown above, it is 
undisputed that the Site cannot sustain the logging industry and that Staff and the BOCC are well 
aware that there has been no timber production on this property for as many as 60 years and that 
the trend in that part of Coeur d'Alene is moving toward residential use. KHD's PUD is in 
compliance with the zoning designation and a portion of the land is designated under the Comp 
Plan in such a way that the PUD is in compliance as to that portion, as well. Given this fact, the 
fact that the only part of the land that needs to be relatively treeless (the golf course) is already 
essentially treeless, and given the nature of the lack of sustainability of timber production on the 
land (and the BOCC's recognition of this), the PUD is in compliance with the goals of the Comp 
Plan and should be approved. 
The case of Ferguson v. The Board of County Commissioners for Ada County, 1 10 Idaho 
785, 718 P.2d 1223 (1986), adheres to the holding in the above cases, but goes even further to 
give a Board more leeway in making decisions regarding the issue of zoning ordinances and 
comprehensive plans. In Fermson, the Zoning Commission recommended approval of a 
Rezoning Application. Because the proposed land use was not compatible with the 
Comprehensive Plan, the Board denied the Rezoning Application. The case was appealed, 
Ordinance and the Statute are basically the same now as they were then. 
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reversed, and remanded to the Board by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Court found that the 
parcel of land at issue was zoned "suburban district" as was the Comp Plan. However, the 
property around the parcel had been rezoned "neighborhood commercial." The Board 
determined it would be arbitrary and capricious not to rezone this last parcel as neighborhood 
commercial. The District Court reversed the Board's decision and the matter was again appealed 
to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court and affirmed the Board's 
decision to rezone the parcel of land despite the fact that the resulting zoning designation was not 
in compliance with the Comp Plan. 
The Court stated that "reclassification of individual property is valid when non- 
conforming uses are so pervasive that the character of the neighborhood has actually changed 
from the purported zoning classification." Id. at 788, citing Dawson Enterprises, Inc., v. Blaine 
County, 98 Idaho 506, 5 15-16, 567 P.2d 1257, 1266-67 (1977). The Court determined that was 
what had occurred in the Fernuson case since the parcel at issue was the only property not zoned 
for commercial use. The present case is analogous in that, as the Court is likely aware, the 
property up and down SH-97 now supports resorts and developments similar to KHD's proposed 
development such as Gozzer Ranch (ROA, 1971) and Arrow Point. Additionally, the proposed 
Powder Horn development, which will also be similar, albeit much larger, has recently had its 
Comp Plan Amendment Application approved by the BOCC, which has been a matter of great 
public interest. As the Court is also likely aware, there are also several smaller housing 
developments spread along SH-97, in addition to the larger developments described above. 
The Gozzer Ranch and Arrow Point developments were approved before the submittal of 
KI-ID's Application. The Powder Horn development came before the Board after KHD's 
Application, but has already had its Amendment to the Comp Plan approved, which will now 
permit it to pursue a Zone Change Application. Projects such as Gozzer Ranch, Arrow Point and 
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Powder Horn are so similar to the development proposed by KHD that for the BOCC to have 
treated KHD so differently and without support from the Record shows the arbitrary and 
capricious nature of their decision to deny the PUD Application. It is beyond question that the 
area surrounding the Site now supports similar, and even larger, resorts. It is also undisputed that 
the area trend along SH-97 is moving toward .residential development with smaller neighborhood 
commercial facilities and away from the agriculture and timber designations. 
Urrutia v, Blaine County, Idaho, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000), provides additional 
support of KHD's argument that its PUD is compatible with the goals and policies of the Comp 
Plan. In addition to embracing the holdings in the cases discussed above, the Unutia Court held 
that "a comprehensive plan does not operate as legally controlling zoning law but rather serves to 
guide and advise the governmental agencies responsible for making zoning decisions." Id. at 
357-58 (emphasis added). The Court further stated that "the comprehensive plan is intended 
merely as a guideline whose primary use is in guiding zoning decisions." Id. at 359 
(emphasis added). 
As noted previously, the Comp Plan specifically provides that "[ilt should be understood the 
map is intentionally general. Designations should be given to broad areas, not specific sites. . . . 
[blecause of the nature of the map, pockets of different land uses may be hidden by broad 
designations." (ROA, 1974). Even Commissioner Elmer Cunie, during the BOCC's deliberation 
meeting on July 27, 2006, with regard to PUD-054-05 stated: 
Um, the Comp Plan. Um, and it's been stated that urn that it is a law. It is a 
law that the County has a Comp Plan. It is not a law um - it's a road map. It's a 
guide. It's not a law that you have to comply with the Comp Plan so but it is a 
- a road map; it's a very important road map (07127106 HT, 0393:24 to 0394:3, 
emphasis added). 
Based on the foregoing analyses and the case law, KHD has shown that the Hearing 
Examiner's Recommendation for 'approval of KHD's Preliminary PUD Application should have 
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been accepted by the BOCC, and specifically, the BOCC should have followed the findings of the 
Hearing Examiner: that KHD's conceptual PUD is compatible with the goals and policies of the 
Comp Plan. KHD has also shown that the BOCC's conclusion as to this issue was not based on 
substantial evidence. The applicable law, the Record and evidence found therein all support the fact 
that the Application is in compliance with the goals and policies of the Comp Plan and that the 
BOCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it reached an opposite conclusion. Finally, in not 
treating KHD's Application in the same manner with regard to the law as it did with Gozzer Ranch, 
Arrow Point and Powder Horn, KHD's substantial right to due process has been prejudiced. Most 
importantly, the BOCC's denial of KHD's PUD Application coupled with its statement, "[tlhere are 
no actions the Applicant could take to obtain a permit" (ROA, 1975) constitutes a taking of KHD's 
property without compensation. 
The effect of denying a property owner of the lawful use of their property is an unlawful 
taking. See City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006) (a decision 
arising out of a Sanders Beach case addressing regulatory taking); see also KMST, LLC v. 
County of Ada, 138 Idaho, 577 P.3d, 56 (2003); see also In re the Application for Zoning 
Change, 140 Idaho 512, 96 P.3d, 613 (2004). In these cases where the courts have held that a 
taking was appropriate, due compensation for the property taken is always required. An arbitrary 
and capricious denial like that of a decision denying Chateau the full and lawful use of its 
property without due compensation is a violation of Federal and State constitutional provisions as 
well as applicable case law. Determination of the level of the "taking" of property is further 
complicated by the BOCC's confusing, inconsistent and, at best, ambiguous discussions 
regarding the Comp Plan's designation of the Site as appropriate for timber usage. Obviously, 
from its decision, the BOCC does not even contemplate that KHD can coinply with the 
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Comprehensive Plan. This is evidenced by comments to the effect that the property would not be 
appropriate for such use. Supra. 
The type of taking in the present case is most appropriately classified as a regulatory 
taking since it arises from the implementation of a regulatory process. An example of this type 
of taking involves cases where denial of certain land use permits can be the basis for a 
landowner's assertion of a regulatory taking. See ex.,  Denial Of A Wetland Permit As Basis For 
Landowners' Remlatorv Taking Claim, 58 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, 81. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed and decided a number of land use regulatory 
taking cases. Infra. However, it was not until 1978 that the Court set out the analytical 
framework for determining when a regulatory taking went so far as to require compensation. See 
Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 
L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). The Penn Central Court identified three factors that are to be considered in 
analyzing a regulatory taking claim: (1) the character of the government action; (2) the economic 
impact of the regulation; and (3) the extent to which the regulation interferes with the reasonable 
investment backed expectations. These three factors together are commonly referred to as the 
Penn Central "ad hoc" balancing test. All three of these factors apply to the BOCC's decision in 
this case. 
Regulatory taking, as opposed to an actual physical taking, can be clearly distinguished. 
Because there is a clear distinction between acquisitions of property for public use and 
regulations prohibiting private uses, it would be inappropriate to treat "Takings Clause" cases 
involving physical takings as controlling precedence for the evaluation of a claim that there has 
been a regulatory taking. Therefore, the Court does not need to address whether a physical 
appropriation advances a substantial government interest. . See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
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Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Anencv, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d, 
5 17(2002). 
In any event, it is well recognized that where a political subdivision inappropriately, and 
in an arbitrary and capricious fashion, applies its ordinances to deprive a property owner from the 
use of its property, a regulatory taking has occurred, and the property owner must be duly 
compensated. 
Because the BOCC's denial of KHD's PUD Application was arbitrary and capricious, and 
thus not supported by the law, it amounts to a regulatory taking, and KHD should be 
compensated if the denial is not duly reversed by this Court. 
In addition, there has always been a strong public policy against unreasonable restraints 
on the alienation of property rights. See Barr Development, Inc. v. Utah Mortgage Loan Corp., 
106 Idaho 46, 675 P.2d 25 (1983) (rejecting a "due on sale" clause as an unreasonable restraint 
and against public policy); See also Ohms v. Church of the Nazarene, 64 Idaho 262, 130 P.2d 
679 (1942) (construing a contract clause in light of the disfavor of restrictions upon alienation o f  
real property). The BOCC's denial of KHD's Application, among other things, seriously 
impinges upon, and constrains KHD in the exercise of its rights regarding the use of its property. 
Landowners have a fundamental right to develop their land in such a way that realizes the 
economic viability of that land, within the restrictions of land use laws and limitations that 
protect the interests of other persons. To arbitrarily and capriciously deny KHD the right to 
develop this land prejudices KHD immensely, and comes without valid reason. 
11. KHD's site location, access and impact regarding State Highway 97 do not create 
insurmountable transportation problems sufficient to warrant denial of KHD's PUD. 
In the Hearing Examiner's Report of March 2, 2006, in which he recommended that the 
BOCC approve KHD's Preliminary PUD Application, the Hearing Examiner acknowledged that 
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KHD has proposed a safe and efficient transportation system for its development. (ROA, 1655). 
Both the BOCC and the Hearing Examiner indicate in their respective Findings of Fact that ITD 
recommended that KHD participates in the funding of the Route Development Plan for State 
Highway 97 (SH-97). (ROA, 1966 & 1646 respectively). In a Memo from Director Rand Wichman 
to the Hearing Examiner, dated February 14, 2006, Staff advised the Hearing Examiner that KHD 
has committed to financially participate in studies pertaining to SH-97 in the amount of One 
Hundred Eighty-five Dollars ($185.00) per proposed lot as recommended by the Kootenai 
Metropolitan Planning Organization [KMPO]. (ROA, 11 93-1 194). In their respective Reports, the 
Hearing Examiner and the BOCC discussed the comments they received from ITD and the East Side 
Highway District (ESHD), which has jurisdiction over the geographical area in which KHD7s 
property is located. (ROA, 1640-1 657 & 1 959 -1 975, respectively). 
In its Order of Decision, the BOCC acknowledges that the Project's proposed roads, trails 
and parking facilities within the Project constitute a safe and efficient transportation system which 
minimizes traffic congestion. (ROA, 1975). However, the BOCC hrther states it has "concerns 
with the proximity of the exits to one another. Additionally, the main transportation issue with this 
development is its location and access tied to Highway 97." (ROA, 1975). The foregoing is one of 
the BOCC's Conclusions of Law upon which it based its determination to deny KHD7s PUD 
Application. (ROA, 1974). 
Also found in the BOCC's Order of Decision is its discussion of the Plan's Transportation 
Goal 14 whereby KHD must "[plrovide for the efficient, safe, and cost-effective movement of 
people and goods." (ROA, 1973). In its analysis of this goal, the BOCC states, "[iln light of the 
public testimony, the personal experiences of the BOCC and the inconsistent positions taken by the 
ITD, this goal has not been met." Each of these issues is addressed below. (ROA, 1973). The 
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Court should note, however, the BOCC has failed to comply with I.C., Sec. 67-6535 which requires 
of the BOCC that: 
Approval or denial of any application (is) to be based upon standards and to be in 
writing. . . . 
(b) The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter 
shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the 
criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied 
upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable provisions 
of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent 
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record. 
The BOCC has failed to utilize any of the criteria required by the above statute to explain how 
and why KHD has failed to provide an "efficient, safe, and cost-effective" transportation system, 
particularly since it has already stated as a Conclusion of Law that KHD's transportation system 
"within the development . . . is safe, efficient and minimizes traffic congestion." (ROA, 1975). 
As it is undisputed that the transportation within the development is not at issue, the 
remaining issue and basis for denial as to transportation can only be the condition of SH-97 
With regard to SH-97, the BOCC states in its Order of Decision as follows: 
All of the road is narrow and its surface is not suitable for heavy traffic. '. . . 
trucks could not safely mix with auto traffic at any point on this road. More over, 
this amount of traffic would pulverize the road and turn it into a rutted impassable 
mess. (Exhibit HE-1002, Affidavit of Robert Martinez) (ROA, 1966, 2.20 & 
1885). 
The inclusion of this statement in those materials considered by the BOCC in its denial of 
KHD's Application is striking. It is especially puzzling considering the fact that there is no 
information as to who Robert Martinez is and what qualifications he may have to reach such a 
conclusion. Far worse, it is an incredible fact that the document containing this quote was actually 
submitted by William F. Boyd nine (9) years earlier in March of 1997 in opposition to a Zone 
Change and Conditional Use Permit regarding a proposed gravel pit to be located south of Moscow 
Bay. (ROA, 1877-1 903 and Exhibit HE-1 002). 
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This decade-old document appears to have been re-submitted by Mr. Boyd in opposition to 
KHD's proposed development and the BOCC quotes fi-om it in its Order of Decision as a basis for 
denying KHD's Application. (ROA, 1959-1975). It is interesting that the BOCC didn't even 
include the first two (2) sentences from the paragraph containing Mr. Martinez' quote, which state, 
"I observed the proposed haul road. A portion of it is public and a portion is private." (ROA, 
1885(e) (emphasis added). It is public knowledge that SH-97 is a public road and this fact should 
have been obvious to the BOCC. That the BOCC would even attempt to use this incredibly 
irrelevant information as support for its denial of KHD's Application is a clear example of the 
arbitrary and capricious nature of its actions in this case. 
It appears that the primary concern at issue with regard to the condition of SH-97 is that of 
its capacity to handle the traffic that may be generated by the KHD's PUD. Pursuant to studies 
conducted by the Kootenai Metropolitan Planning Organization (KMPO) and talung into 
consideration the road width, road design and speed, the carrying capacity of SH-97 is forty (40) 
vehicles per minute. This equates to twenty-four hundred (2,400) cars per hour. (07113106 HT, 
369:18 to 370:24). In 2005, KMPO conducted a Traffic lmpact Analysis (TIA) of SH-97 covering 
the distance from 1-90 south to Harrison, Idaho. The preliminary findings from the TIA were 
presented to the KMPO and ITD Board in July, 2005. 
This study found that in 2030, 9.8 vehicles per minute would travel SH-97, which means 
that only one-fourth (114) of SH-97's carrying capacity will be in use.6 The 9.8 vehicles per minute 
equate to five hundred eighty-eight (588) per hour as compared to the carrying papacity of 2,400 
vehicles per hour. (u.) (ROA, 2 17 1 - 2 172). This same study found that approximately twelve 
hundred (1,200) vehicles per day are currently using SH-97, with that figure increasing to over nine 
thousand (9,000) per day over the next twenty (20) years. (ROA, 2 17 1 - 2 172). 
9.8 vehicles per minute divlded by carrying capacity of 40 vehicles per minute equals 24.5% of carrying 
capacity is being used in the year 2030. T 2 
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KHD retained The Transpo Group to produce a TIA for the Project. (ROA, 1030-1082, 
1400-1402: Amendment to initial TIA). The study area was identified through coordination with 
ITD with the study focused on the two (2) access intersections connecting the Site with SH-97. The 
analysis was for the weekday morning and evening peak hours of adjacent street traffic and 
included the Gozzer Ranch project and additional, temporary traffic from developments to the north 
of SH-97. (ROA, 1032, 1035-1038). The Transpo Group figures were combined with the baseline 
figures to obtain expected traffic volumes reflecting the Chateau's impact. Analyses of the 
Project's impact at the time of estimated build-out in 2007 and in 2020 also were obtained: (ROA, 
1032-1046). The Transpo Group determined that the KHD Project will "generate only minor 
impacts when compared to baseline conditions during the years 2007 and 2020." These figures are 
estimates based on professionally accepted guidelines. (ROA, 1049). 
The foregoing is supported by the testimony of ITD's representative, Barbara Babic, at the 
Public Hearing on PUD-054-05 on July 13, 2006, wherein she answered Commissioner Currie's 
question regarding the capacity of SH-97 by stating that "it is not at or near capacity." (07113106 
HT, 0248:4-8). Having been told by ITD's representative; having heard the testimony of Michael 
Swensen from The Transpo Group, having received the Transportation Impact Analysis; and 
having received the Hearing Examiner's recommendation to approve KHD's Preliminary PUD 
Application, the BOCC still insisted that SH-97 is at or near capacity. 
A reading of the July 13, 2006, Public Hearing Transcript (07113106 HT, 205-389) shows 
that the BOCC relied heavily on amateur traffic studies of SH-97, on Commissioner Currie's own 
exparte study and on the Commissioners' personal experience driving SH-97, rather than on the 
reports and analyses of the professional agencies commissioned to make a determination as to this 
issue. At the July 2006 Public Hearing, citizens spoke of having conducted their own "traffic 
studies" but, of course, the citizens provided no evidence as to the standards used for their studies, 
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nor did they speak to the parameters, methodology, or accuracy of their testing. (07113106 HT, 
0279:20-23; HT, 0325:22 to 0327:24). 
As mentioned above, Commissioner Currie made it known at the July 27, 2006, hearing 
that he had conducted an ex parte traffic study of State Highway 97. (7127106 HT, 0394:8- 
0395:7). He also made it known, for the first time, that the BOCC apparently does not trust ITD 
and that ITD has no credibility with BOCC. (7127106 HT, 0396:2-19). Commissioner Currie's 
personal study is, at best, an unlawful exparte action (Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 
86 P.3d 494 (2004)) and, at worst, a sloppy and deliberate act that defies logic and has 
undermined the integrity of the BOCC's deliberations. Standing alone, this fact that the BOCC 
relied on Commissioner Currie's "findings" is enough to show the Court that the decision of the 
BOCC was arbitrary and capricious. 
Commissioner Currie stated as follows: 
Um, I did my own traffic study. I took a drive out there. And I made sure 
it was on the weekend where there was (sic) no trucks and it was um very, very late 
in the day so there was ah minimal amount of traffic. Speed limit on the road ah is 
45 miles an hour. Um, other than the yellow signs that change that, you cannot 
drive that road at 45 miles an hour. And I have - I tend to have a lead foot but I 
could not drive that road. I drove it twice. One very aggressively and I apology for 
that urn and one very conservatively. I and - I had my stop watch. I had to stop 
once to let-when 1 was aggressive, obviously, to let some cars get ahead of me so 
I could catch up again. But I also had to stop when I was driving conservatively. 
Obviously, there was people are (sic) driving more conservatively than me. (sic) 
So I have major concerns um with that. The capacity of - of - of the road was 
stated by the Highway District that it was not to capacity and it's, and it is not to 
capacity. But it's close. It is darn close to capacity . . . (07127106 HT, 0394:8- 
25). 
This interesting description of the status of SH-97's capacity begs the question: what are Mr. 
Currie's credentials that allow him to completely ignore the professional opinions to the contrary and 
make a determination that, despite all the scientific evidence to the contrary, the highway is close to 
capacity? 
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The three (3) individuals on the BOCC have the responsibility of determining how various 
individuals' lands can be used, based on applicable legal standards. As such, the BOCC must listen 
to, consider and take the advice of the experts they solicit for such information. Following are 
examples of the comments from the Agencies responsible for determining the appropriateness of the 
KHD project: 
a. Idaho Transportation Department 
In its July 26, 2005, letter (ROA, 1374-1375), the Idaho Transportation Department 
informed Staff that it agreed with the methodology and techmcal aspects of the Traffic Impact Study 
prepared by The Transpo Group and dated April, 2005. (ROA, 1030-1082 & 1400-1402). 
However, the one aspect lacking was a discussion of a grade separation which would allow traffic to 
flow from one side of the Project to the other without crossing SH-97. The grade separation issue is 
addressed below. ITD also recommended, as did JSMPO, that KHD participate financially in the 
SH-97 Corridor Study and the SH-97 Safety Study. 
In the Memo to the Hearing Examiner dated February 14,2006, Staff advised that KHD had 
willingly committed to financially participating in the studies pertaining to SH-97. (ROA, 1193- 
1 194). More specifically, in a June 2 1,2006, Memo from KHD to Staff, KHD stated: 
Following PUD approval, we will place in escrow approximately $1 58,000, 
as requested by JSMPO and the Idaho Transportation Department. That's our 
(KHD) share of the SH 97 Corridor Study and SH 97 Safety Project they plan to 
undertake. 
In addition to the recommended mitigation efforts by Kootenai County 
Building and Planning Department, KMPO and ITD, we (KHD) will deposit into 
escrow the entire amount necessary to provide for the completion of guard rails 
along Highway 97 between 1-90 and the top of the Beauty Bay grade where there 
currently are neither guard rails nor concrete barriers so as to provide increased 
safety for our neighbors, residents and the driving public. (ROA, 0052). 
Although in her September 15, 2005, letter (ROA, 0319-0320) to Mike Porcelli of ITD, 
Cheri Howell, the former Director of the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department and 
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KHD's initial Planner, included a list of amendments proposed for KHD's Preliminary PUD 
Application, she did not include discussions regarding a grade separation. Even though KHD 
pointed out that ITD traditionally does not require grade separations when the projected 20-year 
traffic impact is a Grade B, as is KHD's, on or about November 16,2005, KHD submitted to Staff 
its conceptual approaches to a grade separation design and an off-set intersection design as solutions 
to the cross development traffic flows. 
KHD also informed ITD that, due to economic reasons, it preferred the off-set intersection 
design. In a letter to Staff dated December 8, 2005 (ROA, 1371), ITD agreed to "continue 
consideration of both concepts and suggested that [KHD] prepare a presentation to be made to the 
ITD District encroachment permit committee. . ." (which KHD was doing). ITD further stated it 
"has no objection to proceeding with the preliminary approval steps in the development 
process." (ROA, 1371, emphasis added). However, ITD did "request that no final approvals be 
given until the final decision is made as to the design of the main access, and ITD is prepared to 
issue an encroachment permit." (ROA, 1371). ITD reiterated this stance in its June 21, 2006, letter 
to Staff. (ROA, 1369-1370). Again, KHD recognized the importance of complying with these 
suggestions and, in fact, agrees that a final determination on this issue is not appropriately made at 
the preliminary approval stage (which is where KHD was in the process when the BOCC issued its 
denial). 
As fiu-ther evidence of ITD's support of the project, a September 14,2005 letter from ITD's 
Division of Aeronautics, informed Staff that the Division had "reviewed the . . . heliport proposed 
for the Chateau de Loire subdivision . . . (and had) evaluated the proposed site and (could) find no 
immediate, potentially adverse impacts on general aviation in the surrounding area." Therefore, "the 
State of Idaho will not object to this heliport proposal." (ROA, 141 3). 
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Another important issue affecting ITD's review of KHD's project was that Staff led ITD to 
believe the July 13, 2006, Public Hearing was for the final approval on KHD's PUD Application 
when, in fact, the Application was only up for preliminary approval-this is especially relevant 
because KHD was still in the process of considering, and implementing requests made by ITD. 
ITD's letter to Staff dated June 21, 2006, assumed finality even though KHD was only at the 
Preliminary PUD Application stage. (ROA, 1369-1370). This confusion was cleared up when Mike 
Porcelli and Mike Swensen, Senior Transportation Engineer for The Transpo Group, consultant for 
KHD, spoke on July 6, 2006, and exchanged e-mails on July 7 and 10, 2006, wherein Mr. Porcelli 
informed Mr. Swensen that Mr. Wichrnan had requested the June 21,2006, letter from ITD. At the 
request of Mr. Swensen, Mr. Porcelli wrote a clarification letter to Staff stating that the completeness 
of KHD's submittals and their timing with regard to the various stages of the approval process is 
clearly "the call of the County", not ITD. (ROA, 1368). And, unfortunately, it seems that the 
County was calling for a more complete Application than is required by the Zoning Ordinance at the 
conceptual and preliminary stage. 
The BOCC arbitrarily and capriciously stuck to its position that "adding capacity (to SH-97) 
is not feasible" (ROA, 1971), and that KHD had not met the Transportation Goals, despite the fact 
that: (1) ITD has stated it does not object to KHD proceeding with the preliminary approval stage; 
(2) SH-97 is not even near capacity; (3) TIA has shown that the Project will have minimal impact on 
SH-97's traffic flow; (4) KHD has committed over Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) 
to fund SH-97 studies and safety features; (5) the Hearing Examiner has recommended that KHD's 
PUD be approved with conditions (ROA, 1640-1657); and (6) BOCC, itself, found that the 
transportation system within KHD's development is "safe, efficient and minimizes traffic 
congestion" (ROA, 1975). Even though KHD has managed each of the above, it would seem, as the 
BOCC has stated, that there truly are "no actions the Applicant could take to obtain a permit" (ROA, 
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1975). The question, then, must be asked . . . why not? It is common knowledge that other 
developments have been approved along SH-97 and all professional reports support preliminary 
approval of KHD's Application. 
b. East Side Highway District (ESHD) 
The ESHD has jurisdiction over the geographical area in which KHD's Project is located; 
and for this reason, KHD has worked closely with the ESHD and its personnel in developing roads 
and safety features for the Project. In a letter dated July 6, 2005, John Pankratz, ESHD District 
Supervisor, informed Staff that he had met with KHD's representatives, and the District's "Board of 
Commissioners feel that the applicant has addressed the Highway District concerns." The BOCC 
has been assured that the "private roads within the subdivision will be built to Highway District 
standards. . . (and) the board will grant a variance to allow a twenty-four foot (24') paved width 
due to the terrain." (ROA, 1430). 
In a letter dated September 6,2005, (ROA, 1392), the ESHD informed Staff it had reviewed 
and accepted KHD's fifteen (15) changes to its Preliminary PUD Application. The ESHD also 
advised Staff in its September 17,2005, letter that it has "reviewed not only the road layout, but also 
slope and cross sections of the road network and approve of the design included in (KHD's) 
Application." It also advised in a letter to Staff dated March 22,2006, (ROA, 1378), that the ESHD 
found it was not necessary for KHD to build an access road through the subdivision to allow access 
"to private lands lying adjacent to or beyond the subdivision . . ." The ESHD was also aware that 
KHD had been requested by KMPO and ITD to share in the funding of the SH-97 Corridor Study 
and the SH-97 Safety Study, which it knew KHD was prepared to do. Finally, John Pankratz stated 
at the Public Hearing, "I would just like to make a statement that, ah, the developer has worked 
really closely with the commissioners of the East Side Highway District and they have met the 
requirements that we have set on them and that's all I have to say." (02116106 HT, 0192:9-13). 
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Considering this positive feedback from the Agencies that Staff contacted to solicit 
comments on KHD's Preliminary PUD Application with regard to the transportation and access 
issues, there is no viable reason for the BOCC to have concluded that KHD's Application must be 
denied with no recourse to meet and satisfy conditions as recommended by the Hearing Examiner. 
(ROA, 1957-1975: denial; 1656-1657: conditions). 
c. East Side Fire Protection District (ESFD) 
The ESFD has jurisdiction over the geographical area in which KHD's Project is located; 
and for this reason, KHD has worked closely with the ESFD and its personnel in developing a 
facility for an emergency vehicle and personnel to be present in close proximity to the Project's 
residences and with regard to safety features for the Project. In a July 19, 2005, Memo (ROA, 
1422), to Staff from Captain Michael Brannan, Fire Marshall for the District, the Captain laid out 
concerns and suggestions the District had with KHD's PUD Application. These were reviewed by 
KHD and it has already acted upon many of them. For example, the heliport is a part of KHD's 
PUD Application as is the offer to the Fire District to use the golf cart paths for its emergency 
responses. KHD's PUD Application also includes the construction of a facility to house an ESFD 
emergency vehicle and personnel. 
Captain Brannan sent a Memo to Staff on August 22,2005, in which he advised Staff he had 
met with KHD's representatives and had reviewed KHD's new plans for the Project. These plans 
show "roads on both sides of the project, which make the subdivision more contiguous in its traffic 
flow. . ." The Captain stated that the new plans as well as "the use of golf cart paths for emergency 
access is acceptable." (ROA, 1417). Capt. Brannan further stated, "[tlhere is only one place that 
grade will be above lo%, and that is to be mitigated by building a turnout along that section, whch  
is acceptable according to International Fire Code." (ROA, 14 17). 
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Even though the ESFD has stated it accepts KHD's conceptual plans, will continue to work 
with the Project's representatives and found only one place where the grade is over ten percent 
(lo%), the BOCC chose to ignore any of the ESFD statements and, instead, somehow arrived at the 
conclusion that the area where many homes are proposed to be built has slopes of fifteen percent 
(15%) or greater and would not meet the ESFD standards, which is, of course, absolutely false. 
(ROA, 1975). 
d. County Sheriff and County Emergency Medical Sewices (EMS) 
In a letter to KHD fi-om the County Sheriffs Department dated September 2, 2005, Captain 
Ben Wolfinger of the Support Service Bureau stated that he "appreciate(d) the fact that [KHD] not 
only addressed, but exceeded [his] requests for emergency routes in [KI-ID's] proposal." Captain 
Wolfinger hrther stated, "After reviewing all of the proposed amendments, I completely endorse 
your plans . . ." (ROA, 2 1 9 1, emphasis original). 
As the above communications show, none of the agencies responsible for ensuring the safety 
of the residents of the area are concerned about whether the emergency services and facilities 
necessary to serve the development will be readily available. KHD has worked closely with each of 
these organizations to ensure their approval of the safety aspects of the development. 
Beginning on October 20, 2005, there had been two (2) Hearings before the Hearing 
Examiner, a Public Hearing conducted by the BOCC and three (3) Deliberation Meetings by the 
BOCC. The last Meeting was held July 27, 2006, and it was at that Hearing when the BOCC 
denied KHD's PUD Application. Despite this extensive communication, it was not until that final 
Hearing that KHD learned that the BOCC does not trust ITD. 
At that Meeting, Commissioner Currie stated, 
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I am not going to approve another development when IDT (sic) says that 
um we will work this out later because IDT (sic) has some good rules and I agree 
with most of their rules but the problem being is once we approve it, then their 
rules change and we're left holding the bag and I'm not going to have that happen 
again. So, ah, so if you haven't ah got my drift, I am not going to support this 
development. (07/27/06 HT, 396:2-9). 
No inconsistencies have been present as to ITD's position with regard to KHD's application. 
ITD's three (3) major concerns throughout this process have been: 
1. The need for additional discussion to determine the best way to address the flow of 
traffic across SH-97, as the Site straddles the highway. Currently, there are two proposals relating to 
this issue, and KHD has agreed with ITD that it is appropriate to make a final decision as to which 
proposal is safest when the development is closer to the construction phase. It is then that ITD's 
Encroachment Committee will be able give final approval based on which proposal is the safest; 
2. The need for an updated Traffic Impact Study and confirmation that KHD is 
participating in the funding with KMPO of studies of SH-97. It is undisputed that KHD will put the 
required money in Escrow for the use by the KMPO upon it receiving approval to proceed with the 
project; and 
3. The concern that no final approval of the Project should be given to KHD until the 
conditions proposed by ITD are met. 
These concerns have been consistently expressed by ITD throughout the Application process and 
KHD has consistently cooperated with ITD to resolve each of its concerns as KHD shares the goal of 
achieving the highest level of safely possible. 
Every professional entity involved in determining the appropriateness of this project at the 
Site has made a determination that, once final safety issues have been decided, the Site is appropriate 
for the proposed development. To completely ignore these findings and rely instead on the 
completely inappropriate actions of one of the commissioners, and the unsubstantiated opinions of 
3 6 
Appellant's Brief 
citizens, is unquestionably arbitrary. There is a glaring lack of significant evidence in the Record to 
support denying the PUD on the basis of SH-97. Further, to inform KHD at the time of denying its 
PUD Application that the BOCC has no trust in ITD is inherently unfair and reflective of its lack of 
interest in following the dictates of the process. This is especially true considering the fact that it 
was the BOCC itself that requested that ITD review KHD's Application, and in fact, the BOCC 
requested a continuance at one point in the process to allow more time to gather information from 
ITD. 
111. There is no proposed mining operation, and therefore, there has been no mining 
information about which the Department of Environmental Quality should have been 
made aware. 
In its Conclusions of Law section of its Order of Decision, the BOCC states that KHD's 
"proposed conceptual PUD is not in compliance with the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance . . . 
because:" (ROA, 1974, 6.01) ". . . it appears that DEQ was not made aware of the Applicant's 
desire to perform on site mining operations." (ROA, 1975, 6.07). The BOCC firther states that 
evidence found in Exhibit HE-1002 points out "that this area is not suitable for mining operations 
such as are proposed by the Applicant." (ROA, Id.). 
As was discussed above in the section regarding to SH-97, Exhibit HE-1002 is a ten ( I  0) 
year old document that is not even remotely related to the Application that was before the 
BOCC. In any event, KHD has read the document listed as Exhibit HE-1002 and cannot find 
the quotation attributed to it by the BOCC. Simply put, KHD has never included in any of its 
proposals any language concerning mining operations. KHD has not had and does not now 
have plans to do any mining on the Site. 
The BOCC raised the issue that, in none of its communications does the DEQ address the 
"mining" issue. There was a simple answer. There is no mining issue and has never been one for 
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the DEQ to address. As stated, KHD has never raised the issue and has no intention of performing 
any mining operations on the Site. 
The Comment letters received from the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) 
regarding KHD's Preliminary PUD Application have been favorable and have not addressed 
mining. Rather, they have concerned drinking water and the storage of the Project's wastewater. 
For example, in its April 8, 2005, letter to the Building and Planning Department, Gary Gaffney, 
P.E., stated that "the proposed drinking water system employing the selected surface water source 
should be capable of supplying a sufficient quantity of safe drinking water to the .proposed 
population of thls development." (ROA, 1445). This position taken by the DEQ was also reflected 
in its August 4, 2005, letter to KI-ID in which Mr. Gaffney stated that "the proposed drinking water 
and sanitary sewage systems outlined in the application . . . appear to be feasible." (ROA, 1418- 
1419). 
IV. Chateau de Loire will not exceed 475 residential units. 
Staff has expressed concerns about what it perceives to be discrepancies between KHD's 
PUD Narrative and the Site Layout. In the Narrative, KHD is requesting no more than four 
hundred seventy-five (475) residential units and a small commercial area, which Staff asked 
KHD to include in its Plan. Staff is correct that in the Site Plan KHD has accounted for only 
four hundred five (405) units, however, since this is only the preliminary PUD stage, there is no 
requirement to delineate all actual lots or prepare plats designating and locating the 475 units, nor 
would it be logical or efficient to do so, as such plans certainly change during the .actual 
construction phase of any project. 
KHD has submitted a conceptual layout showing possible lot line delineations for a total 
of three hundred fifteen (3 15) residential lots and ninety (90) condos, but until the PUD approval 
process is completed, these figures may change which could change the figures for the 
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SubdivisionIPlat Preliminary Application. (ROA, 01 09-01 10) The exact delineation of lots and 
then the numbers will be set out, as is standard, in KHD's Subdivision/Plat Application. (ROA, 
0301 -0304, 01 08-01 10) 
Because the proposed development will have less than half of the permissible number of 
units, and will use already cleared land for its golf course, and because it is committed to 
preserve the integrity of the natural beauty of the Site, the PUD will ensure the project is 
compatible with the surrounding area. 
V. KHD's right to due process has been violated by the BOCC. 
There have been violations of KHD's right to due process throughout this preliminary 
approval process. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution entitles a person to 
an impartial and disinterested tribunal. "This requirement applies to the Court as well as to state 
administrative agencies charged with applying eligibility criteria for licenses." Stivers v. Pierce, 
71 F.3d 732 (9'" Cir. 1995). Decisions by a zoning board applying general rules or specific 
polices to specific individuals, interests or situations are quasi-judicial and subject to due process 
constraints. Coooer v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407,4 1 1, 6 14 
P.2d 947, 95 1 (1980). Bias of a board member or a commissioner renders his participation in the 
due process hearing constitutionally unacceptable, and the reviewing Court must determine the 
effect of the conflicted vote in order to assure impartial decision-making and to avoid the 
appearance of impropriety. Floyd v. Board of Commissioners of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 
718, 726, 52 P.3d 863, 871 (2002); Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494, 
495 (2004). 
Commissioner Currie announced at the July 27, 2006, Deliberation Meeting that he had 
conducted his own traffic study. However, he did not supply the Parties with a copy of any 
report gleaned from his observation. More important is the fact that pursuant to Article 15, 
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Section 15.08(14) a traffic impact study will be made part of the PUD Application when 
requested by a road agency or the Director. The information presented to the BOCC by citizens 
who conducted their own "studies" are not valid and the BOCC should not have given them any 
weight just as Commissioner Currie's "study" should not have been given any weight. The 
BOCC has to base its decision on the Record and not on matters outside the Record. (Eacret, at 
784). Commissioner Currie's information cannot be considered part of the record because it was 
an improper exparte action, impermissible by law as no notice was given that he had viewed the 
site at issue and had done his own study of the traffic on the highway. Notice must be given to 
the Public if a viewing is to take place so that all interested parties could have the opportunity to 
rebut facts derived from the visit that may come to bear on the decision and create an appearance 
of bias. (Id. at 786). The amateur studies should never have been considered because they have 
no underlying scientific basis and have been presented without any underlying supporting data. 
Unfortunately, that bell has already been rung and the damage caused cannot be undone. 
Further, the BOCC continually asked for more detailed reports, plats, and information than is 
normally required at the preliminary stage. The BOCC's comments that it was not going to apply 
the same criteria to Chateau de Loire as it did to Gozzer Ranch is just another example of the 
BOCC's bias andlor obvious appearance of bias. As early cited, the BOCC stated in its Order and 
Decision the following which is highly prejudicial to KHD: 
[Quoting the Hearing Examiner] "1 see little difference between the recently 
approved Gozzer Ranch PUD and the Chateau de Loire PUD with regard to the 
impact to Highway 97 and the impact on the existing character of the area." The 
problem with this logic is that it leads to an entitlement mentality. To state what all 
parties know, each application is different and is decided on its own merits. 
Whether or not the Gozzer Ranch PUD should have been approved is not the issue 
before us. The issue before us now is whether or not this PUD fits within the 
character of the area and whether or not Highway 97 is capable of safely 
accommodating the proposal. (ROA, 1971). 
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The BOCC has missed the point by citing the above. Yes, all applications are to be decided 
on the merits but what is used as a standard to determine if the merits exist must be evenly and fairly 
I 
applied to each applicant. This is not the situation in the instant case. The "entitlement mentality" 
actually held by KHD is the same as any landowner should have; that it is entitled to be treated fairly 
and to have its Application considered using the same criteria that has been applied to other 
developments. 
KHD also claims that pursuant to 42 USC 1983, its substantial rights have been 
prejudiced because it has a right under the Statute and the 1 4 ' ~  Amendment to a have its property 
right protected. The irrational behavior of the BOCC in not colnplying with the Statutes and 
Ordinances of the State of Idaho and the County of Kootenai and denying KHD's Preliminary 
PUD Application without setting forth, as did the Hearing Examiner, any conditions it could 
attempt to meet in order to have its Application accepted, allowing it to move on to the next stage 
of the process, is a taking of KHD's property without due compensation and in violation of its 
right to due process. See Furlong Companies, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 189 S.W.3d 157, 170 
(2006). 
VI. KHD is entitled to have the BOCC provide it with a list of actions it can take to 
obtain approval. 
The BOCC is required by ordinance to provide an applicant with what conditions it would 
impose, or with a list of actions the applicant could take to obtain approval. The BOCC in the 
present case stated in its Order of Decision that there is no action KHD could take to obtain 
approval. (ROA, 1974-1975). Looking at what the BOCC presents clearly as the two main 
issues which led, however erroneously, to denial by the BOCC, it seems that the BOCC most 
certainly should have complied with this requirement. If the BOCC had a legitimate issue with 
KHD's supposed lack of compliance with the Comp Plan, it could have listed an action KHD 
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could take to obtain approval. For example, the BOCC could have required that KHD obtain a 
Comp Plan Amendment. As to SH-97, the BOCC could have made any number of restrictions: 
limit the number of large trucks that KHD could cause to be on the road, require KHD build an 
overpass over SH-97 where the property is divided by the highway, or even require KHD to 
disproportionately contribute to improving the safety of the highway. There is no requirement 
that the BOCC provide a list of actions that is efficient or economically feasible, but KHD is 
entitled to have such a list to determine the efficiency and feasibility itself and, the fact is, the 
BOCC provided nothing. Not even one suggestion was made as to how KHD could achieve 
approval. 
CONCLUSION 
The BOCC deliberately used irrelevant and immaterial information to form its purported 
basis for denying KHD's preliminary PUD Application. The BOCC's decision is erroneous and 
not based on substantial evidence when such evidence is viewed in light of the Record. As such, 
the decision is arbitrary and capricious and KHD has had its rights prejudiced. 
The BOCC's erroneous rulings have resulted in KHD being forced to retain local counsel in 
order to pursue an appeal and have also caused considerable delays in KHD7s project plans. KHD 
is entitled, pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-1 17, to recover its attorney fees as a result of the BOCC's 
improper actions requiring it to proceed with this appeal. 
If this Court agees with the Appellant and deems KHD's appeal meritorious and remands 
to the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (BOCC), it should reverse the BOCC's denial, 
and order that KHD's Preliminary PUD Application be approved. In the alternative, the Court 
should remand the matter to the BOCC so that KHD's Preliminary PUD Application will have the 
opportunity to be considered in light of the Record, and applicable law, as other area developinents 
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applications have been. Finally, if the Court denies KHD's appeal, the Court should nonetheless 
order compensation to KHD as a result of the BOCC's regulatory taking. 
DATED this &day of ~ecember,  2006. 
GLEN WALKER LAW FIRM 
Glen E. Walker 
Kacey L. Wall 
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Attorneys for Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on 
this day of December, via hand-delivery to the following: 
John Cafferty 
Kootenai County 
Department of Legal Services 
45 1 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 838 16-9000 
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Furlong Companies, Inc, v. City of Kansas - 4 141 In General 
CityMo.2006. 4 14k5 Source and Scope of Power 
Supreme Court of Missouri,En Banc. 41 4k5.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
FURLONG COMPANIES, INC., Respondent, The governmental body has great latitude regarding 
v. zoning. 
CITY OF KANSAS CITY, Missouri, Appellant. 
No. SC 86741.' Zoning and Planning 414 -245 
March 2 1,2006. 
Rehearing Denied May 2,2006. 
Background: Developer brought mandamus action 
against city, seeking an order compelling the city to 
approve its plat application and seeking damages 
under $ 1983. The Circuit Court, Jackson County, 
Justine E. Del Muro, J., found in favor of developer. 
City appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, William Ray Price, 
Jr., J., held that: 
a circuit court was not limited to review of evidence 
in administrative record; 
QJ substantial evidence supported trial court's finding 
that city's decision was unlawful, unreasonable, and 
arbitrary; 
122 city's conduct violated Q 1983; and 
(4J substantial evidence supported finding that 
developer suffered $174,871 as a result of delay in 
plat approval. 
Affirmed as modified. 
West Headnotes 
Zoning and Planning 414 -1 
414 Zoning and Planning 
4141 In General 
4 14kl k. Nature in General. Most Cited Cases 
"Zoning" is the exercise of legislative authority as to 
what land uses are in the interest of the public for 
particular areas within the political subdivision. 
U Zoning and Planning 414 -5.1 
414 Zoning and Planning 
Construction, Operation and Effect 
4 14V(A) In General 
414k245 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans, 
Regulations in General. Most Cited Cases 
"Plat approval" is the ministerial application of 
zoning requirements, uniformly, to all particular 
parcels within the zoned area. 
Zoning and Planning 414 -375.1 
4 1 4 Zoning and Planning 
-
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
4 14VIII(A) In General 
414k375 Right to Permission, and 
Discretion 
414k375.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
A municipality has far less latitude regarding a 
decision on plat approval than a decision on zoning, 
as each landowner is entitled to equal application of 
the zoning and planning laws applicable to his 
property. 
Zoning and Planning 414 -355 
4 14 Zoning and Planning 
-
4 14VII Administration in General 
4 14k353 Powers, Duties, and Liabilities 
414k355 k. Legislative, Judicial, or Quasi- 
Judicial Power. Most Cited Cases 
When proceeding under the subdivision ordinance, 
the plan commission and the city council are acting in 
an administrative capacity and not in a legislative 
capacity. 
Zoning and Planning 414 -375.1 
4 14 Zoning and Planning 
-
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
4 14VIII(A) In General 
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414k375 Right to Permission, and 
Discretion 
414k375.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Zoning and Planning 414 -381.5 
4 14 Zoning and Planning 
-
4 14V111 Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
4 14VIII(A) In General 
4 14k378 Grounds for Grant or Denial 
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans, 
Conformity to Regulations. Most Cited Cases 
The law does not permit administrative bodies to 
exercise an arbitrary and subjective authority over the 
granting or denying of subdivision plats; the exercise 
of discretion and judgment vested in the 
administrative body is to determine whether a plan 
meets the zoning or subdivision requirements. 
Zoning and Planning 414 -381.5 
4 14 Zoning and Planning 
-
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
4 14VIII(A) In General 
4 14k378 Grounds for Grant or Denial 
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans, 
Conformity to Regulations. Most Cited Cases 
It is not a discretion of the planning commission and 
the city council to approve a plan that does not meet 
the zoning or subdivision requirements. 
Zoning and Planning 414 -375.1 
414 Zoning and Planning 
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
4 14VIII(A1 In General 
414k375 Right to Permission, and 
Discretion 
414k375.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Neither the planning commission nor the city council 
has the authority to deny a subdivision plat that 
complies with the subdivision ordinance; if the plat 
complies, then it is the ministerial duty of the 
commission and the council to approve it, and they 
have no discretion to deny it. 
Mandamus 250 -87 
250 Mandamus 
-
25011 Subjects and Purposes of Relief 
250II(B) Acts and Proceedings of Public 
Officers and Boards and Municipalities 
250k87 k. Proceedings to Procure and Grant 
or Revoke Licenses, Certificates, and Permits. Most 
Cited Cases 
Zoning and Planning 414 -375.1 
414 Zoning and Planning 
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
4 14VIII(A) In General 
414k375 Right to Permission, and 
Discretion 
414k375.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
The approval of a preliminary plat that meets the 
subdivision and zoning requirements is a ministerial 
act, and mandamus is the proper remedy in seeking to 
review the denial of such a plat. 
JlOJ Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
-470 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
-
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative 
Agencies, Officers and Agents 
1 5AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
1 5Ak469 Hearing 
15Ak470 k. Necessity and Purpose in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
"Contested cases" under the Missouri Administrative 
Procedure Act provide the parties with an opportunity 
for a formal hearing with the presentation of 
evidence, including sworn testimony of witnesses and 
cross-examination of witnesses, and require written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. V.A.M.S. tj 
536.010(4). 
llfl Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
-681.1 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
-
Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions 
1 5AV(A) In General 
15Ak68 1 Further Review 
15Ak681.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Administrative Law and Procedure 15A -682 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
-
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions 
1 5AV(A) In General 
15Ak68 1 Further Review 
O 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
(Cite as: 189 S.W.3d 157) 
Page 3 
15Ak682 k. Record. Most Cited Cases 
The trial court's decision in reviewing a contested 
case under the Missouri Administrative Procedure 
Act is appealable, but the appellate court also looks 
back to the record created before the administrative 
body. V.A.M.S. 6 536.140. 
1121 Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
-470 
& Administrative Law and Procedure 
1 5AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative 
Agencies, Officers and Agents 
1 SAIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15Ak469 Hearing 
15Ak470 k. Necessity and Purpose in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Administrative Law and Procedure 15A -676 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
-
Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions 
15AV(A) In General 
15Ak676 k. Record. Most Cited Cases 
Non-contested cases do not require formal 
proceedings or hearings before the administrative 
body; as such, there is no record required for review. 
1131 Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
-676 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
-
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions 
15AV(A) In General 
15Ak676 k. Record. Most Cited Cases 
Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
-744.1 
j5tJ Administrative Law and Procedure 
Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions 
1 5AV(D) Scope of Review in General 
15Ak744 Trial De Novo 
15Ak744.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
In the review of a non-contested decision, the circuit 
court does not review the administrative record, but 
hears evidence, determines facts, and adjudges the 
validity of the agency decision. V.A.M.S. 6 
536.150(1). 
1141 Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
-665.1 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
-
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions 
1 5AV(A) In General 
15Ak665 Right of Review 
15Ak665.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Administrative Law and Procedure 15A -676 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
-
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions 
1 5AV(A) In General 
15Ak676 k. Record. Most Cited Cases 
Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
-744.1 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
-
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions 
1 5AV(D) Scope of Review in General 
15Ak744 Trial De Novo 
15Ak744.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
In 'either a contested or a non-contested case the 
private litigant is entitled to challenge the 
governmental agency's decision; the difference is 
simply that in a contested case the private litigant 
must try his or her case before the agency, and 
judicial review is on the record of that administrative 
trial, whereas in a non-contested case the private 
litigant tries his or her case to the court. V.A.M.S. $ 
4 536.100, 536.140. 
1151 Mandamus 250 -12 
250 Mandamus 
Nature and Grounds in General 
250k12 k. Nature of Acts to Be Commanded. 
Most Cited Cases 
The purpose of the extraordinary writ of mandamus 
is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty 
that one charged with the duty has refused to 
perform. 
1161 Mandamus 250 -12 
250 Mandamus 
2501 Nature and Grounds in General 
-
O 2006 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
(Cite as: 189 S.W.3d 157) 
Page 4 
250k12 k. Nature of Acts to Be Commanded. 
Most Cited Cases 
The writ of mandamus can only be issued to compel 
a party to act when it was his duty to act without it. 
1171 Mandamus 250 -12 
250 Mandamus 
-
Nature and Grounds in General 
250k12 k. Nature of Acts to Be Commanded. 
Most Cited Cases 
A writ of mandamus confers upon the party against 
whom it may be issued no new authority, and from its 
very nature can confer none. 
1181 Mandamus 250 -10 
250 Mandamus 
-
a Nature and Grounds in General 
250k10 k. Nature and Existence of Rights to 
Be Protected or Enforced. Most Cited Cases 
A litigant asking relief by mandamus must allege and 
prove that he has a clear, unequivocal, specific right 
to a thing claimed; he must show hmself possessed 
of a clear and legal right to the remedy. 
1191 Mandamus 250 -12 
250 Mandamus 
-
250I Nature and Grounds in General 
250k12 k. Nature of Acts to Be Commanded. 
Most Cited Cases 
Mandamus does not issue except in cases where the 
ministerial duty sought to be coerced is definite, 
arising under conditions admitted or proved and 
imposed by law. 
1201 Mandamus 250 -87 
250 Mandamus 
-
Subjects and Purposes of Relief 
2501I(B) Acts and Proceedings of Public 
Officers and Boards and Municipalities 
250k87 k. Proceedings to Procure and Grant 
or Revoke Licenses, Certificates, and Permits. Most 
Cited Cases 
If a subdivision plat complies with the requirements 
of the subdivision statute or ordinance, mandamus 
may compel approval of the plat; if the plat does not 
comply, mandamus is unavailable and improper. 
1211 Appeal and Error 30 -1032(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
-
30XVI Review 
30XVI(Q Harmless Error 
30XVI(J)I In General 
30k1032 Burden to Show Prejudice from 
Error 
30k1032(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Merely asserting error without malung a showing of 
how that error was somehow prejudicial is not 
sufficient for reversal. 
J2J Mandamus 250 @=;;3168(3) 
250 Mandamus 
-
350111 Jurisdiction, Proceedings, and Relief 
350k168 Evidence 
250k168(3) k. Admissibility of Gidence. 
Most Cited Cases 
In mandamus action that sought order requiring city 
to approve plat application, developer had the right to 
adduce any evidence relevant to proving that it 
presented the city with sufficient evidence to show 
that it met the requirements for preliminary approval; 
city did not conduct preliminary plat hearing as a 
contested case, and thus, the circuit court was not 
limited to review of evidence in administrative 
record. V.A.M.S. 6 536.150(1]. 
1231 Mandamus 250 -168(3) 
250 Mandamus 
-
250111 Jurisdiction, Proceedings, and Relief 
250k168 Evidence 
250k168(3) k. Admissibility of Evidence. 
Most Cited Cases 
In a mandamus proceeding, any competent evidence 
tending to establish, or in any way affecting, the right 
of the relator or duty of respondent, and within the 
allegations of the petition and writ, is admissible. 
1241 Mandamus 250 -1 
250 Mandamus 
-
2501 Nature and Grounds in General 
-
250kI k. Nature and Scope of Remedy in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Under the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, 
mandamus is generally not available if the 
proceeding was tried as a contested case before an 
administrative body. V.A.M.S. t; 536.150. 
1251 Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
-676 
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Administrative Law and Procedure 
I SAV Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions 
I 5AV(A) In General 
15Ak676 k. Record. Most Cited Cases 
In reviewing agency action in a non-contested case, 
the evidentiary standard "as may be properly 
adduced" is not limited to a review of the 
administrative record; this is because in such 
proceedings the parties were not afforded the ability 
to create a record upon which viable review could 
occur. V.A.M.S. 4 536.150/1). 
1261 Zoning and Planning 414 -381.5 
414 Zoning and Planning 
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
4 14VIII(A) In General 
414k378 Grounds for Grant or Denial 
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans, 
Conformity to Regulations. Most Cited Cases 
Substantial evidence supported trial court's finding 
that the city's decision to deny approval of 
developer's preliminary plat was unlawful, 
unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious; traffic study 
indicated that the development would not impact 
traffic, city planner testified that the staclung 
requirement for cars at proposed car wash was 
satisfied, plat complied with lot depth to width ratio 
requirements, developer agreed to satisfy the 
conditions as proposed by the city staff, and city's 
attorney advised that the city could not legally deny 
preliminary plat. 
1271 Constitutional Law 92 -251.3 
92 Constitutional Law 
-
92XII Due Process of Law 
92k25 1.3 k. Reasonableness or Arbitrariness; 
Rational Basis and Relation to Object. Most Cited 
Cases 
Constitutional Law 92 -277(1) 
92 Constitutional Law 
a
92XII Due Process of Law 
92k277 Property and Rights Therein Protected 
92k277(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
There are two elements that must be established to 
prevail on a due process claim under (j 1983; first, a 
claimant must establish a protected property interest 
to which the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
protection applies, and a claimant must also establish 
that the governmental action was truly irrational. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14;42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983. 
1281 Civil Rights 78 -1031 
78 Civil Rights 
a
781 Rights Protected and Discrimination 
~ r o r b i t e d  in General 
78k1030 Acts or Conduct Causing Deprivation 
78k1031 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
The truly irrational standard for government action in 
a (i 1983 claim is something more than arbitrary, 
capricious, or in violation of state law. 42 U.S.C.A. $ 
1983. 
1291 Constitutional Law 92 -278.2(1) 
92 Constitutional Law 
a
Due Process of Law 
92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Planning 
Regulations 
92k278.2(1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Zoning and Planning 414 -381.5 
4 14 Zoning and Planning 
-
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
4 i 4VIII(A) In General 
414k378 Grounds for Grant or Denial 
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans, 
Conformity to Regulations. Most Cited Cases 
City's conduct in denying developer preliminary plat 
approval was truly irrational in violation of 
developer's due process rights and entitled developer 
to relief under & 1983, where the city plan 
commission ignored the advice of the plats review 
committee recommending approval, developer's 
attempts to learn the reasons for the denial were 
rebuffed and it was never afforded any opportunity to 
amend or correct the preliminary plat, and once the 
plat was brought before the city council, the council 
subjected developer to numerous delays and denied 
approval despite the fact that the city's attorney 
advised the city that it could not legally deny the 
preliminary plat. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; 42 
U.S.C.A. !j 1983. 
1301 Civil Rights 78 -1071 
78 Civil Rights 
-
781 Rights Protected and Discrimination 
prohibited in General 
78k107 1 k. Property Rights. Most Cited Cases 
When government acts with intentional disregard of 
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its own valid law, knowing that its actions deprive 
individuals of their property rights, such action is 
truly irrational for purposes of 9 1983 claim. 42 
U.S.C.A. 6 1983. 
1311 Civil Rights 78 -1031 
78 Civil Rights 
-
781 Rights Protected and Discrimination 
prohibited in General 
78k1030 Acts or Conduct Causing Deprivation 
78k103 1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Causation is an essential element of a 4 1983 action. 
42 U.S.C.A. 6 1983. 
1321 Civil Rights 78 -1464 
78 Civil Rights 
-
78111 Federal Remedies in General 
-
78k1458 Monetary Relief in General 
78k1464 k. Measure and Amount. Most 
Cited Cases 
Substantial evidence supported a finding in 
developer's S; 1983 action against city based on city's 
failure to approve preliminary plat that city's delay in 
approving plat resulted in damages to developer 
amounting to $174,871, where delay resulted in loan 
fees that were incurred as the terms of the project 
were revised based on the city's conduct, delay 
required property to be hydroseeded to prevent 
erosion, and it resulted in commercial economic 
damages. 42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983. 
1331 Civil Rights 78 -1462 
78 Civil Rights 
78111 Federal Remedies in General 
-
78k1458 Monetary Relief in General 
78k1462 k. Grounds and Subjects; 
Compensatory Damages. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence was not sufficient to support finding in 
developer's 4 1983 action against city for city's 
failure to approve preliminary plat that $50,000 loan 
that developer took from his retirement account was 
used to pay expenses that were attributable to the 
city's delay in approving the plat, and thus, the loan 
was not allowable as delay damages. 42 U.S.C.A. $ 
1983. 
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I. Introduction 
The City of Kansas City, Missouri, appeals from a 
judgment in mandamus directing that it grant a 
preliminary plat to Furlong Companies, Inc. and 
awarding actual damages of $224,871.00 and 
attorney's fees in the amount of $148,435.20 against 
the city under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 arising from 
the denial of the plat. The city complains that the 
trial court improperly engaged in de novo review 
applicable to noncontested case matters under the 
Missouri Administrative Procedure Act. Section 
5 3 6 . 1 5 0 . ~  The city contends that the review should 
have been limited to the' record before the city 
council because the proceeding was one in 
mandamus. The city also contends that the evidence 
was not sufficient to support the 42 U.S.C. section 
1983 judgment against it. 
FNI. All state statutory references are to 
RSMo 2000. 
The trial court's judgment granting mandamus and 
awarding actual damages and attorney's fees is 
affirmed as modified. 
11. Facts 
Furlong owned 2.76 acres of real property located in 
Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, on the north 
side of Red Bridge Road near Holmes Road. The 
property is located in an area that is zoned for 
intermediate business, high buildings. Furlong 
intended to subdivide the land into three lots and 
develop it for commercial use, with the land 
ultimately to contain two fast food restaurants and a 
car wash. Furlong *I61 purchased the property 
largely because of the established favorable zoning, 
which would allow for the intended uses without the 
difficulty of rezoning. 
Furlong's plan for development of the land was to 
first construct a car wash and, once the land was 
finally platted and properly subdivided, sell or lease 
the other two tracts of land for the construction of 
fast food restaurants. The proceeds from the sale or 
lease of the subdivided tracts would then be used to 
repay or offset Furlong's purchase and construction 
loans. Prior to completing the platting process, 
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Furlong entered into a contract to sell one of the 
tracts to a developer for the construction of a 
Wendy's restaurant and entered into a contract to 
lease the other tract to a developer for the 
construction of a Sonic drive-in. The terms of these 
contracts required that the land be properly and 
finally platted and subdivided before construction. 
On October 1, 1999, Furlong filed an application for 
approval of a preliminary plat for the property with 
the city. On November 3, 1999, Furlong and its 
engineers met with the city's plats review committee 
to receive comments on the preliminary plat. The 
committee reviewed Furlong's application and 
suggested certain conditions that needed to be met 
prior to approval. On December 7, 1999, at a public 
hearing, city staff recommended that the city plan 
commission approve the preliminary plat application 
subject to the conditions. Furlong agreed to all of 
the conditions of approval set forth by city staff. 
Notwithstanding the city staffs recommendation, the 
commission voted to deny Furlong's preliminary plat 
application. The commission did not issue findings 
of fact and conclusions of law as to why Furlong's 
application was denied. 
City staff told Furlong that they could not discuss the 
denial of the application "for fear of litigation." 
Furlong attempted to submit a revised preliminary 
plat reflecting compliance with the conditions, but 
city staff refbsed to accept it. Furlong then requested 
that the plat application be submitted to the city 
council. On February 3, 2000, a proposed ordinance 
reflecting Furlong's preliminary plat application was 
introduced to the city council for first reading. 
On March 1, 8, 15, and 29 of 2000, the Planning, 
Zoning & Economic Development Committee (the 
"P & Z committee"), a subcommittee of the full city 
council, held public hearings regarding approval of 
Furlong's preliminary plat. During the course of 
those hearings, the P & Z committee heard comments 
from area residents both in favor of and in opposition 
to the plat application. The city also requested a 
traffic study to analyze the effect of Furlong's 
proposed plat on the surrounding area. Furlong 
complied with the traffic study request. The study 
ultimately concluded that Furlong's plat would have 
little impact on the existing traffic system. 
At the March 15, 2000, hearing the city requested 
more time and information regarding the traffic 
study. On March 29, 2000, Furlong provided the P 
& Z committee with a revised, more comprehensive 
traffic study, which also concluded that Furlong's 
proposed plat would have little impact on traffic in 
the surrounding area. At the March 29 meeting the P 
& Z committee voted the matter "off the docket," 
meaning that it would not be reviewed again for up to 
six months. 
On April 13, 2000, the chairman of the P & Z 
committee called Furlong's preliminary plat 
ordinance out of committee for docketing before the 
entire city council. The chairman stated that the 
city's legal counsel had attended a closed session and 
advised that there was no legal basis for rejecting 
Furlong's application. On May 4, 2000, the city 
council voted not to approve"l62 Furlong's 
preliminary plat by a vote of 9 to 4. Again, no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law were issued in 
regard to' the city's denial of Furlong's preliminary 
plat. 
Furlong filed suit against the city on May 9, 2000, 
seelung an order of mandamus compelling the city to 
approve its plat application and also seeking damages 
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. After hearing 
evidence on Furlong's mandamus claim, the trial 
court entered an order of mandamus against the city 
on November 29, 2000, compelling the city to 
approve Furlong's plat application immediately and 
without undue delay. In so doing, the trial court 
expressly found that the city's action in denying 
Furlong's preliminary plat application was unlawful, 
unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. After the 
entry of the mandamus order, Furlong moved 
forward with its development plans. Today, the 
property has been completely developed and contains 
a car wash, a Wendy's restaurant, and a Sonic drive- 
in. 
Subsequent to the mandamus trial, the trial court 
heard evidence on Furlong's additional claim for 
damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The trial 
court found "the City's conduct to be more than a 
mere violation of the law but that the action of the 
City rose to the level of truly irrational." The trial 
court awarded Furlong $224,871 .OO in actual 
damages and $148,435.20 for costs and attorney's 
fees. The city appeals. 
111. Points of Error 
The city seeks review asserting four points of error. 
I. The trial court erred in granting a writ of 
mandamus because it exceeded its permissible scope 
of review by hearing the proceeding de novo in that 
review of a plat application denial is limited to the 
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information presented to the city council. 
11. The trial court erred in granting a writ of 
mandamus because there was insufficient evidence to 
show that the city council's decision was arbitrary or 
capricious in that the information the city council 
reviewed was sufficient to support the city council's 
decision to deny the preliminary plat application. 
111. The trial court's grant of judgment on the 
substantive due process claim was clearly erroneous 
because there was no substantial evidence to support 
a finding that the city acted in a clearly irrational 
manner when its city council denied Furlong's 
preliminary plat application in that the trial court 
erroneously declared the law and in that the plat did 
not comply with the city's subdivision ordinance and 
this was a rational basis for the city's denial and in 
that Furlong used the process available and therefore 
was not denied due process 
IV. The trial court's award of damages was clearly 
erroneous because there was no substantial evidence 
to support a finding that the city proximately caused 
the damages award to Furlong. 
IV. General Legal Background 
A. Zoning and Plat ApprovaI 
Zoning and plat approval for subdivision 
development are crucial tools for the orderly 
development of our cities and counties. Yet, these 
tools impact significantly on the freedom of 
landowners to do what they might want with their 
real property and on the relative value that any 
particular piece of property might have. 
*I63 11 lI21r31r41 Zoning and plat approval represent 
different types of authority in political subdivisions. 
"Zoning" is the exercise of legislative authority as to 
what land uses are in the interest of the public for 
particular areas within the political subdivision. The 
governmental body has great latitude in this regard. 
"Plat approval" is the ministerial application of 
zoning requirements, uniformly, to all particular 
parcels within the zoned area. Far less latitude exists 
in this regard, as each landowner is entitled to equal 
application of the zoning and planning laws 
applicable to his property. See generally, Yokely, 
E.C., Law of Subdivisions 2 17-3 18 (2d ed. 198 1). 
B. Missouri law regarding subdivision plat 
approval 
Sections 445.030 and 89.4 10 set forth the procedures 
and mechanisms by which Missouri cities may 
govern the subdividing of land. Section 445.030, in 
relevant part, states: 
... that if such map or plat be of land situated within 
the corporate limits of any incorporated city, town or 
village, it shall not be placed of record until it shall 
have been submitted to and approved by the common 
council of such city, town or village, by ordinance, 
duly passed and approved by the mayor, and such 
approval endorsed upon such map or plat under the 
hand of the clerk and the seal of such city, town, or 
village ... 
Section 89.4 10.1 states:The planning commission 
shall recommend and the council may by ordinance 
adopt regulations governing the subdivision of land 
within its jurisdiction. The regulations, in addition 
to the requirements provided by law for the approval 
of plats, may provide requirements for the 
coordinated development of the city, town or village; 
for the coordination of streets within subdivisions 
with other existing or planned streets or with other 
features of the city plan or official map of the city, 
town or village; for adequate open spaces for traffic, 
recreation, light and air; and for a distribution of 
population and traffic; provided that, the city, town 
or village may only impose requirements for the 
posting of bonds, letters of credit or escrows for 
subdivision-related improvements as provided for in 
subsections 2 to 5 of this section. 
These two statutes were harmonized by the decision 
in City of' Bellefont(iine Neighbors 1,. J.J. Kellcv 
Reultv d Building Co., 460 S.W.2d 298 
(Mo.Aup.1970). In that case, the court he1d:The 
specificity of [section 89.4101 may be considered to 
restrict the broad grant of power given by section 
445.030 and to establish the procedures for carrying 
out the regulation of subdivisions authorized by 
section 445.030. Where the legislature has 
authorized a municipality to exercise a power and 
prescribed the manner of its exercise, the right to 
exercise the power in any other manner is necessarily 
denied. 
Section 89.4 10.1 requires that regulation of 
subdivisions be accomplished in municipalities by 
ordinance. Stale o f  Missouri ex tlel. Schnefet. v. 
Clevel~nd, 847 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Mo.Aup.1992). 
Chapter 66 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of 
Kansas City, Missouri, contains the rules and 
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regulations regarding the subdivision of land located 
in the city. Section 66-42 of the code establishes a 
three-step process for ultimate approval of 
subdivision plats: (1) preliminary plat phase, (2) 
final plat phase review before the city plan 
commission, and (3) final plat phase review before 
the city council. Each phase has a number of steps 
within it. 
*I64 The dispute at issue herein occurred at the 
preliminary plat phase. The preliminary plat phase 
is defined as follows: 
During the preliminary plat phase, the applicant will 
hold preapplication conferences with the secretary to 
the city plan commission, or his designated staff 
representative, to discuss in general the procedures 
and requirements for platting, and more specifically 
the basic plans of the applicant. It is recommended 
that the applicant's engineer meet with the city 
engineer, or his designated staff representative, to 
review the physical features of the development 
relative to the public improvements. The product of 
the preapplication conference will allow the applicant 
to complete a preliminary plat and submit it formally 
for review by the plats review committee. The plats 
review committee shall have the authority to approve 
or disapprove any preliminary plat; provided the 
preliminary plat must comply with all of the 
requirements of this chapter. The developer may 
elect to submit the preliminary plat to the city plan 
commission and city council. Generally, the election 
to proceed before the city plan commission and city 
council is recommended when: 
a. The plats review committee disapproves the 
preliminary plat; 
b. The developer is requesting a variance or 
conditional exception from this chapter; or 
c. The development is planned to be platted in two or 
more phases If the developer elects to proceed to the 
city plan commission and city council, the plats 
review committee will review and forward its 
recommendations to the city plan commission and 
city council. 
Kansas City Code section 66-42. The stated purpose 
of the preliminary plat is to convey the developer's 
"ideas and intentions in platting the proposed 
subdivision." Kansas City Code section 66-43(a). 
The developer may also elect to submit his 
preliminary plat to the city plan commission and the 
city council for approval. Kansas City Code section 
66-43(e). It appears from the testimony at trial that 
submitting a preliminary plat to the city plan 
commission is the standard procedure in Kansas City. 
When the developer elects to proceed before the city 
plan commission, the plats review committee issues a 
recommendation as to approval or denial to the city 
plan commission. Kansas City Code section 66- 
43(f). There is then to be a public hearing before the 
city plan commission. Id. If the commission 
approves the preliminary plat, it is submitted to the 
city council for approval as an ordinance. Kansas 
City Code section 66-43(g). If the plan commission 
rejects or withholds approval, the developer may 
request in writing that the plan be submitted to the 
city council. Id. There is then another public hearing 
before the city council. Id. 
J51r61f'71f'81[9] When proceeding under the 
subdivision ordinance, the plan commission and the 
city council are acting in an administrative capacity 
and not in a legislative capacity. State ex re/. 
Westside Develoamcnl Co.. Inc. v. Wcutker-bv Lake, 
935 S.W.2d 634. 640 (Mo.Avp. 1996). The law does 
not permit administrative bodies to exercise an 
arbitrary and subjective authority over the granting or 
denying of subdivision plats. ScltaefL.r, 847 S.W.2d 
at 873. The exercise of discretion and judgment 
vested in the administrative body is to determine 
whether a plan meets the zoning or subdivision 
requirements. Irl. It is not a discretion to approve a 
plan that does not meet the requirements. a Nor do 
the statutes and the ordinance grant the commission 
or the council the authority to deny a subdivision plat 
that complies with the subdivision ordinance. If 
the *I65 plat complies, then it is the ministerial duty 
of the commission and the council to approve it, and 
they have no discretion to deny it. U The approval 
of a preliminary plat that meets the subdivision and 
zoning requirements is a ministerial act, and 
mandamus is the proper remedy in seelung to review 
the denial of such a plat. See Weatherby Lake. 935 
S.W.2d at 640; Slate ex !-el Menlchlw v. Cia) of 
Pevely, 865 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Mo.Aup.1993); 
Schaefer; 847 S.W .2d at 87 1. 
C. Missouri Administrative Procedure Act 
The Missouri Administrative Procedure Act 
for two types of cases: contested cases and non- 
contested cases. The distinction between these two 
types of cases is an often-litigated issue. A 
"contested case" is defined in the MAPA as "a 
proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, 
duties or privileges of specific parties are required by 
law to be determined after hearing." Section 
536.010(4). The MAPA does not explicitly define a 
"non-contested case," but it has been defined by this 
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Court as a decision that is not required by law to be 
determined after a hearing. Stnte ex re/. M'il.son 
Chevr-ole[, hic. v. Wilson, 332 S.W.2d 867. 870 
(Mo. 1960). 
11 011 1 I ]  Contested case review is controlled by 
sections 536.100 to 536.140. Contested cases 
provide the parties with an opportunity for a formal 
hearing with the presentation of evidence, including 
swom testimony of witnesses and cross-examination 
of witnesses, and require written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Hcrael~) v. Board o f  Educution of 
tlie Webstet- Groves School District, 84 1 S. W.2.d 663, 
668 (Mo. banc 1992). The review of a contested 
case is a review by the trial court of the record 
created before the administrative body. Section 
536.140. The trial court's decision upon such review 
is appealable, but the appellate court also looks back 
to the record created before the administrative body. 
C i h  o f  Cnbool v. Missouri Sfate Board o f  Mediation, 
689 S.W.2d 51.53 (Mo. banc 1985). 
11 211 131 Non-contested cases do not require formal 
proceedings or hearings before the administrative 
body. Farnler's Bank o f  Antonia v. Kosin~nn, 577 
S.W.2d 915.92 1 (Mo.A~p.19791. As such, there is 
no record required for review. P h i ~ u . ~  11. School 
District of  Kansas Citv, 645 S.W.2d 91, 94-5 
(Mo.A~~.1982) .  In the review of a non-contested 
decision, the circuit court does not review the 
administrative record, but hears evidence, determines 
facts, and adjudges the validity of the agency 
decision. Id. Under the procedures of section 
536.1 50, the circuit court conducts such a hearing as 
an original action. Id at 96; section 536.150. I. 
In either a contested or a non-contested case the 
private litigant is entitled to challenge the 
governmental agency's decision. The difference is 
simply that in a contested case the private litigant 
must try his or her case before the agency, and 
judicial review is on the record of that administrative 
trial, whereas in a non-contested case the private 
litigant tries his or her case to the court. Depending 
upon the circumstances, this difference may result in 
procedural advantages or disadvantages to the parties, 
but in either situation, the litigant is entitled to 
develop an evidentiary record in one forum or 
another. 
D. Mandamus 
11 51[16lr1711181~191 The purpose of the 
extraordinary writ of mandamus is to compel the 
performance of a ministerial duty that one charged 
with the duty has refused to perfom. *166Sfatc ex 
re/. Phillip v. P~lhlic School Relit-en~c)nt S,)stern. 364 
Mo. 395, 262 S.W.2d 569. 574 (19531. The writ 
can only be issued to compel a party to act when it 
was his duty to act without it. Icl. It confers upon the 
party against whom it may be issued no new 
authority, and from its very nature can confer none. 
A litigant asking relief by mandamus must allege 
and prove that he has a clear, unequivocal, specific 
right to a thing claimed. He must show himself 
possessed of a clear and legal right to the remedy. Id_ 
Mandamus does not issue except in cases where the 
ministerial duty sought to be coerced is definite, 
arising under conditions admitted or proved and 
imposed by law. Sfnte e,v re/. Bunlcer Resource 
Recvclinn und Reclumation, Inc. v. Melzun, 782 
S.W.2d 381,389 (Mo. banc 1990). 
If a subdivision plat complies with the 
requirements of the subdivision statute or ordinance, 
mandamus may compel approval of the plat. If the 
plat does not comply, mandamus is unavailable and 
improper. 
V. Analysis 
In its first point of error, the city alleges that "the trial 
.court erred in granting a writ of mandamus because it 
exceeded its permissible scope of review by hearing 
the proceeding de novo in that review of a plat 
application denial is limited to the information 
presented to the city council." FN2 
FN2. The parties do not explain the 
significance of the fact that the plat has now 
been approved and the project has been 
completed. Neither argues that this issue is 
moot. Neither explains the consequences of 
this decision beyond its impact upon the Q 
U.S.C. section 1983 claim. 
The city fails to point to any specific evidence that 
was admitted in error or to any prejudice resulting 
from the admission of such evidence. The city 
makes a singular, non-specific reference to "expert 
testimony on the compliance of the plat." Other 
evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Furlong told 
city staff members that he would comply with all of 
their conditions; that city staff members told Mr. 
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Furlong that they would not discuss with him the 
denial of his preliminary plat "for fear of litigation;" 
that Mr. Furlong attempted to submit a revised 
preliminary plat but was not allowed to do so; that 
Mr. Furlong was subjected to various delays during 
the process; and that the city was advised that it had 
no legal basis to deny the preliminary plat. 
1211r221 "By both statute and rule, an appellate court 
is not to reverse a judgment unless it believes the 
error committed by the trial court against the 
appellant materially affected the merits of the 
action." Lewis v. Wuhl, 842 S.W.2d 82, 84-5 (Mo. 
banc 1992) (citing section 512.160(2) and Rule 
84.13(b)). Merely asserting error without making a 
showing of how that error was somehow prejudicial 
is not sufficient for reversal. Nonetheless, there was 
no error in admitting the evidence. 
Neither party contends that the City should have 
conducted Furlong's preliminary plat hearing as a 
contested case and we do not address that question. 
The parties concede that mandamus was the proper 
procedure to challenge the denial of a preliminary 
plat. See Weaiherhv Lake, 935 S.W.2d at 640; 
Menlilzus. 865 S.W.2d at 874: Schaefcr, 847 S.W.2d 
at 871. 
The standard for admission of evidence in a 
mandamus proceeding is the same whether at 
common law or under the MAPA. At common law, it 
is well established that the ordinary principles 
relating to admissibility of evidence in civil actions 
generally are applicable in mandamus proceedings. 
55 C.J.S. Mandunzus 6 352 (1998). Any competent 
evidence tending *I67 to establish, or in any way 
affecting, the right of the relator or duty of 
respondent, and within the allegations of the petition 
and writ, is admissible. Id., see also, State ex re/. 
Raw1in.e~ v. Kansas City, 2 13 Mo.App. 349, 250 
S.W. 927 (1923). 
J2411251 Under the MAPA, mandamus is generally 
not available if the proceeding was tried as a 
"contested case" before an administrative body. 
State ex rel. Keeven 1). Citv o f  Hazelwood, 585 
S.W.2d 557, 560 IMo.App.19792; State ex re/. 
Dodson v. McNenl, 552 S.W.2d 34. 36 
fMo.App.1977); section 536.150. Section 
536.150.1 provides for review of non-contested cases 
as follows: 
When any administrative officer or body existing 
under the constitution or by statute or by municipal 
charter or ordinance shall have rendered a decision 
which is not subject to administrative review, 
determining the legal rights, duties or privileges of 
any person, including the denial or revocation of a 
license, and there is no other provision for judicial 
inquiry into or review of such decision, such decision 
may be reviewed by suit .for injrinction, certiorari, 
mandamus, prohibition, or other appropriate action, 
and in any such review proceeding the court may 
determine the facts relevant to the question whether 
such person at the time of such decision was subject 
to such legal duty, or had such right, or was entitled 
to such privilege, and may hear such evidence on 
such question as may be properly adduced, and the 
court may determine whether such decision, in view 
of the facts as they appear to the court, is 
unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
capricious or involves an abuse of discretion; and the 
court shall render judgment accordingly, and may 
order the administrative officer or body to take such 
further action as it may be proper to require; but the 
court shall not substitute its discretion for discretion 
legally vested in such administrative officer or body, 
and in cases where the granting or withholding of a 
privilege is committed by law to the sole discretion of 
such administrative officer or body, such discretion 
lawfblly exercised shall not be disturbed. 
(emphasis added). The evidentiary standard "as may 
be properly adduced" is not limited to a review of the 
administrative record. This is because in 
proceedings such as the one here, the parties were not 
afforded the ability to create a record upon which 
viable review could occur. See Hanc.lv, 84 1 S.W.2d 
at 668. 
In making its argument that the review in the circuit 
court is limited to the record, the city makes the 
simple mistake of confusing Furlong's burden of 
proof with the standard for determining the 
admissibility of evidence. Although Furlong was 
required to prove that it presented the city with 
sufficient evidence to show that it met the 
requirements for preliminary plat approval, it had the 
right, before the circuit court, to adduce any evidence 
relevant to proving such facts. 
The driving idea behind administrative law in 
Missouri is that the citizen is entitled to a fair 
opportunity to present the facts of his or her case. If 
this occurs in the context of the procedural formality 
and protection of a "contested case" before the 
administrative agency, the review in the courts can be 
limited to the record. If the citizen is denied this 
opportunity before the agency, then he or she is 
entitled to present such evidence as is necessary 
before the courts to determine the controversy. 
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The city relies on Wenfherhy Lake as support for a 
more limited review. Although Weatherhv Lake 
correctly notes "the reviewing court is not authorized 
to *I68 substitute its judgment for the judgment of 
the administrative body if such findings of fact are 
supported by competent and substantial evidence," 
nothing in Weulherhv Lake precludes the introduction 
of evidence to establish what actually occurred in the 
administrative process. 
In its second point of error, the city argues that 
"the trial court erred in granting a writ of mandamus 
because there was insufficient evidence to show that 
the city council's decision was arbitrary or capricious 
in that the information the city council reviewed was 
sufficient to support the city council's decision to 
deny the preliminary plat application." 
The trial court found that the city's decision was 
"unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious in 
that the [city] failed to perform its ministerial duty, 
given that this court finds that [Furlong] met the 
subdivision regulations and the preliminary plat is 
consistent with the zoning ordinance." The standard 
of review for a bench-tried case is well-established. 
An appellate court must sustain the decree or 
judgment of the trial court unless there is no 
substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against 
the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously 
declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the 
law. Mzrrpliv v. Cur-ron. 536 S.W.2d 30. 32 (Mo. 
banc 1976). 
Despite the language of its point relied on, the city 
apparently only challenges the sufficiency of 
Furlong's evidence regarding four conditions for 
approval. First, the city argues that the project had a 
"potential impact on traffic." The record reflects, 
however, that the city council required Furlong to 
conduct a traffic study to examine the impact of the 
proposed development based on Furlong's intended 
uses of the land. Furlong hired a traffic-engineering 
firm to conduct such a study. The city council 
questioned the findings of the initial study, and 
Furlong then asked the traffic engineers to perform a 
more comprehensive study. The studies ultimately 
concluded that the proposed development would have 
little or no impact on existing traffic patterns. There 
was substantial evidence for the trial court to find that 
the proposed development would not have a 
"potential impact on traffic." 
The city also argues that "a reasonable person could 
doubt" that Furlong's plat complied with the 
"stacking" requirements for cars at a car wash. 
However, at trial, the city planner and Furlong's 
engineer testified that the staclung requirement had 
been satisfied. Moreover, the staff report 
recommending approval of Furlong's preliminary plat 
indicates that the stacking requirement was satisfied. 
There was substantial evidence for the trial court to 
find that Furlong complied with section 80- 
140(b)(l)d.4 of the zoning ordinance. 
FN3. Stacking refers to the space occupied 
by a motor vehicle waiting to enter a car 
wash bay. 
The city argues that Furlong did not comply with the 
requirement that the ratio of the lot depth to width 
generally not exceed three to one when subdividing 
large parcels. Under one method of measurement, 
lot 2 as shown on the preliminary plat before the city 
council had a ratio of 3.07 to 1. Other methods of 
measurement, such as talung the average lot depth as 
compared to average lot width, would generate a ratio 
well within the three to one requirement. 
Regardless, there is substantial evidence that this 
issue was easily correctable through a simple revision 
of one of the lot boundary lines. "169 In fact, 
Furlong made such a revision and attempted to 
submit that revised preliminary plat to the city, but 
was not allowed to do so. There was also evidence 
at trial that the three to one ratio requirenient was not 
even applicable to Furlong's preliminary plat because 
the ratio was intended to apply only to the 
subdivision of "large tracts or parcels." There was 
testimony at trial that this provision typically was 
only applied to tracts of ten acres or more, whereas 
Furlong's parcel was only 2.76 acres. There was 
substantial evidence for the trial court to find that 
Furlong's preliminary plat complied with the 
requirement that the lot depth not exceed three times 
the lot width. 
Finally, the city argues that Furlong's preliminary plat 
did not comply with one of the proposed conditions 
recommended by the city staff because it did not 
eliminate the easterly drive on proposed lot 3. 
However, there was evidence that the easterly drive 
had already been approved by Kansas City parks and 
recreation such that the city staff could not properly 
require its elimination. There was also evidence that 
Furlong had agreed to satisfy the conditions as  
proposed by the city staff and was specifically 
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willing to address the issues surrounding the easterly 
drive on proposed lot 3. There was substantial 
evidence for the trial court to find that Furlong's 
preliminary plat complied, or could easily comply 
through simple revision, with all of city staffs 
conditions for approval. 
It also appears that the city's attorney advised, in 
closed session, that the city could not legally deny 
Furlong's preliminary plat. A member of the city 
council indicated that, although he thought Furlong's 
plan was "terrible," he argued in favor of Furlong's 
preliminary plat to the other members of the city 
council based on the advice of the city attorney. 
There was substantial evidence for the trial court to 
find that the city's decision to deny approval of 
Furlong's preliminary plat was unlawful, 
unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. 
In its third point of error, the city argues that "the 
trial court's grant of judgment on the substantive due 
process claim was clearly erroneous because there 
was no substantial evidence to support a finding that 
the city acted in a clearly irrational manner when its 
city council denied Furlong's preliminary plat 
application in that the trial court erroneously declared 
the law and in that the plat did not comply with the 
city's subdivision ordinance and this was a rational 
basis for the city's denial and in that Furlong used the 
process available and therefore was not denied due 
process." 
Furlong alleged that the city violated 42 U.S.C. 4 
1983 in denying its preliminary plat in contravention 
of its ministerial duty to approve it upon compliance 
with the subdivision regulations. Section 1983 states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, 
except that in any action brought against a judicial 
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted 
unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes*170 of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia 
shall be considered to be a statute of  the District of 
Columbia. 
1271r281 There are two elements that must be 
established to prevail on a claim under section 1983. 
First, a claimant must establish "a protected property 
interest to which the Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process protection applies." Bifunrino~is Mrrterial.~, 
Inc. v. Rice Countv, Minn.. 126 F.3d 1068. 1070 (8th 
Cir.1997). A claimant must also establish that the 
governmental action was "truly irrational." Id. The 
truly irrational standard has been fbrther defined as 
"something more than ... arbitrary, capricious, or in 
violation of state law." Chesterfield Developmen/ 
Cow.  v. Cify o f  Chester-field, 963 F.2d 1 102, 1 104 
(8th Cir.1992); Frison v. Citv o f  Pnncdulc, 897 
S.W.2d 129, 132 (Mo.Am.1995). As stated 
previously, the standard of review for a bench-tried 
case in Missouri is well-established. An appellate 
court must sustain the judgment of the trial court 
unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, 
unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless 
it erroneously declares the law, o r  unless it 
erroneously applies the law. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 
32. 
-
The city apparently does not dispute that Furlong had 
a protected property interest, and asserts only that the 
city's conduct in denying Furlong's preliminary plat 
was not truly irrational. The city argues that because 
it believed that Furlong's preliminary plat did not 
comply with the subdivision regulations, its conduct 
in denying the preliminary plat could not technically 
be considered irrational. In part V.B of this opinion, 
the city asserted four bases for its belief that 
Furlong's preliminary plat did not comply with the 
subdivision regulations. As discussed in that part, 
there was substantial evidence for the trial court to 
find not only that Furlong's plat did comply with the 
subdivision regulations as to each of the city's four 
arguments but that there was no rational basis for any 
of those arguments. 
The city also appears to argue that there could be no 
violation of section 1983 because the trial court 
ultimately remedied the improper denial of Furlong's 
preliminary plat. The fact that a trial court remedied 
the city's wrongful and irrational conduct has no 
bearing on whether that conduct was violative of 
section 1983. 
As previously stated, 42 U.S.C. section 1983 
liability requires evidence that exceeds an arbitrary 
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and capricious standard and rises to the "truly 
irrational" level. Unfortunately, there was sufficient 
evidence on which the trial court could determine 
that the city's conduct was truly irrational. 
The city plan commission ignored the advice of the 
plats review committee recommending approval and 
denied Furlong's preliminary plat. Furlong's 
attempts to learn the reasons for denial were rebuffed 
and Furlong was never afforded any opportunity to 
amend or correct the preliminary plat. 
Once Furlong requested that the preliminary plat be 
brought before the city council, the city council 
subjected Furlong to numerous delays. On March 1, 
2000, the P & Z committee of the city council held a 
public meeting to determine the fate of Furlong's 
preliminary plat. No vote was taken and the issue 
was continued until March 8, 2000. During the 
March 8, 2000, meeting no vote was taken, the issue 
was continued for one week, and the committee 
ordered Furlong to undertake a traffic impact study. 
During the March 15, 2000, meeting the committee 
requested that a more detailed traffic study be 
performed, no vote was taken, and the issue was 
continued for two weeks. Finally, on March "171 
29, 2000, after completing two waves of a traffic 
impact study finding that the proposed development 
would have little or no impact on existing traffic 
 condition^,^ the committee again failed to vote on 
Furlong's preliminary plat, instead voting it "off the 
docket," where it could be held in legislative limbo 
for several months with no final decision. 
Ultimately, the preliminary plat was presented to the 
full city council for a final vote on May 4,2000. 
FN4. The city's own engineer reviewed the 
traffic impact study and agreed with the 
findings. 
The city's attorney advised, in closed session, that the 
city could not legally deny Furlong's preliminary plat. 
A member of the city council indicated that, although 
he thought Furlong's plan was "terrible," he argued in 
favor of Furlong's preliminary plat to the other 
members of the city council based on the advice of 
that city attorney. Nonetheless, the city council 
voted to deny the preliminary plat application. 
In the ten years leading up to and including Furlong's 
plat application, there were 197 plat applications 
submitted to the city for review. Of those, 196 were 
approved, typically within one week of submission. 
Only Furlong's preliminary plat was denied during 
that ten-year time period. Such a deviation both 
from the standard treatment of preliminary plats over 
a ten-year period and from the advice of staff and 
counsel leaves no question as to the sufficiency of 
evidence on which the trial court based its decision. 
The Court's role is not to weigh the evidence, but 
only to review the decision for sufficiency of 
evidence. See Mumhv. 536 S.W.2d at 32. All plat 
denial cases do not give rise to an action for violation 
of section 1983. Bitlrnzinolis A4ateriul.s. 126 F.3d at 
1070. 
Mere delay or mistaken application of the law is not 
alone sufficient to meet the "truly irrational" 
standard. In dicta, the Eighth Circuit has even 
suggested that bad faith enforcement of an invalid 
law would not be sufficient to state a claim. /d.. 
Chesterfield Developnzent, 963 F.2d at 1 105. 
The facts of this case go beyond mistaken, 
arbitrary, or capricious application of the law. It is 
clear from the record that all or nearly all of the 
members of the city council believed that Furlong's 
proposed project would be bad for this area of Kansas 
City. To this extent, they were acting in good faith 
and with the best intentions of serving those who 
elected them. However, it is equally clear that under 
the existing and valid ordinances of Kansas City and 
the established law of thls State that Furlong was 
entitled to have its preliminary plat approved. 
Further, there was evidence from which the trial court 
could find that, despite the recommendations of staff 
and legal counsel, and ultimately the arguments of a 
fellow city council member, the city council 
intentionally delayed and denied Furlong its property 
rights in disregard of the law. When government 
acts with intentional disregard of its own valid law, 
knowing that its actions deprive individuals of their 
property rights, such action is "truly irrational." 
The overall course of conduct that the city undertook 
as it reviewed and ultimately denied Furlong's 
preliminary plat was substantial evidence for the trial 
court to find that the city acted in a "truly irrational" 
manner. 
In its fourth point of error, the city argues that "the 
trial court's award of damages was clearly erroneous 
because there, was no substantial evidence to 
support*172 a finding that the city proximately 
caused the damages awarded to Furlong." 
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Causation is an essential element of a sectioli 
1983 action. Mor?oti 11. Bcclicr-, 793 F.2d 185, 187 
-
(8th Cir.1986). In order to award damages, the trial 
court had to determine that the city's conduct in 
denying Furlong's preliminary plat proximately 
caused the economic damage for which Furlong 
seeks to recover. As stated previously, an appellate 
court must sustain the judgment of the trial court 
unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it 
is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously 
declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law. 
M~rrphv, 536 S.W.2d at 32. 
There was substantial evidence in the trial court 
to support a finding of proximate cause. Furlong 
presented John Ward, an economic expert, to 
establish its damages. Mr. Ward testified that the 
earliest date Furlong's plat could have been.approved 
was March 2, 2000, the date of the first P & Z 
committee meeting. The trial court ordered the city 
to approve Furlong's preliminary plat on November 
29,2000. The plat was not finally approved until the 
city complied with the order of the trial court on 
December 14, 2000. This constitutes a delay of 287 
days. Mr. Ward testified that the total commercial 
economic damages suffered by Furlong as a result of 
the denial of the preliminary plat and the resulting 
287-day delay in development amounted to 
$173,071.00. This figure did not include a 
$50,000.00 loan that Mr. Furlong took from his 
retirement account and infused into the company. 
The figure also omitted the costs of hydraseeding the 
property to prevent erosion and runoff ($1,300.00) 
and the loan fees incurred as the terms of the project 
were continually revised based on the city's conduct 
($500.00). The trial court appears to have accepted 
Mr. Ward's damage calculations as well as the 
testimony as to the retirement account loan, the cost 
of hyrdraseeding, and the loan fees. These figures 
total the $224,871.00 that the trial court awarded. 
The city does not object to the amount of the 
damages stated by Mr. Ward or the methodology he 
used in calculating damages. 
1331 The cost of hydraseeding was caused by the 
delay because Furlong incurred the expense of 
maintaining property that would have been sold but 
for the delay in approving Furlong's preliminary plat. 
Likewise, the loan fees were directly attributable to 
the delay as the loan terms had to be revised as the 
city continued to prolong the process and ultimately 
denied Furlong's preliminary plat. The $50,000.00 
loan Mr. Furlong took from his retirement account, 
however, is not allowable as delay damages. There 
is no evidence that the retirement account loan h n d s  
were used to pay expenses that were not already 
accounted for in Mr. Ward's calculations or were 
attributable to the delay. 
The city makes two arguments that Furlong's 
damages were not proximately caused by the city's 
conduct in denying Furlong's preliminary plat. First, 
the city asserts that Furlong should have sought 
conditional building permits while the plat was being 
considered or while the litigation was pending. The 
city argues that any delay in construction on the site 
could have been avoided had Furlong sought such 
conditional permits. The city fails to reconcile its 
argument with the fact that the contracts that Furlong 
had with both Wendy's and Sonic were conditioned 
on the land first being properly and finally platted 
and subdivided. Moreover, the law simply does not 
require a party to accept the risk of going forward 
with construction of multi-million dollar facilities on 
the basis of conditional building permits on land that 
*I73 has not been finally platted and is the subject of 
ongoing litigation. 
The city also argues that Furlong caused the delay by 
seeking de novo review of the city council's decision 
rather than proceeding on the record made before the 
city council. As already established, review de novo 
was the proper procedure in this case. Furlong 
cannot be expected to sacrifice its right to proper 
review for the sake of expediency. 
There was substantial evidence for the trial court to 
find that $174,871.00 of Furlong's damages were 
proximately caused by the City's conduct in denying 
the preliminary plat.FNS 
FN5. The city apparently does not contest 
the award or amount of attorney's fees. 
VI. Conclusion 
The judgment of the trial court as to actual damages 
is reduced to a sum of $174,871.00, and as modified 
the judgment is affirmed. 
All concur. 
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Supreme Court of the United States 
PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION 
COMPANY et al., Appellants, 
v. 
CITY OF NEW YORK et al. 
No. 77-444. 
Argued April 17, 1978. 
Decided June 26, 1978. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1978. 
See 439 U.S. 883,99 S.Ct. 226. 
Following refusal of New York City Landmarks 
Preservation Commission to approve plans for 
construction of 50-story office building over Grand 
Central Terminal, which had been designated a 
"landmark," the terminal owner filed suit charging, 
inter alia, that application of landmarks preservation 
law constituted a "taking" of the property without 
just compensation and arbitrarily deprived owners of 
their property without due process. The Supreme 
Court, Trial Term, New York County, granted 
injunctive relief. The Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, reversed. 
The Court of Appeals, 42 N.Y.2d 324. 397 N.Y.S.2d 
914, 366 N.E.2d 1271, affirmed, and owners 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brennan, 
held that: (1) owners could not establish a "talung" 
merely by showing that they had been denied the 
right to exploit the superadjacent airspace, 
irrespective of remainder of the parcel; (2) landmark 
laws which embody a comprehensive plan to 
preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest are 
not discriminatory, like "reverse spot" zoning; (3) 
that the law affected some owners more severely than 
others did not itself result in a "taking," and (4) the 
law did not interfere with owners' present use or 
prevent it from realizing a reasonable rate of return 
on its investment, especially since preexisting air 
rights were transferable to other parcels in the 
vicinity. 
Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice 
Stevens joined. 
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205-l.O(a); General Municipal Law N.Y. f 96-a; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5,14. 
1181 Eminent Domain 148 -2.27(3) 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
-
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.27 Environmental Protection 
148k2.27(31 k. Historic Preservation; 
Landmarks. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(5), 148k2(1)) 
Designating New York City railroad termination as a 
"landmark" under New York City landmarks law no 
more effectuated an appropriation of the air space 
above the terminal for governmental use than a 
zoning law appropriates property since the 
designation simply prohibited owners or others from 
occupying certain features of that space while 
allowing them gainfully to use remainder of the 
parcel. Administrative Code N.Y. Ej 205- 1 .O(a); 
General Municipal Law N.Y. 6 96-a; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5,14. 
1191 Eminent Domain 148 -2.27(3) 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Tahng; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.27 Environmental Protection 
148k2.27(3) k. Historic Preservation; 
Landmarks. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(5), 148k2(1)) 
New York City's landmark law is not rendered 
invalid because of failure to provide "just 
compensation" whenever a landmark owner is 
restricted in the exploitation of property interest, such 
air rights, to a greater extent than provided for under 
applicable zoning laws. Administrative Code N.Y. Ej 
205-l.O(a); General Municipal Law N.Y. 4 96-a; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5,14. 
1201 Eminent Domain 148 -2.27(3) 
148 Eminent Domain 
7
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
& What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.27 Environmental Protection 
148k2.27(3) k. Historic Preservation; 
Landmarks. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(5), 148k2(1)) 
Designation of New York City railway terminal as a 
"landmark" and concomitant refusal to permit 
construction of 50-story office building over the 
terminal did not constitute an interference of such 
magnitude as to constitute a "taking" since the 
"landmark" designation did not interfere with present 
uses, owners were not completely prohibited from 
occupying airspace above the terminal and 
preexisting air r~ghts were made transferable to at 
least eight nearby parcels, one or two of which had 
been found suitable for construction of new office 
buildings. Administrative Code N.Y. Ej 205- 1 .O(a); 
General Mullici~al Law N.Y. (I 96-a; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5,14. 
1211 Eminent Domain 148 -2.27(3) 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
j4tJ Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.27 Environmental Protection 
148k2.27(3) k. Historic Preservation; 
Landmarks. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(5), 148k2(1)) 
While ability to transfer preexisting air rights over 
railroad terminal, which was designated a 
"landmark," might not have constituted just 
compensation if a taking had occurred, such rights 
mitigated whatever financial burdens the landmark 
law had imposed on terminal owners and, for such 
reason, were to be taken into account in considering 
impact of the regulation. Administrative Code N.Y. 
Ej 205-1 .O(a); General Munici~al Law N.Y. (I 96-a; 
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5,u. 
**2649 Syllabus FNI 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court but has been prepared 
by the Reporter of Decisions for the 
convenience of the reader. See United 
States 11. Detr-oil Tinihcr & L~mil~er. Co., 200 
U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 
499. 
"104 Under New York City's Landmarks 
Preservation Law (Landmarks Law), which was 
enacted to protect historic landmarks and 
neighborhoods from precipitate decisions to destroy 
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or fundamentally alter their character, the Landmarks 
Preservation Commission (Commission) may 
designate a building to be a "landmark" on a 
particular "landmark site" or may designate an area 
to be a "historic district." The Board of Estimate 
may thereafter modify or disapprove the designation, 
and the owner may seek judicial review of the final 
designation decision. The owner of the designated 
landmark must keep the building's exterior "in good 
repair" and before exterior alterations are made must 
secure Commission approval. Under two ordinances 
owners of landmark sites may transfer development 
rights from a landmark parcel to proximate lots. 
Under the Landmarks Law, the Grand Central 
Terminal (Terminal), which is owned by the Penn 
Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates (Penn 
Central) was designated a "landmark" and the block 
it occupies a "landmark site." Appellant Penn 
Central, though opposing the designation before the 
Commission, did not seek judicial review of the final 
designation decision. Thereafter appellant Penn 
Central entered into a lease with appellant UGP 
Properties, whereby UGP was to construct a 
multistory office building over the Terminal. After 
the Commission had rejected appellants' plans for the 
building as destructive of the Terminal's historic and 
aesthetic features, with no judicial review thereafter 
being sought, appellants brought suit in state court 
claiming that the application of the Landmarks Law 
had "taken" their property without just compensation 
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and arbitrarily deprived them of their property 
without due process of law in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court's grant of 
relief was reversed on appeal, the New York Court of 
Appeals ultimately concluding that there was no 
"taking" since the Landmarks Law had not 
transferred control of the property to the city, but 
only restricted appellants' exploitation of it; and that 
there was no denial of due process because (1) the 
same use of the Terminal was permitted as before; 
(2) the appellants had not shown that they could not 
earn a reasonable return on their investment*l05 in 
the Terminal itself; (3) even if the Terminal proper 
could never operate at a reasonable profit, some of 
the income from Penn Central's extensive real estate 
holdings in the area must realistically be imputed to 
the Terminal; and (4) the development rights above 
the Terminal, which were made transferable to 
numerous sites in the vicinity, provided significant 
compensation for loss of rights above the Terminal 
itself. Held: The application of the Landmarks Law 
to the Terminal property does not constitute a 
"talung" of appellants' property within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the 
States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 2559- 
2666. 
(a) In a wide variety of contexts the government 
may execute laws or programs that adversely affect 
recognized economic values without its action 
constituting a "taking," and in instances such as 
zoning laws where a state tribunal has reasonably 
concluded that "the health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare" would be promoted by prohibiting particular 
contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld 
land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely 
affected real property interests. In many instances 
use restrictions that served a substantial public 
purpose have been upheld against "talung" 
challenges, e. 2.. Goldblatt v. Hem~stead, 369 U.S. 
590. 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130: Hadc~chrck v. 
Sebastian. 239 U.S. 394. 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348, 
though a state statute that substantially furthers 
important public policies may so frustrate distinct 
investment-backed expectations as ""2650 to 
constitute a "taking," e. p.. Pennsvh~anin Coal Co. I). 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393. 43 S.Ct. 158. 67 L.Ed. 322, 
and government acquisitions of resources to permit 
uniquely public functions constitute "talungs," a 
United States v. Catuh11.328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 
90 L.Ed. 1206. Pp. 2659-2662. 
(b) In deciding whether particular governmental 
action has effected a "taking," the character of the 
action and nature and extent of the interference with 
property rights (here the city tax block designated as 
the "landmark site") are focused upon, rather than 
discrete segments thereof. Consequently, appellants 
cannot establish a "taking" simply by showing that 
they have been denied the ability to exploit the super- 
jacent airspace, irrespective of the remainder of 
appellants' parcel. Pp. 2662-2663. 
(c) Though diminution in property value alone, as 
may result from a zoning law, cannot establish a 
"taking," as appellants concede, they urge that the 
regulation of individual landmarks is different 
because it applies only to selected properties. But it 
does not follow that landmark laws, which embody a 
comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic 
or aesthetic interest, are discriminatory, like "reverse 
spot" zoning. Nor can it be successfully contended 
that designation of a landmark involves only a matter 
of taste and therefore will inevitably "106 lead to 
arbitrary results, for judicial review is available and 
there is no reason to believe it will be less effective 
than would be so in the case of zoning or any other 
context. Pp. 2663-2664. 
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(d) That the Landmarks Law affects some 
landowners more severely than others does not itself 
result in "taking," for that is often the case with 
general welfare and zoning legislation. Nor, 
contrary to appellants' contention, are they solely 
burdened and unbenefited by the Landmarks Law, 
which has been extensively applied and was enacted 
on the basis of the legislative judgment that the 
preservation of landmarks benefits the citizenry both 
economically and by improving the overall quality of 
city life. Pp. 2664-2665. 
(e) The Landmarks Law no more effects an 
appropriation of the airspace above the Terminal for 
governmental uses than would a zoning law 
appropriate property; it simply prohibits appellants 
or others from occupying certain features of that 
space while allowing appellants gainfully to use the 
remainder of the parcel. United States v. Causby, 
supra, distinguished. P. 2665. 
(f) The Landmarks Law, which does not interfere 
with the Terminal's present uses or prevent Penn 
Central from realizing a "reasonable return" on its 
investment, does not impose the drastic limitation on 
appellants' ability to use the air rights above the 
Terminal that appellants claim, for on this record 
there is no showing that a smaller, harmonizing 
structure would not be authorized. Moreover, the 
pre-existing air rights are made transferable to other 
parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, thus 
mitigating whatever financial burdens appellants 
have incurred. Pp. 2665-2666. 
42 N.Y.2d 324, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914. 366 N.E.2d 
1271, affirmed. 
Daniel M. Gribbon, Washington, D. C., for 
appellants. 
Leonard J. Koerner, New York City, for appellees. 
Patricia M. Wald, Washington, D. C., for the U. S., 
as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. 
*I07 Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion 
of the Court. 
The question presented is whether a city may, as part 
of a comprehensive program to preserve historic 
landmarks and historic districts, place restrictions on 
the development of individual historic landmarks-in 
addition to those imposed by applicable zoning 
ordinances-without effecting a "taking" requiring the 
payment of "just compensation." Specifically, we 
must decide whether the application of New York 
City's Landmarks Preservation Law to the parcel of 
land occupied by Grand Central Terminal has "taken" 
its owners' property in violation**2651 of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Over the past 50 years, all 50 States and over 500 
municipalities have enacted laws to encourage or 
require the preservation of buildings and areas with 
historic or aesthetic importance.= These nationwide 
legislative efforts have been "108 precipitated by 
two concerns. The first is recognition that, in recent 
years, large numbers of historic structures, 
landmarks, and areas have been destroyed FN2 without 
adequate consideration of either the values 
represented therein or the possibility of preserving 
the destroyed properties for use in economically 
productive ways. The second is a widely shared 
belief that structures with special historic, cultural, or 
architectural significance enhance the quality of life 
for all. Not only do these buildings and their 
workmanship represent the lessons of the past and 
embody precious features of our heritage, they serve 
as examples of quality for today. "[Hlistoric 
conservation is but one aspect of the much larger 
problem, basically an environmental one, of 
enhancing-or perhaps developing for the first time- 
the quality of life for people." FN4 
FNI. See National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, A Guide to State Historic 
Preservation Programs (1976); National 
Trust for Historic Preservation, Directory of 
Landmark and Historic District 
Commissions (1976). In addition to these 
state and municipal legislative efforts, 
Congress has determined that "the historical 
and cultural foundations of the Nation 
should be preserved as a living part of our 
community life and development in order to 
give a sense of orientation to the American 
people," National Historic Preservation Act 
of 1966, 80 Stat. 915, 16 U.S.C. 6 470(b) 
(1976 ed.), and has enacted a series of 
measures designed to encourage 
preservation of sites and structures of 
historic, architectural, or cultural 
significance. See generally Gray, The 
Response of Federal Legislation to Historic 
Preservation, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3 14 
(1 97 1 ). 
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FN2. Over one-half of the buildings listed in 
the Historic American Buildings Survey, 
begun by the Federal Government in 1933, 
have been destroyed. See Costonis, The 
Chicarlo Plan: Incentive Zoning and the 
Preservation of Urban Landmarks. 85 
Harv.L.Rev. 574, 574 n. 1 (19721, citing 
Huxtable, Bank's Building Plan Sets Off 
Debate on "Progress," N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 
1971, section 8, p. 1, col. 2. 
FN3. See, e. g., N.Y.C. Admin. Code, $ 
205-1 .O(a) (1976). 
FN4. Gilbert, Introduction, Precedents for 
-
the Future, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3 1 1, 
3 12 (1971), quoting address by Robert Stipe, 
197 1 Conference on Preservation Law, 
Washington, D. C., May 1, 1971 
(unpublished text, pp. 6-7). 
New York City, responding to similar concerns and 
acting "109 pursuant to a New York State enabling 
A C ~ , ~  adopted its Landmarks Preservation Law in 
1965. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code, ch. 8-A, $ 205-1.0 
el seq. (1976). The city acted from the conviction 
that "the standing of [New York City] as a world- 
wide tourist center and world capital of business, 
culture and government" would be threatened if 
legislation were not enacted to protect historic 
landmarks and neighborhoods from precipitate 
decisions to destroy or fundamentally alter their 
character. $ 205-l.O(a). The city believed that 
comprehensive measures to safeguard desirable 
features of the existing urban fabric would benefit its 
citizens in a variety of ways: e. g.,  fostering "civic 
pride in the beauty and noble accomplishments of the 
past"; protecting and enhancing "the city's attractions 
to tourists and visitors"; "support[ing] and stimul 
[ating] business and industry"; "strengthen[ing] the 
economy of the city"; and promoting "the use of 
historic districts, landmarks, interior landmarks and 
scenic landmarks for the education, pleasure and 
welfare of the people of the city." $ 205-1 .O(b). 
FN5. See N.Y.Gen.Mun.Law # 96-a 
-
{McKinnev 1977). It declares that it is the 
public policy of the State of New York to 
preserve structures and areas with special 
historical or aesthetic interest or value and 
authorizes local governments to impose 
reasonable restrictions to perpetuate such 
structures and areas. 
The New York City law is typical of many urban 
landmark laws in that its primary method of 
achieving its goals is not by **2652 acquisitions of 
historic properties,w but rather by involving public 
entities in land-use decisions affecting these 
properties "110 and providing services, standards, 
controls, and incentives that will encourage 
preservation by private owners and users.:N7 While 
the law does place special restrictions on landmark 
properties as a necessary feature to the attainment of 
its larger objectives, the major theme of the law is to 
ensure the owners of any such properties both a 
"reasonable return" on their investments and 
maximum latitude to use their parcels for purposes 
not inconsistent with the preservation goals. 
FN6. The consensus is that widespread 
-
public ownership of historic properties in 
urban settings is neither feasible nor wise. 
Public ownership reduces the tax base, 
burdens the public budget with costs of 
acquisitions and maintenance, and results in 
the preservation of public buildings as 
museums and similar facilities, rather than 
as economically productive features of the 
urban scene. See Wilson & Winkler, The 
Response of State Legislation to Historic 
Preservation, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 
329,330-33 1,339-340 (197 1). 
FN7. See Costonis, supra n.2, at 580-581; 
-
Wilson & Winkler, supra n.6; Ranlun, 
Operation and Interpretation of the New 
York City Landmark Preservation Law, 36 
Law & Contemp. Prob. 366 (1971). 
The operation of the law can be briefly summarized. 
The primary responsibility for administering the law 
is vested in the Landmarks Preservation Commission 
(Commission), a broad based, I 1-member agency 
assisted by a technical staff. The Commission first 
performs the function, critical to any landmark 
preservation effort, of identifying properties and 
areas that have "a special character or special 
historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the 
development, heritage or cultural characteristics of 
the city, state or nation." $ 207-1 .O(n); see Q 207- 
1 .O(h). If the Commission determines, after giving 
all interested parties an opportunity to be heard, that a 
building or area satisfies the ordinance's criteria, it 
will designate a building to be a "landmark," Q 207- 
l.O(n), situatedxlll on a particular "landmark 
site," $ 207-1.0(0 ), or will designate an area to 
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be a "historic district," jj 207-l.O(h). After the 
Commission makes a designation, New York City's 
Board of Estimate, after considering the relationship 
of the designated property "to the master plan, the 
zoning resolution, projected public improvements 
and any plans for the renewal of the area involved," jj 
207-2.0(g)(l), may modify or disapprove the 
designation, and the owner may seek **2653 judicial 
review of the final designation decision. Thus far, 
3 1 historic districts and over 400 individual 
landmarks have been finally d e ~ i ~ n a t e d , ~  and the 
process is a continuing one. 
FNs. The ordinance creating the 
Commission requires that it include at least 
three architects, one historian qualified in 
the field, one city planner or landscape 
architect, one realtor, and at least one 
resident of each of the city's five boroughs. 
N.Y.C. Charter jj 534 (1976). In addition 
to the ordinance's requirements concerning 
the composition of the Commission, there is, 
according to a former chairman, a "prudent 
tradition" that the Commission include one 
or two lawyers, preferably with experience 
in municipal government, and several 
laymen with no specialized qualifications 
other than concern for the good of the city. 
Goldstone, Aesthetics in Historic Districts, 
36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 379, 384-385 
(1971). 
FN9. " 'Landmark.' Any improvement, any 
part of which is thirty years old or older, 
which has a special character or special 
historical or aesthetic interest or value as 
part of the development, heritage or cultural 
characteristics of the city, state or nation and 
which has been designated as a landmark 
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter." 
4 207-1 .O(n). 
FN 10. " 'Landmark site.' An improvement 
parcel or part thereof on which is situated a 
landmark and any abutting improvement 
parcel or part thereof used as and 
constituting part of the premises on which 
the landmark is situated, and which has been 
designated as a landmark site pursuant to the 
provisions of this chapter." jj 207-1.0(0 ). 
FNII. " 'Historic district.' Any area which: 
(1) contains improvements which: (a) have 
a special character or special historical or 
aesthetic interest or value; and (b) represent 
one or more periods or styles of architecture 
typical of one or more eras in the history of 
the city; and (c) cause such area, by reason 
of such factors, to constitute a distinct 
section of the city; and (2) has been 
designated as a historic district pursuant to 
the provisions of this chapter." jj 207- 
l.O(h). The Act also provides for the 
designation of a "scenic landmark," see # 
207-1 .O(w), and an "interior landmark." 
See 4 207-1 .O(m). 
FN 12. See Landmarks Preservation 
Commission of the City of New York, 
Landmarks and Historic Districts. (1977). 
Although appellants are correct in noting 
that some of the designated landmarks are 
publicly owned, the vast majority are, like 
Grand Central Terminal, privately owned 
structures. 
Final designation as a landmark results in restrictions 
upon the property owner's options concerning use of 
the landmark site. First, the law imposes a duty 
upon the owner to keep the exterior features of the 
building "in good' repair" to assure that the law's 
objectives not be defeated by the landmark's "112 
falling into a state of irremediable disrepair. See # 
207-lO.O(a). Second, the Commission must approve 
in advance any proposal to alter the exterior 
archtectural features of the landmark or to construct 
any exterior improvement on the landmark site, thus 
ensuring that decisions concerning construction on 
the landmark site are made with due consideration of 
both the public interest in the maintenance of the 
structure and the landowner's interest in use of the 
property. See jj jj 207-4.0 to 207-9.0. 
In the event an owner wishes to alter a landmark site, 
three separate procedures are available through which 
administrative approval may be obtained. First, the 
owner may apply to the Commission for a "certificate 
of no effect on protected architectural features": that 
is, for an order approving the improvement or 
alteration on the ground that it will not change or 
affect any architectural feature of the landmark and 
will be in harmony therewith. See jj 207-5.0. 
Denial of the certificate is subject to judicial review. 
Second, the owner may apply to the Commission for 
a certificate of .''appropriateness." See jj 207-6.0. 
Such certificates will be granted if the Commission 
concludes-focusing upon aesthetic, historical, and 
architectural values-that the proposed construction on 
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the landmark site would not unduly hinder the 
protection, enhancement, perpetuation, and use of the 
landmark. Again, denial of the certificate is subject 
to judicial review. Moreover, the owner who is 
denied either a certificate of no exterior effect or a 
certificate of appropriateness may submit an 
alternative or modified plan for approval. The final 
procedure-seeking a certificate of appropriateness on 
the ground of "insufficient return," see 4 207-8.0- 
provides special mechanisms, which vary depending 
on whether or not the landmark enjoys a tax 
exemption,m to ensure **2654 that designation 
does not cause economic hardship. 
FN13. If the owner of a non-tax-exempt 
parcel has been denied certificates of 
appropriateness for a proposed alteration 
and shows that he is not earning a 
reasonable return on the property in its 
present state, the Commission and other city 
agencies must assume the burden of 
developing a plan that will enable the 
landmark owner to earn a reasonable return 
on the landmark site. The plan may 
include, but need not be limited to, partial or 
complete tax exemption, remission of taxes, 
and authorizations for alterations, 
construction, or reconstruction appropriate 
for and not inconsistent with the purposes of 
the law. jj 207-8.0(c). The owner is free 
to accept or reject a plan devised by the 
Commission and approved by the other city 
agencies. If he accepts the plan, he 
proceeds to operate the property pursuant to 
the plan. If he rejects the plan, the 
Commission may recommend that the city 
proceed by eminent domain to acquire a 
protective interest in the landmark, but if the 
city does not do so within a specified time 
period, the Commission must issue a notice 
allowing the property owner to proceed with 
the alteration or improvement as originally 
proposed in his application for a certificate 
of appropriateness. 
Tax-exempt structures are treated somewhat 
differently. They become eligible for special 
treatment only if four preconditions are satisfied: (1) 
the owner previously entered into an agreement to 
sell the parcel that was contingent upon the issuance 
of a certificate of approval; (2) the property, as it 
exists at the time of the request, is not capable of 
earning a reasonable retum; (3) the structure is no 
longer suitable to its past or present purposes; and 
(4) the prospective buyer intends to alter the 
landmark structure. In the event the owner 
demonstrates that the property in its present state is 
not earning a reasonable return, the Commission 
must either find another buyer for it or allow the sale 
and construction to proceed. 
But this is not the only remedy available for owners 
of tax-exempt landmarks. As the case at bar 
illustrates, see infra, at 2658, if an owner files suit 
and establishes that he is incapable of earning a 
"reasonable retum" on the site in its present state, he 
can be afforded judicial relief. Similarly, where a 
landmark owner who enjoys a tax exemption has 
demonstrated that the landmark structure, as 
restricted, is totally inadequate for the owner's 
"legitimate needs," the law has been held invalid as 
applied to that parcel. See Lrrtherrrn Chirrch V .  Citv 
o f N e w  York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 316 
N.E.2d 305 (1974). 
"113 Although the designation of a landmark and 
landmark site restricts the owner's control over the 
parcel, designation also enhances the economic 
position of the landmark owner in one significant 
respect. Under New York City's zoning laws, 
owners of real property who have not developed their 
property *I14 to the full extent permitted by the 
applicable zoning laws are allowed to transfer 
development rights to contiguous parcels on the same 
city block. See New York City, Zoning Resolution 
Art. I, ch. 2, 8 12-1 0 (1978) (definition of "zoning 
lot"). A 1968 ordinance gave the owners of 
.landmark sites additional opportunities to transfer 
development rights to other parcels. Subject to a 
restriction that the floor area of the transferee lot may 
not be increased by more than 20% above its 
authorized level, the ordinance permitted transfers 
from a landmark parcel to property across the street 
or across a street intersection. In 1969, the law 
governing the conditions under which transfers from 
landmark parcels could occur was liberalized, see 
New York City Zoning Resolutions 74-79 to 74-793, 
apparently to ensure that the Landmarks Law would 
not unduly restrict the development options of the 
owners of Grand Central Terminal. See Marcus, Air 
Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. 372, 375 (1971). The class of 
recipient lots was expanded to include lots "across a 
street and opposite to another lot or lots which except 
for the intervention of streets or street intersections f 
[orlm a series extending to the lot occupied by the 
landmark building [, provided that] all lots [are] in 
the same ownership." New York City Zoning 
Resolution 74-79 (emphasis d e ~ e t e d ) . ~  In addition, 
the 1969 amendment permits, in highly 
cornmercialized*115 areas like midtown Manhattan, 
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the transfer of all unused development rights to a these are eligible to be recipients of development 
single parcel. Ibid. rights afforded the Terminal by virtue of landmark 
designation. 
FN14. To obtain approval for a proposed 
-
transfer, the landmark owner must follow 
the following procedure. First, he must 
obtain the permission of the Commission 
which will examine the plans for the 
development of the transferee lot to 
determine whether the planned construction 
would be compatible with the landmark. 
Second, he must obtain the approbation of 
New York City's Planning Commission 
which will focus on the effects of the 
transfer on occupants of the buildings in the 
vicinity of the transferee lot and whether the 
landmark owner will preserve the landmark. 
Finally, the matter goes to the Board of 
Estimate, which has final authority to grant 
or deny the application. See also Costonis, 
supra n.2, at 585-586 (1972). 
This case involves the application of New York 
City's Landmarks Preservation Law to Grand Central 
Terminal (Terminal). The Terminal, which is owned 
by the Penn Central Transportation Co. and its 
affiliates (Penn Central), is one of New York City's 
most famous buildings. Opened in 1913, it is 
regarded not only as providing an ingenious 
engineering solution to the problems presented by 
urban railroad stations, but also as a magnificent 
example of the French beaux-arts style. 
The Terminal is located in midtown Manhattan. Its 
south facade faces 42d Street and that street's 
intersection with Park Avenue. At street level, the 
Terminal is bounded on the west by Vanderbilt 
Avenue, on the east by the Commodore Hotel, and on 
the north by the Pan-American Building. Although a 
20-story office tower, to have been located above the 
Terminal, was part of the original design, the planned 
tower was never c o n ~ t r u c t e d . ~  The Terminal itself 
is an eight-story structure which Penn **2655 Central 
uses as a railroad station and in which it rents space 
not needed for railroad purposes to a variety of 
commercial interests. The Terminal is one of a 
number of properties owned by appellant Penn 
Central in this area of midtown Manhattan. The 
others include the Barclay, Biltmore, Commodore, 
Roosevelt, and Waldorf-Astoria Hotels, the Pan- 
American Building and other office buildings along 
Park Avenue, and the Yale Club. At least eight of 
FN 1 5. The Terminal's present foundation 
includes columns, which were built into it 
for the express purpose of supporting the 
proposed 20-story tower. 
On August 2, 1967, following a public hearing, the 
Commission designated the Terminal a "landmark" 
and designated the *I16 "city tax block" it occupies 
a "landmark site." The Board of Estimate 
confirmed this action on September 21, 1967. 
Although appellant Penn Central had opposed the 
designation before the Commission, it did not seek 
judicial review of the final designation decision. 
FN 16. The Commission's report stated: 
"Grand Central Station, one of the great buildings of 
America, evokes a spirit that is unique in this City. 
It combines distinguished architecture with a brilliant 
engineering solution, wedded to one of the most 
fabulous railroad terminals of our time. Monumental 
in scale, this great building functions as well today as 
it did when built. In style, it represents the best of 
the French Beaux Arts." Record 2240. 
On January 22, 1968, appellant Penn Central, to 
increase its income, entered into a renewable 50-year 
lease and sublease agreement with appellant UGP 
Properties, Inc. (UGP), a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Union General Properties, Ltd., a United Kingdom 
corporation. Under the terms of the agreement, UGP 
was to construct a multistory ofice building above 
the Terminal. UGP promised to pay Penn Central $1 
million annually during construction and at least $3 
million annually thereafter. The rentals would be 
offset in part by a loss of some $700,000 to $1 
million in net rentals presently received from 
concessionaires displaced by the new building. 
Appellants UGP and Penn Central then applied to 
the Commission for permission to construct an office 
building atop the Terminal. Two separate plans, 
both designed by architect Marcel Breuer and both 
apparently satisfying the terms of the applicable 
zoning ordinance, were submitted to the Commission 
for approval. The first, Breuer 1, provided for the 
construction of a 55-story office building, to be 
cantilevered above the existing facade and to rest on 
the roof of the Terminal. The second, Breuer I1 
~ e v i s e d , ~  called for tearing *I17 down a portion 
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of the Terminal that included the 42d Street facade, 
stripping off some of the remaining features of the 
Terminal's facade, and constructing a 53-story office 
building. The Commission denied a certificate of no 
exterior effect on September 20, 1968. Appellants 
then applied for a certificate of "appropriateness" as 
to both proposals. After four days of hearings at 
which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission 
denied this application as to both proposals. 
FN17. Appellants also submitted a plan, 
denominated Breuer 11, to the Commission. 
However, because appellants learned that 
Breuer I1 would have violated existing 
easements, they substituted Breuer I1 
Revised for Breuer 11, and the Commission 
evaluated the appropriateness only of Breuer 
I1 Revised. 
The Commission's reasons for rejecting certificates 
respecting Breuer I1 Revised are summarized in the 
following statement: "To protect a Landmark, one 
does not tear it down. To perpetuate its architectural 
features, one does not strip them off." Record 2255. 
Breuer I, which would have preserved the existing 
vertical facades of the present structure, received 
more sympathetic consideration. The Commission 
first focused on the effect that the proposed tower 
would have on one desirable feature created by the 
present structure and its surroundings: the dramatic 
view of the Terminal from Park Avenue South. 
Although appellants had contended that the Pan- 
American Building had already destroyed the 
silhouette of the south facade and that one additional 
tower could do no **2656 hrther damage and might 
even provide a better background for the facade, the 
Commission disagreed, stating that it found the 
majestic approach from the south to be still unique in 
the city and that a 55-story tower atop the Terminal 
would be far more detrimental to its south facade 
than the Pan-American Building 375 feet away. 
Moreover, the Commission found that from closer 
vantage points the Pan Am Building and the other 
towers were largely cut off from view, which would 
not be the case of the mass on top of the Terminal 
planned under Breuer I. In conclusion, the 
Commission stated: 
"[We have] no fixed rule against making additions to 
designated buildings-it all depends on how they are 
done . . . . But to balance a 55-story office tower 
above *I18 a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems 
nothing more than an aesthetic joke. Quite simply, 
the tower would overwhelm the Tefminal by its sheer 
mass. The 'addition' would be four times as high as 
the existing structure and would reduce the Landmark 
itself to the status of a curiosity. 
"Landmarks cannot be divorced from their settings- 
particularly when the setting is a dramatic and 
integral part of the original concept. The Terminal, 
in its setting, is a great example of urban design. 
Such examples are not so plentiful in New York City 
that we can afford to lose any of the few we have. 
And we must preserve them in a meaningful way- 
with alterations and additions of such character, 
scale, materials and mass as will protect, enhance and 
perpetuate the original design rather than overwhelm 
it." Id., at 2251. 
FN18. In discussing Breuer I, the 
Commission also referred to a number of 
instances in which it had approved additions 
to landmarks: "The office and reception 
wing added to Gracie Mansion and the 
school and church house added to the 12th 
Street side of the First Presbyterian Church 
are examples that harmonize in scale, 
material and character with the structures 
they adjoin. The new Watch Tower Bible 
and Tract Society building on Brooklyn 
Heights, though completely modem in 
idiom, respects the qualities of its 
surroundings and will enhance the Brooklyn 
Heights Historic District, as Butterfield 
House enhances West 12th Street, and 
Breuer's own Whitney Museum.its Madison 
Avenue locale." Record 225 1. 
Appellants did not seek judicial review of the denial 
of either certificate. Because the Terminal site 
enjoyed a tax exemption,w remained suitable for its 
present and future uses, and was not the subject of a 
contract of sale, there were no further administrative 
remedies available to appellants as to the Breuer I 
and Breuer I1 Revised plans. See n. 13, supra. 
Further, appellants did not avail themselves of the 
opportunity to develop *I19 and submit other plans 
for the Commission's consideration and approval. 
Instead, appellants filed suit in New York Supreme 
Court, Trial Term, claiming, inter. alia, that the 
application of the Landmarks Preservation Law had 
"taken" their property without just compensation in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and arbitrarily deprived them of their property 
without due process of law in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Appellants sought a 
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief barring the 
city from using the Landmarks Law to impede the 
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construction of any structure that might otherwise 
lawfilly be constructed on the Terminal site, and 
damages for the "temporary taking" that occurred 
between August 2, 1967, the designation date, and 
the date when the restrictions arising from the 
Landmarks Law would be lifted. The trial court 
granted the injunctive and declaratory relief, but 
severed the question of damages for a "temporary 
talung." 
FN19. See N.Y. Real Prou. Tax Law Ci 489- 
aa et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1977). 
-
FN20. Although that court suggested that 
any regulation of private property to protect 
landmark values was unconstitutional if 
"just compensation" were not afforded, it 
also appeared to rely upon its findings: first, 
that the cost to Pem Central of operating the 
Terminal building itself, exclusive of purely 
railroad operations, exceeded the revenues 
received from concessionaires and tenants in 
the Terminal; and second, that the special 
transferable development rights afforded 
Penn Central as an owner of a landmark site 
did not "provide compensation to plaintiffs 
or minimize the harm suffered by plaintiffs 
due to the designation of the Terminal as a 
landmark." 
**2657 111 Appellees appealed, and the New York 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed. 50 
A.D.2d 265,377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975). The Appellate 
Division held that the restrictions on the development 
of the Terminal site were necessary to promote the 
legitimate public purpose of protecting landmarks 
and therefore that appellants could sustain their 
constitutional claims only by proof that the regulation 
deprived them of all reasonable beneficial use of the 
property. The Appellate Division held that the 
evidence appellants *I20 introduced at trial- 
"Statements of Revenues and Costs," purporting to 
show a net operating loss for the years 1969 and 
1971, which were prepared for the instant litigation- 
had not satisfied their b ~ r d e n . ~  First, the court 
rejected the claim that these statements showed that 
the Terminal was operating at a loss, for in the court's 
view, appellants had improperly attributed some 
railroad operating expenses and taxes to their real 
estate operations and compounded that error by 
failing to impute any rental value to the vast space in 
the Terminal devoted to railroad purposes. Further, 
the Appellate Division concluded that appellants had 
failed to establish either that they were unable to 
increase the Terminal's commercial income by 
transforming vacant or underutilized space to 
revenue-producing use, or that the unused 
development rights over the Terminal could not have 
been profitably transferred to one or more nearby 
 site^.^ The Appellate Division concluded that all 
appellants had succeeded in showing was that they 
had been deprived of the property's most profitable 
use, and that this showing did not establish that 
appellants had been unconstitutionally deprived of 
their property. 
FN2 1. These statements appear to have 
reflected the costs of maintaining the 
exterior architectural features of the 
Terminal in "good repair" as required by the 
law. As would have been apparent in any 
case therefore, the existence of the duty to 
keep up the property was here-and will 
presumably always be-factored into the 
inquiry concerning the constitutionality of 
the landmark restrictions. 
The Appellate Division also rejected the claim that 
an agreement of Penn Central with the Metropolitan 
Transit Authority and the Connecticut Transit 
Authority provided a basis for invalidating the 
application of the Landmarks Law. 
FN22. The record reflected that Penn 
Central had given serious consideration to 
transferring some of those rights to either 
the Biltmore Hotel or the Roosevelt Hotel. 
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 42 
N.Y.2d 324. 397 N.Y.S.2d 914. 366 N.E.2d 1271 
(1977). That court summarily rejected any claim 
that the Landmarks Law had "taken" *I21 property 
without "just compensation," id.. at 329, 397 
N.Y.S.2d. at 917, 366 N.E.2d. at 1274, indicating that 
there could be no "talung" since the law had not 
transferred control of the property to the city, but 
only restricted appellants' exploitation of it. In that 
circumstance, the Court of Appeals held that 
appellants' attack on the law could prevail only if the 
law deprived appellants of their property in violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Whether or not there was a denial of 
substantive due process turned on whether the 
restrictions deprived Penn Central of a "reasonable 
return" on the "privately created and privately 
managed ingredient" of the Terminal. Id., at 328, 
397 N.Y.S.2d. at 916, 366 N.E.2d. at 1273 . '~~ '  The 
Court of **2658 Appeals concluded that the 
Landmarks Law had not effected a denial of due 
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process because: (1) the landmark regulation 
permitted the same use as had been made of the 
Terminal for more than half a century; (2) the 
appellants had failed to show that they could not earn 
a reasonable return on their investment in the 
Terminal itself; (3) even if the Terminal proper could 
never operate at a reasonable profit some of the 
income from Penn Central's extensive real estate 
holdings in the area, which include hotels and office 
buildings, must realistically be imputed to the 
Terminal; and "122 (4) the development rights 
above the Terminal, which had been made 
transferable to numerous sites in the vicinity of the 
Terminal, one or two of which were suitable for the 
construction of office buildings, were valuable to 
appellants and provided "significant, perhaps 'fair,' 
compensation for the loss of rights above the terminal 
itself." Id.. at 333-336. 397 N.Y.S.2d. at 922, 366 
N.E.2d. at 1276-1278. 
FN23. The Court of Appeals suggested that 
in calculating the value of the property upon 
which appellants were entitled to earn a 
reasonable return, the "publicly created 
components of the value of the property-i. 
e . ,  those elements of its value attributable to 
the "efforts of organized society" or to the 
"social complex" in which the Terminal is 
located-had to be excluded. However, since 
the record upon which the Court of Appeals 
decided the case did not, as that court 
recognized, contain a basis for segregating 
the privately created from the publicly 
created elements of the value of the 
Terminal site and since the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals in any event rests upon 
bases that support our aMirmance see infra, 
this page, we have no occasion to address 
the question whether it is permissible or 
feasible to separate out the "social 
increments" of the value of property. See 
Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context 
for the Grand Cen~ral Terminal Decision, 
91 Harv.L.Rev. 402,416-4 17 (1977). 
Observing that its affirmance was "[oln the present 
record," and that its analysis had not been fully 
developed by counsel at any level of the New York 
judicial system, the Court of Appeals directed that 
counsel "should be entitled to present . . . any 
additional submissions which, in the light of [the 
court's] opinion, may usefully develop further the 
factors discussed." Id., at 337, 397 N.Y.S.2d, at 922, 
366 N.E.2d. at 1279. Appellants chose not to avail 
themselves of this opportunity and filed a notice of 
appeal in this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction. 
434 U.S. 983 (19771. We affirm. 
The issues presented by appellants are (1) whether 
the restrictions imposed by New York City's law 
upon appellants' exploitation of the Terminal site 
effect a "taking" of appellants' property for a public 
use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, 
which of course is made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicapo, B. 
& 0. R. Co. v. Chicapo. 166 U.S. 226, 239, 17 S.Ct. 
581. 585. 41 L.Ed. 979 (18971, and, (23, if so, 
whether the transferable development rights afforded 
appellants constitute "just compensation" w i t h  the 
meaning of the Fifth ~ r n e n d m e n t . ~  We need only 
address the question whether a "taking" has 
o c c ~ r r e d . ~  
FN24. Our statement of the issues is a 
distillation of four questions presented in the 
jurisdictional statement: 
"Does the social and cultural desirability of 
preserving historical landmarks through government 
regulation derogate from the constitutional 
requirement that just compensation be paid for 
private property taken for public use? 
"Is Penn Central entitled to no compensation for that 
large but unmeasurable portion of the value of its 
rights to construct an office building over the Grand 
Central Terminal that is said to have been created by 
the efforts of 'society as an organized entity'? 
"Does a finding that Penn Central has failed to 
establish that there is no possibility, without 
exercising its development rights, of earning a 
reasonable return on all of its remaining properties 
that benefit in any way from the operations of the 
Grand Central Terminal warrant the conclusion that 
no compensation need be paid for the talung of those 
rights? 
"Does the possibility accorded to Penn Central, 
under the landmark-preservation regulation, of 
realizing some value at some time by transferring the 
Terminal development rights to other buildings, 
under a procedure that is conceded to be defective, 
severely limited, procedurally complex and 
speculative, and that requires ultimate discretionary 
approval by governmental authorities, meet the 
constitutional requirements of just compensation as 
applied to landmarks?" Jurisdictional Statement 3-4. 
The first and fourth questions assume that there has 
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been a taking and raise the problem whether, under 
the circumstances of this case, the transferable 
development rights constitute "just compensation." 
The second and third questions, on the other hand, 
are directed to the issue whether a taking has 
occurred. 
FN25. As is implicit in our opinion, we do 
not embrace the proposition that a "taking" 
can never occur unless government has 
transferred physical control over a portion of 
a parcel. 
Before considering appellants' specific 
contentions, it will be useful to review **2659 the 
factors that have shaped the jurisprudence of the Fifth 
Amendment injunction "nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." 
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a 
problem of considerable difficulty. While this Court 
has recognized that the "Fifth Amendment's 
guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole," Armstrong v. United States, 
364 *124U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 
L.Ed.2d 1554 (19601, this Court, quite simply, has 
been unable to develop any "set formula" for 
determining when "justice and fairness" require that 
economic injuries caused by public action be 
compensated by the government, rather than remain 
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. 
See Goldblatl v. Hemuslead, 369 U.S. 590, 594. 82 
S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). Indeed, we 
have frequently observed that whether a particular 
restriction will be rendered invalid by the 
government's failure to pay for any losses 
proximately caused by it depends largely "upon the 
particular circumstances [in that] case." United 
States v. Central Eirreka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 
168, 78 S.Ct. 1097, 1104. 2 L.Ed.2d 1228 (1958); 
see United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156, 
73 S.Ct. 200,203.97 L.Ed. 157 (1952). 
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiries, the Court's decisions have identified several 
factors that have particular significance. The 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant 
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. 
See Goldhlutt v. Henzpstead, supru, 369 U.S.. at 594, 
82 S.Ct.. at 990. So, too, is the character of the 
governmental action. A "talung" may more readily 
be found when the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by government, 
see, e. g.. United Stutes v. Cni~shv, 328 U.S. 256. 66 
S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946L than when 
interference arises from some public program 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good. 
"Government hardly could go on if to some extent 
values incident to property could not be diminished 
without paying for every such change in the general 
law," Pennsvlvanicr Coal Co. v. Muhon. 260 U.S. 
393.413.43 S.Ct. 158. 159.67 L.Ed. 322 (1922, and 
this Court has accordingly recognized, in a wide 
variety of contexts, that government may execute 
laws or programs that adversely affect recognized 
economic values. Exercises of the taxing power are 
one obvious example. A second are the decisions in 
which this Court has dismissed "taking" challenges 
on the ground that, while the challenged government 
action caused *I25 economic harm, it did not 
interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound 
up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to 
constitute "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes. 
See, e. g.. United States v. Willo14t River Power Co., 
324 U.S. 499, 65 S.Ct. 761, 89 L.Ed. 1101 (1945) 
(interest in high-water level of river for runoff for 
tailwaters to maintain power head is not property); 
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Wcrter. P o ~ w r  Co., 
229 U.S. 53, 33 S.Ct. 667, 57 L.Ed. 1063 (1913) (no 
property interest can exist in navigable waters); see 
also Dernoresl v. Citv Bunk Co.. 321 U.S. 36, 64 
S.Ct 384, 88 L.Ed. 526 (1944); M~rhlker v. Hurlem 
R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 25 S.Ct. 522, 49 L.Ed. 872 
(1905); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale 
L.J. 36,61-62 (1964). 
More importantly for the present case, in instances in 
which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that "the 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare" would be 
promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses 
of land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations 
that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real 
property interests. See N e c t o ~ ~  v. Cambrid~c. 277 
U.S. 183, 188, 48 S.Ct. 447, 448, 72 L.Ed. 842 
(1928). Zoning laws are, of course, the classic 
example, see **2660Euclicl v. Anihler Renlhi Co.. 
272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) 
(prohibition of industrial use); Gorich 11. Fox, 274 
U.S. 603, 608, 47 S.Ct. 675, 677, 71 L.Ed. 1228 
(requirement that portions of parcels be left 
unbuilt); JYelck v. S~vn.sey, 214 U.S. 91, 29 S.Ct. 
567. 53 L.Ed. 923 (1909) (height restriction), which 
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have been viewed as permissible governmental action 
even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of the 
property. See Goldhlatt v. Hernpstead, .supr-u. 369 
U.S., at 592-593, 82 S.Ct., at 988-989, and cases 
cited; see also Eastlake 11. Forest Citv Enter~rises~ 
Inc.. 426 U.S. 668, 674, n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 2362 n. 
8.49 L.Ed.2d 132 (1976). 
Zoning laws generally do not affect existing uses of 
real property, but "taking" challenges have also been 
held to be without merit in a wide variety of 
situations when the challenged g&ernmental actions 
prohibited a beneficial use to which individual 
parcels had previously been devoted and thus caused 
substantial individualized harm. Miller v. Schoene, 
276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246. 72 L.Ed. 568 (19281, is 
illustrative. In that case, a state entomologist, acting 
pursuant to a state statute, ordered *I26 the 
claimants to cut down a large number of ornamental 
red cedar trees because they produced cedar rust fatal 
to apple trees cultivated nearby. Although the 
statute provided for recovery of any expense incurred 
in removing the cedars, and permitted claimants to 
use the felled trees, it did not provide compensation 
for the value of the standing trees or for the resulting 
decrease in market value of the properties as a whole. 
A unanimous Court held that this latter omission did 
not render the statute invalid. The Court held that 
the State might properly make "a choice between the 
preservation of one class of property and that of the 
other" and since the apple industry was important in 
the State involved, concluded that the State had not 
exceeded "its constitutional powers by deciding upon 
the destruction of one class of property [without 
compensation] in order to save another which, in the 
judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the 
public." Id.. at 279.48 S.Ct., at 247. 
Again, Hadaclzech- v. Sebrrstiun, 239 U.S. 394, 36 
S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (19151 upheld a law 
prohibiting the claimant from continuing his 
otherwise lawful business of operating a brickyard in 
a particular physical community on the ground that 
the legislature had reasonably concluded that the 
presence of the brickyard was inconsistent with 
neighboring uses. See also United States v. Central 
Eureka Mining Co., supra (Government order closing 
gold mines so that skilled miners would be available 
for other mining work held not a taktng); Atchison, 
T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Conrni'n, 346 
U.S. 346. 74 S.Ct. 92, 98 L.Ed. 51 (1953) (railroad 
may be required to share cost of constructing railroad 
grade improvement); Wulls v. Midlrrnd Crn-)>on Co., 
254 U.S. 300,41 S.Ct. 11  8.65 L.Ed. 276 (1920) (law 
prohibiting manufacture of carbon black upheld); 
Rcinn1ar1 I). Little Rocli. 237 U.S. 17 1 , 35 S.Ct. 5 1 1 , 
59 L.Ed. 900 (191 51 (law prohibiting livery stable 
upheld); Mi~rler v. Kon.~a.r, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 
273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887) (law prohibiting liquor 
business upheld). 
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, is a recent 
example. There, a 1958 city safety ordinance 
banned any excavations below *I27 the water table 
and effectively prohibited the claimant from 
continuing a sand and gravel mining business that 
had been operated on the particular parcel since 1927. 
The Court upheld the ordinance against a "taking" 
challenge, although the ordinance prohibited the 
present and presumably most beneficial use of the 
property and had, like the regulations in Miller and 
Hadacheck, severely affected a particular owner. 
The Court assumed that the ordinance did not prevent 
the owner's reasonable use of the property since the 
owner made no showing of an adverse effect on the 
value of the land. Because the restriction served a 
substantial public purpose, the Court thus held no 
taking had occurred. It is, of course, implicit in 
Goldblatt that a use restriction on real property may 
constitute a "talung" if not reasonably necessary to 
the effectuation of a substantial public purpose, see 
**2661 Necto~v v. Conrbridne, .s~rur-a; cf. Moore v. 
East Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494, 5 13-514, 97 S.Ct. 
1932, 1943, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (19771 (STEVENS, J., 
concurring), or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh 
impact upon the owner's use of the property. 
Penn.s~~lvcmiu Coal Co. v. Muhon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 
S.Ct. 158. 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922), is the leading case 
for the proposition that a state statute that 
substantially fbrthers important public policies may 
so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations 
as to amount to a "taking." There the claimant had 
sold the surface rights to particular parcels of 
property, but expressly reserved the right to remove 
the coal thereunder. A Pennsylvania statute, enacted 
after the transactions, forbade any mining of coal that 
caused the subsidence of any house, unless the house 
was the property of the owner of the underlying coal 
and was more than 150 feet from the improved 
property of another. Because the statute made it 
commercially impracticable to mine the coal, id., at 
414. 43 S.Ct., at 159, and thus had nearly the same 
effect as the complete destruction of rights claimant 
had reserved from the owners of the surface land, see 
id.. at 414-415, 43 S.Ct., at 159-160, the Court held 
that the statute was invalid as effecting a "taking" 
"128 without just compensation. See also 
Ar-mstron~! v. U~~itecl Stutes, 364 U.S. 40, 80 S.Ct. 
1563. 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960) (Government's 
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complete destruction of a materialman's lien in 
certain property held a "taking"); Hucisort Water. Co. 
11. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355, 28 S.Ct. 529, 53 1, 
52 L.Ed. 828 (1908) (if height restriction makes 
property wholly useless "the rights of property . . . 
prevail over the other public interest" and 
compensation is required). See generally 
Michelman, Pro~ertv. Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just 
Compensation" Law. 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1 165, 1229- 
1234 (19671. 
Finally, government actions that may be 
characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or 
facilitate uniquely public functions have often been 
held to constitute "takings." Uniled Slales v. Culisbv. 
328 U.S. 256.66 S.Ct. 1062.90 L.Ed. 1206 (19461, is 
illustrative. In holding that direct overflights above 
the claimant's land, that destroyed the present use of 
the land as a chicken farm, constituted a "taking," 
Causby emphasized that Government had not 
"merely destroyed property [but was] using a part of 
it for the flight of its planes." Id., 328 U.S.. at 262- 
263. n. 7. 66 S.Ct.. at 1066. See also Gripas v.  
Allealtenv Counts, 369 U.S. 84, 82 S.Ct. 531, 7 
L.Ed.2d 585 (1962) (overflights held a talung); 
Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 43 
S.Ct. 135. 67 L.Ed. 287 (1922) (United States 
military installations' repeated firing of guns over 
claimant's land is a taking); United S1ate.y v. Cress, 
243 U.S. 316. 37 S.Ct. 380, 61 L.Ed. 746 (1917) 
(repeated floodings of land caused by water project is 
talung); but see YMCA 1). United Stales, 395 U.S. 85, 
89 S.Ct. 151 1, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 17 (1969) (damage 
caused to building when federal officers who were 
seelung to protect building were attacked by rioters 
held not a taking). See generally Michelman, supra, 
at 1226-1229; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 
Yale L.J. 36 (1964). 
121 In contending that the New York City law has 
"taken" their property in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, appellants make a series of 
arguments, which, while tailored to the facts of this 
case, essentially urge that *I29 any substantial 
restriction imposed pursuant to a landmark law must 
be accompanied by just compensation if it is to be 
constitutional. Before considering these, we 
emphasize what is not in dispute. Because this Court 
has recognized, in a number of settings, that States 
and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls 
to enhance the quality of life by preserving the 
character and desirable aesthetic features of a city, 
see Ne1.1) Orlcat7,v 11. D ~ ~ k e s .  427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 
2513. 49 L.Ed.2d 51 1 (1976); Younr v. Amn-icntl 
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50. 96 S.Ct. 2440. 49 
L.Ed.2d 3 10 (1 976); Villnpe o f  Belle Tert-c v. 
Bornas. 416 U.S. 1. 9-10. 94 S.Ct 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 
797 (1974); **2662 Berman v. Parker: 348 U.S. 26, 
33. 75 S.Ct. 98, 102. 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954); Welch 11. 
S~vasev, 214 U.S., at 108, 29 S.Ct., at 571, appellants 
do not contest that New York City's objective of 
preserving structures and areas with special historic, 
architectural, or cultural significance is an entirely 
permissible governmental goal. They also do not 
dispute that the restrictions imposed on its parcel are 
appropriate means of securing the purposes of the 
New York City law. Finally, appellants do not 
challenge any of the specific factual premises of the 
decision below. They accept for present purposes 
both that the parcel of land occupied by Grand 
Central Terminal must, in its present state, be 
regarded as capable of earning a reasonable 
r e t ~ r n , ~  and that the transferable development 
rights afforded appellants by virtue of the Terminal's 
designation as a landmark are valuable, even if not as 
valuable as the rights to construct above the 
Terminal. In appellants' view none of these factors 
derogate from their claim that New York City's law 
has effected a "talung." 
FN26. Both the Jurisdictional Statement 7-8, 
n. 7, and Brief for Appellants 8 n. 7 state 
that appellants are not seeking review of the 
New York courts' determination that Penn 
Central could earn a "reasonable return" on 
its investment in the Terminal. Although 
appellants suggest in their reply brief that 
the factual conclusions of the New York 
courts cannot be sustained unless we accept 
the rationale of the New York Court of 
Appeals, see Reply Brief for Appellants 12 
n. 15, it is apparent that the findings 
concerning Penn Central's ability to profit 
from the Terminal depend in no way on the 
Court of Appeals' rationale. 
"130 They first observe that the airspace above the 
Terminal is a valuable property interest, citing United 
Stales v. Causby, supra. They urge that the 
Landmarks Law has deprived them of any gainfil use 
of their "air rights" above the Terminal and that, 
irrespective of the value of the remainder of their 
parcel, the city has "taken" their right to this 
superadjacent airspace, thus entitling them to "just 
compensation" measured by the fair market value of 
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Appeals contrasted the New York City 
Landmarks Law with both zoning and 
historic-district legislation and stated at one 
point that landmark laws do not "further a 
general community plan," 42 N.Y.2d 324, 
330. 397 N.Y.S.2d 914. 918. 366 N.E.2d 
1271. 1274 (1977h it also emphasized that 
the implementation of the objectives of the 
Landmarks Law constitutes an "acceptable 
reason for singling out one particular parcel 
for different and less favorable treatment." 
Ihid., 397 N.Y.S.2d. at 918, 366 N.E.2d. at 
1275. Therefore, we do not understand the 
New York Court of Appeals to disagree with 
our characterization of the law. 
[131[141 Equally without merit is the related 
argument that the decision to designate a structure as 
a landmark "is inevitably arbitrary or at least 
subjective, because it is basically a matter of taste," 
Reply Brief for Appellants 22, thus unavoidably 
singling out individual landowners for disparate and 
unfair treatment. The argument has a particularly 
hollow ring in this case. For appellants not only did 
not seek judicial review of either the designation or 
of the denials of the certificates of appropriateness 
and of no exterior effect, but do  not even now suggest 
that the Commission's decisions concerning the 
Terminal were in any sense arbitrary or unprincipled. 
But, in *I33 any event, a landmark owner has a right 
to judicial review of any Commission decision, and, 
quite simply, there is no basis whatsoever for a 
conclusion that courts will have any greater difficulty 
identifying arbitrary or discriminatory action in the 
context of landmark regulation than in the **2664 
context of classic zoning or indeed in any other 
context.= 
FN29. When a property owner challenges 
the application of a zoning ordinance to his 
property, the judicial inquiry focuses upon 
whether the challenged restriction can 
reasonably be deemed to promote the 
objectives of the community land-use plan, 
and will include consideration of the 
treatment of similar parcels. See generally 
NCCIOM) V .  Cnntbrid~e, 277 U.S. 183, 48 
S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928). When a 
property owner challenges a landmark 
designation or restriction as arbitrary or 
discriminatory, a similar inquiry presumably 
will occur. 
Next, appellants observe that New York City's 
law differs from zoning laws and historic-district 
ordinances in that the Landmarks Law does not 
impose identical or similar restrictions on all 
structures located in particular physical communities. 
It follows, they argue, that New York City's law is 
inherently incapable of producing the fair and 
equitable distribution of benefits and burdens of 
governmental action which is characteristic of zoning 
laws and historic-district legislation and which they 
maintain is a constitutional requirement if "just 
compensation" is not to be afforded. It is, of course, 
true that the Landmarks Law has a more severe 
impact on some landowners than on others, but that 
in itself does not mean that the law effects a "talung." 
Legislation designed to promote the general welfare 
commonly burdens some more than others. The 
owners of the'brickyard in Hadacheck, of the cedar 
trees in Miller v. Schoene, and of the gravel and sand 
mine in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, were uniquely 
burdened by the legislation sustained in those 
 case^.^ Similarly, zoning"l34 laws often affect 
some property owners more severely than others but 
have not been held to be invalid on that account. For 
example, the property owner in Euclid who wished to 
use its property for industrial purposes was affected 
far more severely by the ordinance than its neighbors 
who wished to use their land for residences. 
FN30. Appellants attempt to distinguish 
these cases on the ground that, in each, 
government was prohibiting a "noxious" use 
of land and that in the present case, in 
contrast, appellants' proposed construction 
above the Terminal would be beneficial. 
We observe that the uses in issue in 
Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt were 
perfectly lawful in themselves. They 
involved no "blameworthiness, . . . moral 
wrongdoing or conscious act of dangerous 
risk-talung which induce[d society] to shift 
the cost to a pa[rt]icular individual." Sax, 
Talungs and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 
36, 50 (1964). These cases are better 
understood as resting not on any supposed 
"noxious" quality of the prohibited uses but 
rather on the ground that the restrictions 
were reasonably related to the 
implementation of a policy-not unlike 
historic preservation-expected to produce a 
widespread public benefit and applicable to 
all similarly situated property. 
Nor, correlatively, can it be asserted that the 
destruction or fundamental alteration of a historic 
landmark is not harmful. The suggestion that the 
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beneficial quality of appellants' proposed 
construction is established by the fact that the 
construction would have been consistent with 
applicable zoning laws ignores the development in 
sensibilities and ideals reflected in landmark 
legislation like New York City's. Cf. West Bros. 
Brick Co. v. Alexandria. 169 Va. 271, 282-283. 192 
S.E. 881. 885-886. u~peal  cli.smis.se~1 fbr want o f 'a  
suhsfuntial fe(lerc11 otlestion, 302 U.S. 658. 58 S.Ct. 
369. 82 L.Ed. 508 (1937). 
11 61 r171 In any event, appellants' repeated 
suggestions that they are solely burdened and 
unbenefited is factually inaccurate. This contention 
overlooks the fact that the New York City law applies 
to vast numbers of structures in the city in addition to 
the Terminal-all the structures contained in the 31 
historic districts and over 400 individual landmarks, 
many of which are close to the ~ e r m i n a l . ~  Unless 
we are to reject the judgment of the New York City 
Council that the preservation of landmarks benefits 
all New York citizens and all structures, both 
economically and by improving the quality of life in 
the city as a whole-which we are unwilling to do-we 
cannot *I35 conclude that the owners of the 
Terminal have in no sense been benefited by the 
Landmarks Law. Doubtless appellants believe they 
are more burdened than **2665 benefited by the law, 
but that must have been true, too, of the property 
owners in Miller, Hadacheck, Euclid, and Goldblatt. 
FN32 
-
FN31. There are some 53 designated 
landmarks and 5 historic districts or scenic 
landmarks in Manhattan between 14th and 
59th Streets. See Landmarks Preservation 
Commission, Landmarks and Historic 
Districts (1977). 
FN32. It is, of course, true that the fact the 
duties imposed by zoning and historic- 
district legislation apply throughout 
particular physical communities provides 
assurances against arbitrariness, but the 
applicability of the Landmarks Law to a 
large number of parcels in the city, in our 
view, provides comparable, if not identical, 
assurances. 
[181 Appellants' final broad-based attack would have 
us treat the law as an instance, like that in United 
States v. Causby, in which government, acting in an 
enterprise capacity, has appropriated part of their 
property for some strictly governmental purpose. 
Apart from the fact that Catlsby was a case of 
invasion of airspace that destroyed the use of the 
farm beneath and this New York City law has in 
nowise impaired the present use of the Terminal, the 
Landmarks Law neither exploits appellants' parcel for 
city purposes nor facilitates nor arises from any 
entrepreneurial operations of the city. The situation 
is not remotely like that in Causby where the airspace 
above the property was in the flight pattern for 
military aircraft. The Landmarks Law's effect is 
simply to prohibit appellants or anyone else from 
occupying portions of the airspace above the 
Terminal, while permitting appellants to use the 
remainder of the parcel in a gainful fashion. This is 
no more an appropriation of property by government 
for its own uses'than is a zoning law prohibiting, for 
"aesthetic" reasons, two or more adult theaters within 
a specified area, see YOZ~IIP V .  Anzericnn Mini 
Theatres, Itzc., 427 U . S .  50. 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 
L.Ed.2d 3 10 (19761, or a safety regulation prohibiting 
excavations below a certain level. See Goldblatt v. 
Hempstead. 
Rejection of appellants' broad arguments is not, 
however, the end of our inquiry, for all we thus far 
have established is '136 that the New York City law 
is not rendered invalid by its failure to provide "just 
compensation" whenever a landmark owner is 
restricted in the exploitation of property interests, 
such as air rights, to a greater extent than provided 
for under applicable zoning laws. We now must 
consider whether the interference with appellants' 
property is of such a magnitude that "there must be 
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to 
sustain [it]." Pennsvlvaniri Coal Co. v. Mnhon, 260 
U.S., at 413. 43 S.Ct., at 159. That inquiry may be 
narrowed to the question of the severity of the impact 
of the law on appellants' parcel, and its resolution in 
turn requires a carehl assessment of the impact of the 
regulation on the Terminal site. 
1201r2 11 Unlike the governmental acts in Goldblatt, 
Millel; Causby, Griggs, and Hadacheck, the New 
York City law does not interfere in any way with the 
present uses of the Terminal. Its designation as a 
landmark not only permits but contemplates that 
appellants may continue to use the property precisely 
as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad 
terminal containing office space and concessions. 
So the law does not interfere with what must be 
regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation 
concerning the use of the parcel. More importantly, 
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on this record, we must regard the New York City 
law as permitting Penn Central not only to profit 
from the Terminal but also to obtain a "reasonable 
return" on its investment. 
Appellants, moreover, exaggerate the effect of the 
law on their ability to make use of the air rights 
above the Terminal in two respects.M First, it 
simply cannot be maintained, on this record, that 
appellants have been prohibited from occupying any 
portion of the airspace above the Terminal. While 
the Commission's actions in denying applications to 
construct an *I37 office building in excess of 50 
stories above the Terminal may indicate that it will 
rehse to issue a certificate**2666 of appropriateness 
for any comparably sized structure, nothing the 
Commission has said or done suggests an intention to 
prohibit any construction above the Terminal. The 
Commission's report emphasized that whether any 
construction would be allowed depended upon 
whether the proposed addition "would harmonize in 
scale, material and character with [the Terminal]." 
Record 225 1. Since appellants have not sought 
approval for the construction of a smaller structure, 
we do not know that appellants will be denied any 
use of any portion of the airspace above the 
Terminal. 
FN33. Appellants, of course, argue at length 
that the transferable development rights, 
while valuable, do not constitute "just 
compensation." Brief for Appellants 36-43. 
FN34. Counsel for appellants admitted at 
oral argument that the Commission has not 
suggested that it would not, for example, 
approve a 20-story office tower along the 
lines of that which was part of the original 
plan for the Terminal. See Tr, of Oral Arg. 
19. 
Second, to the extent appellants have been denied 
the right to build above the Terminal, it is not literally 
accurate to say that they have been denied all use of 
even those pre-existing air rights. Their ability to 
use these rights has not been abrogated; they are 
made transferable to at least eight parcels in the 
vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which have 
been found suitable for the construction of new office 
buildings. Although appellants and others have 
argued that New York City's transferable 
development-rights program is far from ideal,M the 
New York courts here supportably found that, at least 
in the case of the Terminal, the rights afforded are 
valuable. While these rights may well not have 
constituted ''just compensation" if a "taking" had 
occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly 
mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has 
imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be 
taken into account in considering the impact of 
regulation. Cf. Goldhlatt v. Hemn.steud, 369 U.S., at 
594 n. 3.82 S.Ct.. at 990 n. 3. 
FN35. See Costonis, supra n. 2, at 585-589. 
"138 On this record, we conclude that the 
application of New York City's Landmarks Law has 
not effected a "talung" of appellants' property. The 
restrictions imposed are substantially related to the 
promotion of the general welfare and not only permit 
reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but 
also afford appellants opportunities further to 
enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also 
other properties.m 
FN36. We emphasize that our holding today , 
is on the present record, which in turn is 
based on Penn Central's present ability to 
use the Terminal for its intended purposes 
and in a gainful fashion. The city conceded 
at oral argument that if appellants can 
demonstrate at some point in the future that 
circumstances have so changed that the 
Terminal ceases to be "economically 
viable," appellants may obtain relief. See 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 42-43. 
A fjrm ed. 
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE and Mr. Justice STEVENS join, dissenting. 
Of the over one million buildings and structures in 
the city of New York, appellees have singled out 400 
for designation as official  andm marks.^ The owner 
of a building might initially be pleased that his 
property has been chosen by a distinguished 
committee of architects, historians, and city *I39 
planners for such a singular distinction. But he may 
well discover, as appellant Penn Central 
Transportation Co, did here, that the landmark 
designation imposes upon him ""2667 a substantial 
cost, with little or no offsetting benefit except for the 
honor of the designation. The question in this case is 
whether the cost associated with the city of New 
York's desire to preserve a limited number of 
"landmarks" within its borders must be borne by all 
of its taxpayers or whether it can instead be imposed 
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entirely on the owners of the individual properties. 
FNI. A large percentage of the designated 
-
landmarks are public structures (such as the 
Brooklyn Bridge, City Hall, the Statute of 
Liberty and the Municipal Asphalt Plant) 
and thus do not raise Fifth Amendment 
taking questions. See Landmarks 
Preservation Commission of the City of 
New York, Landmarks and Historic Districts 
(1977 and Jan. 10, 1978, Supplement). 
Although the Court refers to the New York 
ordinance as a comprehensive program to 
preserve historic landmarks, ante, at 265 1, 
the ordinance is not limited to historic 
buildings and gives little guidance to the 
Landmarks Preservation Commission in its 
selection of landmark sites. Section 207- 
1 .O(n) of the Landmarks Preservation Law, 
as set forth in N.Y.C. Admin. Code, ch. 8-A 
(1976), requires only that the selected 
landmark be at least 30 years old and 
possess "a special character or special 
historical or aesthetic interest or value as 
part of the development, heritage or cultural 
characteristics of the city, state or nation." 
Only in the most superficial sense of the word can 
this case be said to involve "zoning." FNZ Typical 
zoning restrictions may, it is true, so limit the 
prospective uses of a piece of property as to diminish 
the value of that property in the abstract because it 
may not be used for the forbidden purposes. But any 
such abstract decrease in value will more than likely 
be at least partially offset by an increase in value 
which flows from similar restrictions as to use on 
neighboring *I40 properties. All property owners 
in a designated area are placed under the same 
restrictions, not only for the benefit of the 
municipality as a whole but also for the common 
benefit of one another. In the words of Mr. Justice 
Holmes, speaking for the Court in Pennsvlvanin Coal 
Co. 1). Mallon. 260 U . S .  393, 415. 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 
67 L.Ed. 322 (19221, there is "an average reciprocity 
of advantage." 
FN2. Even the New York Court of Appeals 
conceded that "[tlhis is not a zoning case. . . 
. Zoning restrictions operate to advance a 
comprehensive community plan for the 
common good. Each property owner in the 
zone is both benefited and restricted from 
exploitation, presumably without 
discrimination, except for permitted 
continuing nonconforming uses. The 
restrictions may be designed to maintain the 
general character of the area, or to assure 
orderly development, objectives inuring to 
the benefit of all, which property owners 
acting individually would find difficult or 
impossible to achieve . . . . 
'Wor does this case involve landmark regulation of a 
historic district. . . . [In historic districting, as in 
traditional zoning,] owners although burdened by the 
restrictions also benefit, to some extent, from the 
furtherance of a general community plan. 
"Restrictions on alteration of individual 
landmarks are not designed to hrther a 
general community plan. Landmark 
restrictions are designed to prevent 
alteration or demolition of a single piece of 
property. To this extent, such restrictions 
resemble 'discriminatory' zoning 
restrictions, properly condemned . . . ." 42 
N.Y.2d 324. 329-330, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 
917-91 8.366 N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (1977). 
Where a relatively few individual buildings, all 
separated from one another, are singled out and 
treated differently from surrounding buildings, no 
such reciprocity exists. The cost to the property 
owner which results from the imposition of 
restrictions applicable only to his property and not 
that of his neighbors may be substantial-in this case, 
several million dollars-with no comparable reciprocal 
benefits. And the cost associated with landmark 
legislation is likely to be of a completely different 
order of magnitude than that which results from the 
imposition of normal zoning restrictions. Unlike the 
regime affected by the latter, the landowner is not 
simply prohibited from using his property for certain 
purposes, while allowed to use it for all other 
purposes. Under the historic-landmark preservation 
scheme adopted by New York, the property owner is 
under an affirmative duty to preserve his property as 
a landmark at his own expense. To suggest that 
because traditional zoning results in some limitation 
of use of the property zoned, the New York City 
landmark preservation scheme should likewise be 
upheld, represents the ultimate in treating as alike 
things which are different. The rubric of "zoning" 
has not yet sufficed to avoid the well-established 
proposition that the Fifth Amendment bars the 
"Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
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should be borne by the public as a whole." good-faith attempts, have so far been unable to 
Arni.sfronn v. United Stntes. 364 U.S. 40. 49, 80 S.Ct. obtain. Because the Taking Clause of the Fifth 
1 563, 1569.4 L.Ed.2d 1554 ( 1960). See discussion Amendment has not always been read literally, 
infra, at pp. 2671-2672. however, the constitutionality of appellees' actions 
requires a closer scrutiny of this Court's interpretation 
In August 1967, Grand Central Terminal was of the three key words in the Taking Clause- 
designated a landmark over the objections of its "property," "taken," and "just compensation." ';NJ 
owner Penn Central. Immediately upon this 
designation, Penn Central, like all *I41 owners of a 
landmark site, was placed under an affirmative duty, 
backed **2668 by criminal fines and penalties, to 
keep "exterior portions" of the landmark "in good 
repair." Even more burdensome, however, were the 
strict limitations that were thereupon imposed on 
Penn Central's use of its property. At the time Grand 
Central was designated a landmark, Penn Central was 
in a precarious financial condition. In an effort to 
increase its sources of revenue, Penn Central had 
entered into a lease agreement with appellant UGP 
Properties, Inc., under which UGP would construct 
and operate a multistory office building cantilevered 
above the Terminal building. During the period of 
construction, UGP would pay Penn Central $1 
million per year. Upon completion, UGP would rent 
the building for 50 years, with an option for another 
25 years, at a guaranteed minimum rental of $3 
million per year. The record is clear that the 
proposed office building was in full compliance with 
all New York zoning laws and height limitations. 
Under the Landmarks Preservation Law, however, 
appellants could not construct the proposed office 
building unless appellee Landmarks Preservation 
Commission issued either a "Certificate of No 
Exterior Effect" or a "Certificate of 
Appropriateness." Although appellants' architectural 
plan would have preserved the facade of the 
Terminal, the Landmarks Preservation Commission 
has refused to approve the construction. A 
FN3. The guarantee that private property 
shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation is applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although the state "legislature may 
prescribe a form of procedure to be observed 
in the taking of private property for public 
use, . . . it is not due process of law if 
provision be not made for compensation." 
Chicano, B. & 0. R. Co. v. Chica,co. 166 
U.S. 226, 236. 17 S.Ct. 581. 584, 41 L.Ed. 
979 (1 897). 
FN4. The Court's opinion touches base with, 
-
or at least attempts to touch base with, most 
of the major eminent domain cases decided 
by this Court. Its use of them, however, is 
anything but meticulous. In citing to 
United States v. Cr~ltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 
156. 73 S.Ct. 200, 97 L.Ed. 157 (19521, for 
example, ante, at 2659, the only language 
remotely applicable to eminent domain is 
stated in terms of "the destruction of 
respondents' terminals by a trained team of 
engineers in the face of their impending 
seizure by the enemy." 344 U.S., at 156. 73 
S.Ct., at 203. 
The Fifth Amendment provides in part: "nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." *I42 In a very literal sense, the 
actions of appellees violated this constitutional 
prohibition. Before the city of New York declared 
Grand Central Terminal to be a landmark, Penn 
Central could have used its "air rights" over the 
Terminal to build a multistory office building, at an 
apparent value of several million dollars per year. 
Today, the Terminal cannot be modified in any form, 
including the erection of additional stories, without 
the permission of the Landmark Preservation 
Commission, a permission which appellants, despite 
Appellees do not dispute that valuable property 
rights have been destroyed. And the Court has 
frequently emphasized that the term "property" as 
used in the Taking Clause includes the entire "group 
of rights inhering in the citizen's [ownership]." 
United States v. Genernl Motors C o r ~ . .  323 U.S. 373, 
65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 31 1 (1945). The term is not 
used in the 
"vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing 
with respect to which the citizen exercises rights 
recognized by law. [Instead, it] . . . denote [s] the 
group o f  rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the 
physical THING, AS "143 THE RIGHT TO 
POSSESS, USE AND DISPOSE OF IT. . . . the 
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort o f  
inter:est the **2669 citizen may possess." Id., at 377- 
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378, 65 S.Ct.. at 359 (emphasis added) 
While neighboring landowners are free to use their 
land and "air rights" in any way consistent with the 
broad boundaries of New York zoning, Penn Central, 
absent the permission of appellees, must forever 
maintain its property in its present statesm The 
property has been thus subjected to a nonconsensual 
servitude not borne by any neighboring or similar 
properties. EM 
FN5. In particular, Penn Central cannot 
increase the height of the Terminal. Thls 
Court has previously held that the "air 
rights" over an area of land are "property" 
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. See 
United States 1). Causbv, 328 U.S. 256, 66 
S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) ("air 
rights" taken by low-flying airplanes); 
Griaas v. Alleahenv County, 369 U.S. 84, 82 
S.Ct. 531, 7 L.Ed2d 585 (1962) (same); 
Portsmolrtk Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. 
United Sfates. 260 U.S. 327, 43 S.Ct. 135, 
67 L.Ed. 287 (1922) (firing of projectiles 
over summer resort can constitute taking). 
See also Butler v. Frontier Tele~hone Co., 
186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 7 16 (1 906) (stringing 
of telephone wire across property constitutes 
a taking). 
FN6. It is, of course, irrelevant that 
appellees interfered with or destroyed 
property rights that Penn Central had not yet 
physically used. The Fifth Amendment 
must be applied with "reference to the uses 
for which the property is suitable, having 
regard to the existing business or wants of 
the community, or such as may be 
reasonably expected in the immediate 
future." Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 
403. 408, 25 L.Ed. 206 (1879) (emphasis 
added). 
Appellees have thus destroyed-in a literal sense, 
"takenw-substantial property rights of Penn Central. 
While the term "taken" might have been narrowly 
interpreted to include only physical seizures of 
property rights, "the construction of the phrase has 
not been so narrow. The courts have held that the 
deprivation of the former owner rather than the 
accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign 
constitutes the taking." Id., at 378, 65 S.Ct., at 359. 
See also *144Uriitetl Slutes v. Lvnah, 188 U.S. 445, 
469, 23 S.CL. 349. 47 L.Ed. 539 1903); Duran 
v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625, 83 S.CL. 999. 1009, 10 
L.Ed.2d 15 (1963). Because "not every destruction 
or injury to property by governmental action has been 
held to be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense," 
Armstron.~ 1). UnitedSlutes, 364 U.S.. at 48, 80 S.Ct., 
at 1568, however, this does not end our inquiry. But 
an examination of the two exceptions where the 
destruction of property does not constitute a taking 
demonstrates that a compensable talung has occurred 
here. 
FN7. "Such a construction would pervert the 
constitutional provision into a restriction 
upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights 
stood at the common law, instead of the 
government, and make it an authority for 
invasion of private right under the pretext of 
the public good, which had no warrant in the 
laws or practices of our ancestors." 188 
U.S., at 470, 23 S.Ct., at 357. 
As early as 1887, the Court recognized that the 
government can prevent a property owner from using 
his property to injure others without having to 
compensate the owner for the value of the forbidden 
use. 
"A prohibition simply upon the use of property for 
purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be 
injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the 
community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a 
taking or an appropriation of property for the public 
benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner 
in the control or use of his property for lawful 
purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is 
only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, 
for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the 
public interests. . . . The power which the States 
have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their 
property as will be prejudicial to the health, the 
morals, or the safety of the public, is not-and, 
consistently with the existence and safety of 
organized society, cannot be-burdened with the 
condition that the State must compensate such 
individual owners for pecuniary losses they may 
sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a 
noxious use of "145 theirproperty, to inflict **2670 
injury upon the: community." Murler v. K L I I I . F ~ ~ ,  123 
U.S. 623,668-669. 8 S.Ct. 273, 301.31 L.Ed. 205. 
Thus, there is no "talung" where a city prohibits the 
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operation of a brickyard within a residential area, see 
Hadacheck v. Sehastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 
60 L.Ed. 348 (19151, or forbids excavation for sand 
and gravel below the water line, see Goldhlatt 11. 
Hem~stead. 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 
130 (1962). Nor is it relevant, where the 
government is merely prohibiting a noxious use of 
property, that the government would seem to be 
singling out a particular property owner. Haducheck, 
supra. at 413.36 S.Ct., at 1 4 6 . ~ ~ '  
FN8. Each of the cases cited by the Court 
-
for the proposition that legislation which 
severely affects some landowners but not 
others does not effect a "taking" involved 
noxious uses of property. See Hudachcck; 
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 
246. 72 L.Ed. 568 (1928); Goldblatt. See 
ante, at 2660-2661,2664. 
The nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not 
coterminous with the police power itself. The 
question is whether the forbidden use is dangerous to 
the safety, health, or welfare of others. Thus, in 
Ctrr-tin v. Benson. 222 U.S. 78. 32 S.Ct. 31, 56 L.Ed. 
102 (19 1 11, the Court held that the Government, in 
prohibiting the owner of property within the 
boundaries of Yosemite National Park from grazing 
cattle on his property, had taken the owner's property. 
The Court assumed that the Government could 
constitutionally require the owner to fence his land or 
take other action to prevent his cattle from straying 
onto others' land without compensating him. 
"Such laws might be considered as strictly 
regulations of the use of property, of so using it that 
no injury could result to others. They would have 
the effect of malung the owner of land herd his cattle 
on his own land and of making him responsible for a 
neglect of it." Id., at 86.32 S.Ct., at 33. 
The prohibition in question, however, was "not a 
prevention of a misuse or illegal use but the 
prevention of a legal and essential use, an attribute of 
its ownership." Ibid. 
Appellees are not prohibiting a nuisance. The 
record is "146 clear that the proposed addition to the 
Grand Central Terminal would be in full compliance 
with zoning, height limitations, and other health and 
safety requirements. Instead, appellees are seelung 
to preserve what they believe to be an outstanding 
example of beaux-arts architecture. Penn Central is 
prevented from further developing its property 
basically because too good a job was done in 
designing and building it. The city of New York, 
because of its unadorned admiration for the design, 
has decided that the owners of the building must 
preserve it unchanged for the benefit of sightseeing 
New Yorkers and tourists. 
Unlike land-use regulations, appellees' actions do not 
merely prohibit Penn Central from using its property 
in a narrow set of noxious ways. Instead, appellees 
have placed an affirmative duty on Penn Central to 
maintain the Terminal in its present state and in 
"good repair." Appellants are not free to use their 
property as they see fit within broad outer boundaries 
but must strictly adhere to their past use except where 
appellees conclude that alternative uses would not 
detract from the landmark. While Penn Central may 
continue to use the Terminal as it is presently 
designed, appellees otherwise "exercise complete 
dominion and control over the surface of the land," 
United Slales v. Causbv, 328 U.S. 256. 262. 66 S.Ct. 
1062. 1066. 90 L.Ed. 1206 (19461, and must 
compensate the owner for his loss. Ibid. "Property is 
taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are 
made upon an owner's use of it to an extent that, as 
between private parties, a servitude has been 
acquired." United States v. Dickinson, 33 1 U.S. 745, 
748.67 S.Ct. 1382. 1385. 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1 947). See 
also Duparz v. Rank, stmra, 372 U.S.. at 625, 83 
S.Ct.. at 1009.':~" 
FN9. In Mononwahela N(/l?iwation Co. v. 
-
United Stcrte.~, 148 U S .  3 12. 13 S.Ct. 622, 
37 L.Ed. 463 (18931, the Monongahela 
company had expended large sums of 
money in improving the Monongahela River 
by means of locks and dams. When the 
United States condemned this property for 
its own use, the Court held that full 
compensation had to be awarded. "Suppose, 
in the improvement of a navigable stream, it 
was deemed essential to construct a canal 
with locks, in order to pass around rapids or  
falls. Of the power of Congress to condemn 
whatever land may be necessary for such 
canal, there can be no question; and of the 
equal necessity of paying full compensation 
for all private property taken there can be as 
little doubt." Id., at 337. 13 S.Ct., at 630. 
Under the Court's rationale, however, where 
the Government wishes to preserve a pre- 
existing canal system for public use, it need 
not condemn the property but need merely 
order that it be preserved in its present form 
and be kept " ~ n  good repair." 
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Even where the government prohibits a noninjurious 
use, the Court has ruled that a taking does not take 
place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross 
section of land and thereby "secure[s] an average 
reciprocity of advantage." Pennsvlvania Coul Co. v. 
Mahon. 260 U.S.. at 415, 43 S.Ct., at 160. It is 
for this reason that zoning does not constitute a 
"talung." While zoning at times reduces individual 
property values, the burden is shared relatively 
evenly and it is reasonable to conclude that on the 
whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of 
the zoning will be benefited by another. 
FNIO. Appellants concede that the 
preservation of buildings of historical or 
aesthetic importance is a permissible 
objective of state action. Brief for 
Appellants 12. CJ Berntan v. Parker-, 348 
U.S. 26. 75 S.Ct. 98. 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954); 
United States v. Gettvsbzlra Electric R. Co., 
160 U.S. 668, 16 S.Ct. 427. 40 L.Ed. 576 
(1896). 
For the reasons noted in the text, historic zoning, as 
has been undertaken by cities, such as New Orleans, 
may well not require compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Here, however, a multimillion dollar loss has been 
imposed on appellants; it is uniquely felt and is not 
offset by any benefits flowing from the preservation 
of some 400 other "landmarks" in New York City. 
Appellees have imposed a substantial cost on less 
than one one-tenth of one percent of the buildings in 
New York City for the general benefit of all its 
people. It is exactly this imposition of general costs 
on a few individuals at which the "taking" protection 
is directed. The Fifth Amendment 
"prevents the public from loading upon one 
individual more than his just share of the burdens of 
government, *I48 and says that when he surrenders 
to the public something more and different from that 
which is exacted from other members of the public, a 
full and just equivalent shall be returned to him." 
Mononpahela Naviaation Co. v. United States, 148 
U.S. 312. 325. 13 S.Ct. 622, 626, 37 L.Ed. 463 
(1893). 
Less than 20 years ago, this Court reiterated that the 
"Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property 
shall not be taken for a public use without just 
compensation was designed to bar Government from 
Page 25 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole." Arnlstrong I). Uilirerl Stales, 
364 U.S.. at 49. 80 S.Ct.. at 1569. 
Cf. Nasltville. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 
FNl 1. "It is true that the police power 
embraces regulations designed to promote 
public convenience or the general welfare, 
and not merely those in the interest of public 
health, safety and morals. . . . But when 
particular individuals are singled out to bear 
the cost of advancing the public 
convenience, that imposition must bear 
some reasonable relation to the evils to be 
eradicated or the advantages to be secured. . 
. . While moneys raised by general taxation 
may constitutionally be applied to purposes 
from which the individual taxed may receive 
no benefit, and indeed, suffer serious 
detriment, . . . so-called assessments for 
public improvements laid upon particular 
property owners are ordinarily constitutional 
only if based on benefits received by them." 
294 U.S.. at 429-430. 55 S.Ct.. at 494-495. 
As Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, "the question at bottom" in an 
eminent domain case "is upon whom the loss of the 
changes desired should fall." 260 U.S., at 416. 43 
S.Ct.. at 160. The benefits that appellees believe 
will flow from preservation of the Grand Central 
Terminal will accrue to all the citizens of New York 
City. There is no **2672 reason to believe that 
appellants will enjoy a substantially greater share of 
these benefits. If the cost of preserving Grand 
Central Terminal were spread evenly across the entire 
population of the city of New York, the burden per 
person would be in cents per year-a minor cost 
appellees would *I49 surely concede for the benefit 
accrued. Instead, however, appellees would impose 
the entire cost of several million dollars per year on 
Penn Central. But it is precisely this sort of 
discrimination that the Fifth Amendment 
prohibits.w 
FN12. The fact that the Landmarks 
Preservation Commission may have allowed 
additions to a relatively few landmarks is of 
no comfort to appellants. Ante, at 2656 n. 
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18. Nor is it of any comfort that the 
Commission refuses to allow appellants to 
construct any additional stories because of 
their belief that such construction would not 
be aesthetic. Ante, at 2656. 
Appellees in response would argue that a talung only 
occurs where a property owner is denied all 
reasonable value of his property.w The Court has 
frequently held that, even where a destruction of 
property rights would not otherwise constitute a 
taking, the inability of the owner to make a 
reasonable return on his property requires 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. See, e. 
g., United States v. Lvnuh, 188 U.S., at 470, 23 S.Ct., 
at 357. But the converse is not true. A taking does 
not become a noncompensable exercise of police 
power simply because the government in its grace 
allows the owner to make some "reasonable" use of 
his property. "[Ilt is the character of the invasion, not 
the amount of damage resulting from it, *I50 so long 
as the damage is substantial, that determines the 
question whether it is a taking." United States v. 
Cress, 243 U.S. 316,328.37 S.Ct. 380.385.61 L.Ed. 
746 (1917); United States v. Cazrshv. 328 U.S.. at 
266, 66 S.Ct.. at 1068. See also Goldblntt v. 
Hemnstead. 369 U.S., at 594.82 S.Ct., at 990. 
FN 13. Difficult conceptual and legal 
problems are posed by a rule that a taking 
only occurs where the property owner is 
denied all reasonable return on his property. 
Not only must the Court define "reasonable 
return" for a variety of types of property 
(farmlands, residential properties, 
commercial and industrial areas), but the 
Court must define the particular property 
unit that should be examined. For example, 
in this case, if appellees are viewed as 
having restricted Penn Central's use of its 
"air rights," all return has been denied. See 
Pennsvlvattia Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 
393. 43 S.Ct. 158. 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). 
The Court does little to resolve these 
questions in its opinion. Thus, at one point, 
the Court implies that the question is 
whether the restrictions have "an unduly 
harsh impact upon the owner's use of the 
property," ante, at 2661; at another point, 
the question is phrased as whether Penn 
Central can obtain "a 'reasonable return' on 
its investment," ante, at 2666; and, at yet 
another point, the cjuestion becomes whether 
the landmark is "economically viable," ante, 
Appellees, apparently recognizing that the 
constraints imposed on a landmark site constitute a 
taking for Fifth Amendment purposes, do not leave 
the property owner empty-handed. As the Court 
notes, ante, at 2654-2655, the property owner may 
theoretically "transfer" his previous right to develop 
the landmark property to adjacent properties if they 
are under his control. Appellees have coined this 
system "Transfer Development Rights," or TDR's. 
Of all the terms used in the Taking Clause, "just 
compensa'tion" has the strictest meaning. The Fifth 
Amendment does not allow simply an approximate 
compensation but requires "a full and perfect 
equivalent for the property taken." Monolz.calzela 
Navipation Co. v. United Stutes. 148 U.S., at 326. 13 
S.Ct.. at 626. 
"[Ilf the adjective 'just' had been omitted, and the 
provision was simply that property should not be 
taken without compensation, the natural import of the 
language would be that the compensation should be 
the equivalent of the property. And this is made 
emphatic by the adjective 'just.' There can, in view 
of the combination of those two words, be no doubt 
that the compensation must be a full and perfect 
equivalent for the property taken." ]bid. 
**2673 See also United States v. Lvnuh: supra. 188 
U.S., at 465, 23 S.Ct., at 355; United Stutc.s v. P P M J ~ P  
Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 117, 71 S.Ct. 670, 671. 95 
L.Ed. 809 (195 1). And the determination of whether 
a "full and perfect equivalent" has been awarded is a 
'Ijudicial function." United Stutes v. Neil) River. 
Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343-344, 43 S.Ct. 565, 
566-567.67 L.Ed. 1014 (1923). The fact "151 that 
appellees may believe that TDR's provide full 
compensation is irrelevant. 
"The legislature may determine what private 
property is needed for public purposes-that is a 
question of a political and legislative character; but 
when the taking has been ordered, then the question 
of compensation is judicial. It does not rest with the 
public, taking the property, through Congress or the 
legislature, its representative, to say what 
compensation shall be paid, or even what shall be the 
rule of compensation. The Constitution has declared 
that just compensation shall be paid, and the 
ascertainment of that is a judicial inquiry." 
Mononptr hcla N(rvi.ytrtion Co. v. United Stcrtes, .sunr.u, 
148 U.S., at 327, 13 S.Ct., at 626. 
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Appellees contend that, even if they have "taken" 
appellants' property, TDR's constitute "just 
compensation." Appellants, of course, argue that 
TDR's are highly imperfect compensation. Because 
the lower courts held that there was no "talung," they 
did not have to reach the question of whether or not 
just compensation has already been awarded. The 
New York Court of Appeals' discussion of TDR's 
gives some support to appellants: 
"The many defects in New York City's program for 
development rights transfers have been detailed 
elsewhere . . . . The area to which transfer is 
permitted is severely limited [and] complex 
procedures are required to obtain a transfer permit." 
42 N.Y.2d 324.334-335.397 N.Y.S.2d 914,920,366 
N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (1977). 
And in other cases the Court of Appeals has noted 
that TDR's have an "uncertain and contingent market 
value" and do "not adequately preserve" the value 
lost when a building is declared to be a landmark. 
French Inve.~tina Co. v. Citv of New York. 39 N.Y.2d 
587, 591, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 7. 350 N.E.2d 381, 383, 
appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 990. 97 S.Ct. 515. 50 
L.Ed.2d 602 (1976). On the other hand, there is 
evidence in the record that Penn Central has been 
*I52 offered substantial amounts for its TDR's. 
Because the record on appeal is relatively slim, I 
would remand to the Court of Appeals for a 
determination of whether TDR's constitute a "full and 
perfect equivalent for the property taken." 
FN14. The Court suggests, ante, at 2663, 
that if appellees are held to have "taken" 
property sights of landmark owners, not 
only the New York City Landmarks 
Preservation Law, but "all comparable 
landmark legislation in the Nation" must 
fall. This assumes, of course, that TDR's 
are not "just compensation" for the property 
rights destroyed. It also ignores the fact 
that many States and cities in the Nation 
have chosen to preserve landmarks by 
purchasing or condemning restrictive 
easements over the facades of the landmarks 
and are apparently quite satisfied with the 
- - . . 
results. See, e. g., 0re.Rev.Stat. 4 4 
27 1.71 0, 27 1.720 ( 1977); Md.Ann.Code, 
Art. 41, $ 181A (1978); Va.Code $ $ 10- 
145.1 and 10-138(e) (1978); Richmond, 
Va., City Code $ $ 21-23 et seq. (1975). 
The British National Trust has effectively 
used restrictive easements to preserve 
landmarks since 1937. See National Trust 
Act, 1937, 1 Edw. 8 and 1 Geo. 6 ch. lvii, $ 
$ 4 and 8. Other States and cities have 
found that tax incentives are also an 
effective means of encouraging the private 
preservation of landmark sites. See, e. g., 
Conn.Gen.Stat. 6 12-127a (1977); 
Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 24, $ 11-48.2-6 (1976); 
Va.Code 4 10-139 (1978). The New York 
City Landmarks Preservation Law departs 
drastically from these traditional, and 
constitutional, means of preserving 
landmarks. 
Over 50 years ago, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for 
the Court, warned that the courts were "in danger of 
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the 
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving 
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way 
of paying for the change." Peiznsvlvnniu Coal Co. I>. 
Mahon, 260 U.S., at 416, 43 S.Ct., at 160. The 
Court's opinion in this case demonstrates **2674 that 
the danger thus foreseen has not abated. The city of 
New York is in a precarious financial state, and some 
may believe that the costs of landmark preservation 
will be more easily borne by corporations such as 
Penn Central than the overburdened individual 
taxpayers*153 of New York. But these concerns do 
not allow us to ignore past precedents construing the 
Eminent Domain Clause to the end that the desire to 
improve the public condition is, indeed, achieved by 
a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for 
the change. 
U.S.N.Y.,1978. 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York 
438 U.S. 1.04, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 11 ERC 1801, 57 
L.Ed.2d 63 1, 8 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,528 
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Stivers v. PierceC.A.9 (Nev.), 1995. 
United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit. 
Martin STIVERS; Mary Chase Emsberger; Chamar, 
Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
Richard PIERCE; George D. Wendell; Denise 
Conrad; Gary T. Robey; Brian McKay; Carol 
Widmer-Hanna; Robert J. Rodefer; Bill Bertram; 
individually and as members of the Nevada State 
Private Investigators Licensing Board; The Nevada 
State Private Investigators Licensing Board; and 
Does 1-1 0, Defendants-Appellees. 
NOS. 93-16756,94-15966. 
Argued and Submitted March 16, 1995. 
Decided Dec. 1, 1995. 
After Nevada State Private Investigators Licensing 
Board denied application for licenses as private 
investigator, private patrolman, and process server, 
applicant brought 5 1983 action against Board and 
individual board members. Applicant alleged that 
one Board member had pecuniary interest in outcome 
and was biased against applicant, and that, influenced 
by that member's bias, other Board members and 
certain employees prejudged application and acted in 
arbitrary and improper manner. After action was 
filed, Board granted application for individual 
licenses in order to settle plaintiffs' claims for 
injunctive relief. The United States District Court 
for the District of Nevada, Howard D. McKibben, J., 
thereafter granted summary judgment to defendants 
on remaining claims, and rejected plaintiffs motion 
for attorney fees for time spent pursuing injunctive 
relief. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Reinhardt, J., held that: (1) genuine issues remained 
as to whether board member who owned private 
security and investigation firm was biased against 
plaintiff; (2) bias on part of one single member of 
tribunal taints proceedings and violates due process; 
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was "prevailing party" for purposes of his request for 92 Constitutional Law -
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92k287.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
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to conclude that board member harbored personal 
grudge against firm's original owner, there was no 
rational basis for concluding that he retained bias 
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Const.Amend. 14. 
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Fact that Nevada State Private Investigators 
Licensing Board denied plaintiffs application for 
license despite contrary recommendations of its own 
legal counsel was circumstantial evidence of 
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N.R.S. 648.005 et seq. 
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due process, is whether action was taken in good 
faith or for purpose of causing harm. U.S.C.A. 
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92k287.2(1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
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Const.Amend. 14. 
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Where one member of multi-person tribunal is 
actually biased, or where circumstances create 
appearance that one member is biased, proceedings 
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views influenced those of other members, even if 
vote is unanimous. U.S.C.A. Const.Arnend. 14. 
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Detectives 125 -3 
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-
125k3 k. Licenses and Regulations. Most Cited 
Cases 
License applicant's failure to seek recusal of allegedly 
biased member of Nevada State Private Investigators 
Licensing Board did not, in applicant's 9: 1983 action 
against board members, result in waiver of his claim 
that denial of his application resulted from bias on 
part of board, in violation of due process; statute 
governing Board did not provide mechanism for 
seeking recusal, and imposed no such requirement. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; N.R.S. 648.005 et seq. 
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U.S.C.A. Const.Amel~d. 1 I; 42 U.S.C.A. 6 1983. 
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170Bk268 What Are Suits Against States 
170Bk269 k. State Officers or Agencies, 
Actions Against. Most Cited Cases 
Eleventh Amendment did not bar applicant's 4 1983 
action against Nevada State Private Investigators 
Licensing Board members in their individual 
capacities, alleging that denial of application violated 
due process in that one Board member had pecuniary 
interest in outcome and was biased against applicant, 
and that, influenced by that member's bias, other 
Board members and Board investigators prejudged 
application and acted in arbitrary and improper 
manner. U.S.C.A. Const.Arnends. 11, l4; 42 
U.S.C.A. 6 1983; N.R.S. 648 et seq. 
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78k1376(2 k. Good Faith and 
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Motive and Intent, in General. Most Cited Cases 
(Fonnerly 78k2 14(2)) 
Qualified immunity doctrine shelds government 
officials from liability if reasonable government 
official could have believed that his conduct was 
lawful, in light of clearly established law and 
information he possessed; this standard requires two- 
part analysis, i.e., whether law prohibiting official 
conduct was clearly established, and whether 
reasonable official could have believed that hls 
conduct complied with law. 42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983. 
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Motive and Intent, in General. Most Cited Cases 
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If law prohibiting government official's conduct was 
clearly established and reasonable official could not 
have believed his conduct lawful, official is not 
immune from liability. 42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983. 
1241 Civil Rights 78 -1432 
78 Civil Rights 
-
78111 Federal Remedies in General 
-
78k1425 Questions of Law or Fact 
78k1432 k. Defenses; Immunity and Good 
Faith. Most Cited Cases 
(Former1 y 78k244) 
Whether law governing government official's conduct 
at issue in & 1983 action was clearly established, so 
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of law for court to decide. 42 U.S.C.A. 6 1983. 
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78k1376(3) k. States and Territories and 
Their Officers and Agencies. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k2 14(3)) 
Nevada State Private Investigators Licensing Board 
member was not qualifiedly immune from liability in 
f 1983 action by unsuccessful license applicant who 
alleged that member's opposition to application was 
motivated by member's own personal bias and 
pecuniary interest; reasonable official harboring 
actual bias against license applicant could not have 
believed that his participation in licensing proceeding 
was appropriate. 42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983. 
1261 Federal Civil Procedure 170A -2491.5 
Federal Civil Procedure 
170AXVII Judgment 
170AXVlI(C1 Summary Judgment 
I70AXVII(C)2 Particular Cases 
170Ak2491.5 k. Civil Rights Cases in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Genuine issues of material fact, precluding summary 
judgment for Nevada State Private Investigators 
Licensing Board members on qualified immunity 
grounds in 4 1983 action against them by 
unsuccessful applicant who alleged that denial of his 
license applications violated due process, existed as 
to whether defendants prejudged his applications and 
acted together to deprive him of licenses he sought. 
U.S.C.A. Consl.Amend. 14; 43 U.S.C.A. 4 1983; 
N.R.S. 648.005 et seq. 
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Federal Courts 170B -878 
Federal Courts 
170BVIII Courts of Appeals 
17OBVIII(K Scope, Standards, and Extent 
170BVIII(K)5 Questions of Fact, Verdicts 
and Findings 
170Bk870 Particular Issues and 
Questions 
170Bk878 k. Costs and Attorney's 
Fees. Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals reviews factual findings underlying 
district court's decision to deny attorney fees for clear 
error; however, fee determination will be reversed if 
district court applied incorrect legal standard in 
arriving at its decision. 
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-
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78k1482 k. Results of Litigation; 
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k296) 
Plaintiff may recover attorney fees under 9 1988 if 
he is prevailing party; litigant need not prevail on 
every issue, or even on central issue in case, to be 
considered "prevailing party," but rather, it is enough 
that he succeed on any significant claim affording 
some of relief sought, either pendente lite or at 
conclusion of litigation. 42 U.S.C.A. Q 1988. 
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Federal Remedies in General 
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78k1482 k. Results of Litigation; 
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k296) 
If plaintiff is only partially successful in seeking 
relief, and achieves only some benefits sought by 
litigation, he is still considered "prevailing party," as 
degree of success is irrelevant to question whether 
plaintiff is prevailing party. 42 U.S.C.A. 8 1988. 
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-
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k1477 Attorney Fees 
78k1482 k. Results of Litigation; 
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k296) 
Relief afforded plaintiff need not be "judicially 
decreed" to justify fee award under 3 1988-voluntary 
action, such as change in conduct that addresses 
grievance, is sufficient; focus is on substance of 
relief granted. 42 U.S.C.A. 6 1988. 
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-
781JI Federal Remedies in General 
78k1477 Attorney Fees 
78k1482 k. Results of Litigation; 
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k296) 
Where plaintiff who seeks attorney fees under 3 
198R asserts that his lawsuit was "catalyst" for relief 
subsequently awarded, court must determine: (1) 
whether there is "causal link" between lawsuit and 
relief awarded; and (2) whether there was "legal 
basis" for plaintiffs claim. 42 U.S.C.A. Q 1988. 
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-
Federal Remedies in General 
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78k1482 k. Results of Litigation; 
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k296) 
Applicant who sued Nevada State Private 
Investigators Licensing Board for allegedly 
unconstitutional denial of license application was 
"prevailing party" who was thus entitled to attorney 
fees for time spent pursuing injunctive relief, in light 
of fact that, after applicant instituted action, "special 
board" awarded him his licenses; lawsuit was 
"catalyst" for relief awarded, as defendants conceded 
that special board meeting was convened in order to 
partially settle suit, and there was legal basis for suit 
even though district court granted summary judgment 
to defendants on merits, as plaintiff presented 
substantial legal and factual questions. 42 U.S.C.A. $ 
1988. 
-
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1331 Civil Rights 78 -1482 
78 Civil Rights 
-
Federal Remedies in General 
78k 1477 Attorney Fees 
78k1482 k. Results of Litigation; 
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k296) 
Civil Rights 78 -1484 
78 Civil Rights 
-
Federal Remedies in General 
78k1477 Attorney Fees 
78k1484 k. Awards to Defendants; 
Frivolous, Vexatious, or Meritless Claims. Mosl 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k299) 
Plaintiff who obtains favorable settlement is not 
required to demonstrate that he would have prevailed 
on merits in order to be considered "prevailing party" 
for purposes of request for attorney fee award; 
rather, claim has basis in law so long as it is not 
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. 42 U.S.C.A. 
3 1988. 
1341 Civil Rights 78 -1482 
78 Civil Rights 
-
Federal Remedies in General 
78k1477 Attorney Fees 
78k1482 k. Results of Litigation; 
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k296) 
Supreme Court's decision in Farrar did not alter test 
for determining when litigant qualifies as "prevailing 
party" for purposes of attorney fee award under 2 
1988, as Court explicitly affirmed its prior holding 
that degree of success does not affect prevailing party 
in court; Farrar did, however, change standard for 
determining when prevailing party is entitled to 
recover fees, as Farrar held that prevailing party 
must be denied fees where he obtains only narrow, 
technical victory such as nominal damages. &? 
U.S.C.A. 6 1988. 
*736 Terri Kevser-Cooper, Reno, Nevada, for the 
plaintiffs-appellants. 
P. Mark Ghan, Assistant Attorney General, Carson 
City, Nevada, for the defendants-appellees. 
Appeals from the United States District Court for the 
District of Nevada. 
Before: FLETCHER, REINHARDT, and JOHN 7'. 
NOONAN. Jr., Circuit Judges. 
Opinion by Judge REINHARDT; Concurrence by 
Judge NOONAN. 
OPINION 
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: 
This action arises out of decisions by the Nevada 
State Private Investigators Licensing Board ("the 
Board"), denying the plaintiffs' applications for 
licenses in the fields of private investigation, private 
patrol, and process serving. The plaintiffs contend 
that one of the Board members had a pecuniary 
interest in the outcome and was biased against them. 
They also contend that, influenced by that member's 
bias, the other Board members and certain employees 
prejudged their applications and acted in an arbitrary 
and improper manner. 
Plaintiffs Martin Stivers, Mary Chase Emsberger, 
and Chamar, Inc. brought suit under section 1983 for 
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. 
The plaintiffs contend that the denial of their license 
applications violated their due process right to a fair 
hearing before an impartial tribunal. After this 
action was filed, the Board granted Stivers' 
application for individual licenses in order to settle 
the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief. The 
district court subsequently granted summary 
judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims, 
and rejected the plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees 
for time spent pursuing injunctive relief. We affirm 
the grant of summary judgment as to Stivers' claim 
for damages against the Board, but reverse the grant 
of summary judgment as to his claim for damages 
against the individual defendants. We also reverse 
the denial of attorney's fees. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In March 1988, the plaintiffs filed license 
applications with the Board. Plaintiff Martin Stivers 
applied for licenses as a private investigator, private 
patrolman, and process server. Stivers, along with 
co-plaintiff Mary Chase Ernsberger, also submitted 
an application for a corporate license on behalf of 
"Chamar Inc.," a newly formed company. Between 
June 1988 and December 1989, the Board conducted 
five separate hearings to consider the plaintiffs' 
license applications. At the September 1988 
meeting, it denied Chamar's application for corporate 
licenses because of alleged "unlicensed activity." It 
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later denied Stivers' application for "lack of 
integrity." The plaintiffs allege that, in denying their 
applications, members and employees of the Board 
violated their due process rights. In particular, they 
contend that *737 defendant Richard Pierce, a 
member of the Board, had a pecuniary and personal 
interest in ensuring that their applications were 
denied, that Pierce was actually biased against the 
plaintiffs, and that the Board's actions were 
influenced by Pierce's bias. 
A. Pierce's Background 
To understand the plaintiffs' allegations regarding 
Pierce's bias, it is helpful to step back several 
years.FN' In the mid-19701s, Pierce was employed as 
a private investigator, polygraph examiner, and 
process server for Russ Jones and Associates, a 
private security and investigation firm that was at that 
time owned by Russ Jones. When Jones refused to 
permit Pierce to become a co-owner, Pierce became 
angry and resentful. While Jones was away on 
vacation, and had temporarily left Pierce in charge of 
Jones' company, Pierce started his own business in 
direct competition with Russ Jones and Associates. 
Not surprisingly, the two men exchanged angry 
words upon Jones' return. During their heated 
exchange, Pierce threatened to run Jones' company 
out of business. 
FNI. Because this is a motion for summary 
judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. 
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 
655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 
(1 962). Accordingly, we assume for 
purposes of this opinion that the facts 
presented by the plaintiffs are true. In any 
event, those are the facts on which we base 
this opinion. 
After leaving Russ Jones and Associates, Pierce's 
own business prospered. Dick Pierce and Associates 
soon becoming the largest private security company 
in Northern Nevada. In 1986, Pierce became one of 
the five members of the Nevada Private Investigators 
Licensing Board. A creature of Nevada Statute, the 
Board consists of the Attorney General (or his 
designate) and four members appointed by the 
Governor. Nev.Rev.Stat. G 648.020( 1). Of the 
Governor's appointees, one must be a private 
investigator, one a private patrolman, one a 
polygraph examiner, and one a representative of the 
general public. Nev.Rev.Stat. 6 648.020(21. The 
Board is responsible for licensing and regulating 
private investigators, private patrolmen, process 
servers, polygraph operators, repossessors, dog 
handlers, and companies providing these services. 
Nev.Rev.Stat. 6 F 648.030, 648.060, 648.070. No 
person or company may engage in any such business 
unless licensed by the Board. Nev.Rev.Stat. 6 
648.060. As a member of the Board, Pierce had 
authority to vote on the licensing of companies which 
would compete directly with Dick Pierce and 
Associates. 
B. Stivers' Backgrotind 
Stivers has a long history in the private investigation 
and security business. He has worked as a private 
patrolman, private investigator, and process server 
for a total of 30 years. He was licensed in North 
Dakota in 1980 and, when he left that state in 1986, 
his license was still in good standing. Stivers arrived 
in Nevada in 1986, intending to start his own 
business. That same year, he became the general 
manager of the Reno branch office of Great Western 
Security, a Carson City based company. 
As manager of Great Western's Reno branch, Stivers 
aggressively sought new business. Among the more 
lucrative opportunities pursued by Stivers was 
security for the convention business for Bally's 
Casino in Reno. Bally's had previously employed 
Dick Pierce and Associates for the vast majority of its 
convention security needs. Under Stivers' direction, 
however, Great Western was "very successful" in 
outbidding Pierce's company and "took away a 
substantial amount of business from Mr. Pierce," 
including business at Bally's. Great Western's 
successful bidding cost Pierce approximately $55,000 
overall. 
C. Formation o f  Chamar- 
Upon arriving in Reno, Stivers became friends with 
Emsberger, and the two made plans to enter the 
private security business together: Ernsberger would 
put up the cash to purchase a company; Stivers, with 
his long history in the industry, was to run the 
business. 
While employed with Great Western, Stivers became 
acquainted with W.G. "Butch" "738 Tamblyn, who 
was then owner of Russ Jones and Associates. 
Tamblyn had purchased the company from Russ 
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Jones in the early 1980's and, by 1987, was hoping to process server for Chamar, with additional fees of 
sell it. Stivers and Ernsberger reached an agreement $1,550. 
with Tamblyn. Stivers and Ernsberger formed 
Chamar, Inc. for the purpose of purchasing the assets Problems began to develop in June 1988, when the 
of Russ Jones and Associates. Under the agreement, plaintiffs appeared before the Board for the first time. 
Tamblyn would not sell the corporation itself, at least 
immediately. Until licenses could be obtained for 
Chamar, they would all do business under the name 
of Russ Jones and Associates. 
Under Nevada law, corporations providing private 
investigation and security services are required to 
have a licensed "qualifying agentm-a person meeting 
the individual licensing requirements for the type of 
work in which the company engages. Nev.Rev.Stat. 
648.110. Tamblyn agreed to remain the 
"qualifying agent" of Russ Jones and Associates until 
August 1992. Stivers expected that he would be able 
to obtain a license to act as Chamar's qualifying agent 
after that date. 
Pursuant to the agreement, Chamar purchased the 
assets of Russ Jones and Associates in August 1987. 
Shortly after the sale, Tamblyn notified Carol 
Widmer-Hanna, the Board's executive secretary, of 
the change in ownership. Tamblyn explained that 
the corporation's assets had been sold to Chamar, but 
that the business would temporarily continue to 
operate under the name Russ Jones and Associates, 
with Tamblyn remaining the corporation's qualifying 
agent. Widmer-Hanna told him that they were 
"proceeding fine." At Widmer-Hanna's request, 
Tamblyn sent written notification of the change in 
corporate structure. Neither Widmer-Hama nor any 
other representative of the Board informed Tamblyn 
that there was anythlng improper about the 
arrangement to which he, Stivers, and Ernsberger had 
agreed. 
D. The Application Process 
In December 1987, Ernsberger and Stivers began the 
process of filing applications for the appropriate 
licenses, in accordance with Nev.Rev.Stat. k 
648.070. Ernsberger and Stivers delivered to 
Widmer-Hanna a copy of Chamar's certificate of 
corporate good standing, along with the purchase 
agreement between Chamar and Russ Jones and 
Associates. In March 1988, applications were 
submitted for the license of Chamar, and for licenses 
for Stivers and Ernsberger as corporate officers of 
Chamar, along with their application fee of $750. 
Stivers filed an application for qualifying agent status 
as a private investigator, private patrolman, and 
Despite her prior communications with Tamblyn, the 
Board's executive secretary, Widmer-Hanna, had 
erroneously placed plaintiffs on the agenda as a 
"name change." Pierce led the questioning, insisting 
that it was inappropriate to consider Chamar's 
application as a name change, since Stivers and 
Ernsberger were in fact seeking licenses for a new 
corporation. Consideration of the plaintiffs' 
applications was for this reason deferred until 
September 1988. Concerned that their business 
might not be operating legally, Stivers specifically 
asked the Board whether Russ Jones and Associates 
could continue to do business until the September 
1988 meeting. Board members Robey, Widmer- 
Hanna, and Giordano (the Deputy Attorney General) 
each replied that the plaintiffs could continue to do 
business "under Russ Jones," as long as Tamblyn 
remained the qualifying agent. Following the 
Board's instructions, the plaintiffs' business continued 
to operate under the name Russ Jones and Associates 
with Tamblyn as qualifying agent. 
Despite the Board's assurances at the June 1988 
hearing, Pierce opened the next hearing in September 
1988 by accusing the plaintiffs of "doing business 
without a license." Stivers responded by informing 
the Board that he was not aware of any violation of 
state law. Although Stivers and his attorney told the 
Board that their business was operating under the 
name Russ Jones and Associates, that Tamblyn was 
the qualifying agent, and that Chamar had never 
engaged in the patrol or security business, Pierce 
repeatedly accused the plaintiffs of operating 
illegally. In addition, the Board members questioned 
"739 Stivers extensively about his past experience, 
accused him of lying about his credentials, and 
rehsed to accept his affidavits regarding his 
experience. The Board unanimously voted to deny a 
corporate license on the basis of "unlicensed 
activity." See Nev.Rev.Stat. t; 648.1 10(3)(f). Upon 
Pierce's suggestion that the remaining license 
applications were "moot," the Board declined to 
consider Stivers' applications for private investigator, 
private patrolman, or process server licenses. 
On December 7, 1988, the plaintiffs brought suit in 
Nevada state court to contest the Board's denials of 
their license applications. In January 1989, plaintiffs 
and their lawyers met with Board counsel Dana 
Sarnmons, who agreed that the plaintiffs had been 
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operating legally. Sarnrnons told the plaintiffs that unanimously approved Ernsberger's application for 
they would be granted the licenses they sought if they corporate officer status with respect to Russ Jones 
appeared at the Board's next meeting. Relying on and Associates, with Tamblyn to continue acting as 
Sarnmons' representations, plaintiffs voluntarily qualifying agent for the company. 
dismissed their state action. 
At its March 1989 meeting, Sammons informed the 
Board that plaintiffs had been operating legally and 
recommended that the licenses be granted. After a 
recess, Board members expressed "serious 
reservation[s]" about Stivers' qualifications and 
doubts about his "integrity." In particular, they 
expressed concern that Stivers lacked the requisite 
hours of experience required to obtain the licenses he 
sought. Board members based their concerns, at 
least in part, on an investigative report prepared by 
Robert Rodefer that raised questions about Stivers' 
background and experience. - FN2 Despite the 
recommendation of the Board's counsel, the Board 
refused to grant Stivers' application and postponed 
voting on all the applications until the next meeting. 
FN2. As discussed infra part II.B.5, Rodefer 
admitted in his deposition that thls report 
contained several serious inaccuracies and 
omissions. 
Stivers again appeared before the Board in September 
1989 with additional documentation of his 
experience. Although Board investigator Bill 
Bertram conceded that Stivers had 12,000 hours of 
private investigation experience-more than the 
required 10,000 hours-the Board remained 
unsatisfied on this point. Several members 
continued to accuse him of lying about his 
experience. Calling Stivers a "professional victim," 
Board member Denise Conrad moved to deny his 
application and Pierce seconded the motion. The 
Board voted unanimously to deny Stivers' application 
as a qualifying agent based on "untruthfulness or lack 
of integrity." See Nev.Rev.Stat. 4 648.100(3)(c). 
Pierce then moved that Chamar's application be 
denied, for the same reasons. When another board 
member suggested that Russ Jones and Associates' 
operations be permitted to continue, with Tamblyn 
acting as qualifying agent, Pierce vigorously 
disagreed. The Board deferred consideration of 
whether Tamblyn could be approved as a qualifying 
agent for Chamar until the next meeting. 
At the December 1989 meeting, the plaintiffs' 
attorney informed ine Board that Tamblyn would 
remain the qualifying agent for Russ Jones and 
Associates, instead of Stivers. The Board 
E. District Court Proceedings 
Plaintiffs filed this action in federal district court on 
September 6, 199 1, alleging that the defendants had 
violated their rights under the due process and equal 
protection clauses. Their complaint requested 
damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. 
On January 6, 1992, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction and petition for a writ of 
mandamus in order to secure their licenses. . 
In an effort to settle the claim for injunctive relief, the 
defendants agreed to convene a "special board" to 
reconsider Stivers' license applications. Based on 
an application *740 identical to that which Stivers 
had earlier submitted, the special board unanimously 
voted to grant Stivers individual licenses. Stivers 
has since become owner of S and W Protective 
Sewice, a Board licensed private patrol, process 
sewing, and private investigation company. Chamar 
never obtained its license; it remains the parent 
company of Russ Jones and Associates, which 
continues to do business with Ernsberger as its Board 
licensed corporate officer and Tamblyn as its Board 
licensed qualifying agent. 
FN3. Before the district court granted their 
motion for summary judgment, the 
defendants moved for a protective order 
prohibiting any mention of the special 
board, on the grounds that: (1) it was 
irrelevant; (2) it was inadmissible as a 
subsequent remedial measure; and (3) it 
was an offer of settlement. The district 
court granted the defendants' motion for a 
protective order, without stating its reasons 
for doing so. Under the terms of this order, 
the "special board" was to be referred' to at 
trial only for the purpose of limiting 
damages by showing the date on which 
Stivers was issued a license. Because 
Stivers does not challenge this protective 
order, we do not consider the "special 
board" meeting in reviewing the district 
court's~decision to grant summary judgment. 
This meeting is relevant only to the question 
of the plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's 
fees. 
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After the special board's decision, plaintiffs withdrew 
their motion for preliminary injunction and 
mandamus, informing the court that there were no 
remaining issues pertaining to injunctive relief. The 
case proceeded on the plaintiffs' claims for 
declaratory relief and damages. 
The district court subsequently granted summary 
judgment to the defendants. The court concluded 
that Chamar's complaint for denial of its license was 
barred by the statute of limitations. The court further 
concluded that Ernsberger had failed to state a claim 
on her own behalf and could not recover damages for 
harm done to Chamar. Although the district court 
found that Stivers had a protected property interest in 
the licenses that had been denied him, it granted 
summary judgment to the defendants, on the ground 
that Stivers had "not offered competent evidence to 
show that the [Board's] actions were irrational, 
malicious, capricious, or arbitrary." The court 
further stated that its inquiry was limited to "whether 
Defendants acted capriciously." The court did not 
address Stivers' allegations that Pierce harbored a 
personal bias against him and had a pecuniary 
interest in seeing his application denied. The 
plaintiffs appealed. 
After Stivers obtained his licenses, but before the 
district court granted summary judgment, the 
plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees. The 
court initially rejected the motion on the ground that 
it was premature. After summary judgment, the 
plaintiffs filed another motion for attorney's fees, 
asserting that they were entitled to fees for time spent 
pursuing injunctive relief, since Stivers had obtained 
the licenses he sought. The district court again 
denied their motion, reasoning that plaintiffs could 
not be considered prevailing parties-even though they 
had obtained injunctive relief-because they lost their 
damages claim on the merits. The plaintiffs 
appealed this order separately. 
11. DUE PROCESS CLAIM 
The district court correctly found that the 
plaintiffs had a protected property interest in the 
licenses that were denied them, and the defendants do 
not seriously contest this finding.m The central 
question on appeal is whether a genuine issue of 
material fact exists as to Stivers' claim that he was 
denied his due process right to a fair hearing before 
an impartial tribunaLFNS We conclude that there is. 
FN4. The defendants' brief contains a single 
parenthetical statement disagreeing with the 
district court's holding on this issue: "The 
[district] Court did find the plaintiffs had a 
property interest in being licensed by the 
[Board] (a conclusion with which the 
defendants-appellees disagree on the basis 
of Krrlft v. Jacku. 872 F.2d 862, 866 (9th 
-1) ...." As the district court 
recognized, and as Kraft states, the existence 
of a protected property interest hinges on 
whether state law confers a "reasonable 
expectation of entitlement." Id. at 866. In 
Kraji, the court determined that the Nevada 
Gaming Board had almost absolute 
discretion to grant or deny new gaming 
licenses. Id. at 868; see also Jacobson 1,. 
Hnnnifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(finding no protected property interest, 
where gaming statute gave board "full and 
absolute power and authority" to grant or 
deny gaming licenses). In contrast, the 
Private Investigator Licensing Board's 
actions are limited by significant substantive 
restrictions. See Nev.Rev.Stat. 4 S 648.005 
et. seq. The district court properly 
concluded that these restrictions create a 
protected property interest in the licenses in 
question. 
FN5. After the special board meeting, at 
which Stivers was awarded his individual 
license, the plaintiffs informed the court that 
there was "no hrther issue of injunctive 
relief." Thus, no claim for injunctive relief 
is before us on appeal. 
In their appellate briefs, the plaintiffs do not 
challenge the district court's determination 
that the statute of limitations had expired 
with respect to Chamar's claim or its 
determination that Emsberger could not sue 
on behalf of Chamar. They raise only the 
issue whether Stivers was denied a fair 
hearing before a fair tribunal when he 
applied for licenses as a private investigator, 
private patrolman, and process server. 
Although the plaintiffs at oral argument 
asserted that the grant of summary judgment 
was also erroneous as to Emsberger's and 
Chamar's claims, they waived this issue by 
failing to raise i t  in their briefs. See 
Ri~lersitle-Linden Investnzcirt Co.. 945 F.2d 
320. 324-25 (9th Cir. 1991 1. Accordingly, 
our inquiry is limited to the question 
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whether the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment to the defendants on 
Stivers' claim for damages and declaratory 
relief. (It is not clear what if any declaratory 
relief may be available to Stivers but 
because the parties do not address that 
question, neither do we.) 
*741 A. Right to an Unbiased Trihtlnal 
It is well-settled that the Due Process Clause 
prevents the state from depriving a plaintiff of a 
protected property interest without "a fair trial in a 
fair tribunal." In re M~ir.chison. 349 U.S. 133, 136, 
75 S.Ct 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). As Justice 
Black wrote in Murchison: 
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of 
due process. Fairness of course requires an absence 
of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of 
law has always endeavored to prevent even the 
probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be 
a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to 
try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. 
Id. at 136, 75 S.Ct. at 625; see also Marshall v. 
Jerrico, Inc.. 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 
1613. 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980) ("the Due Process 
Clause entitles a person to an impartial and 
disinterested tribunal"). This requirement applies 
not only to courts, but also to state administrative 
agencies charged with applying eligibility criteria for 
licenses. Withr.o~.c~ v. Larliin. 421 U.S. 35, 46, 95 
S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975); Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 41 1 U.S. 564, 578-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689. 1697- 
98. 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). In attempting to make 
out a claim of unconstitutional bias, a plaintiff must 
"overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity" 
on the part of decision-makers. Withrow. 42 1 U.S. at 
47, 95 S.Ct at 1464. He must show that the 
adjudicator "has prejudged, or reasonably appears to 
have prejudged, an issue." Kenneall~~ v. Lurzare~~, 
967 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir.1992 (quoting Par?irznton 
1,. Gedan. 880 F.2d 116, 135 (9th Cir.1989) 
(Reinhardt, J, concurring and dissenting)), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 1054, 113 S.Ct. 979, 122 L.Ed.2d 
133 (1993). 
There are two ways in which a plaintiff may 
establish that he has been denied his constitutional 
right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. In 
some cases, the proceedings and surrounding 
circumstances may demonstrate actual bias on the 
part of the adjudicator. See T(ivlor. v. Haves, 41 8 
U.S. 488, 501-04. 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-06, 41 
L.Ed.2d 897 ( 1974); Cinck.t.ell~r Cureer (ind 
Finishin~ Scllools, Inc. 1,. Federal ;ri.atlc Con1n7'11, 
425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C.Cir.1970). In other cases, 
the adjudicator's pecuniary or personal interest in the 
outcome of the proceedings may create an 
appearance of partiality that violates due process, 
even without any showing of actual bias. Gibson, 
4 1 1 U.S. at 578, 93 S.Ct. at 1697-98; see also E,rx-on 
Corn, v. Heinze, 32 F.3d 1399. 1403 (9th Cir. 19941 
("the Constitution is concerned not only with actual 
bias but also with 'the appearance of justice.' "). 
B. Evidence ofBias on the Part o f  Pierce 
jX3J As this case demonstrates, the two categories of 
bias claims are not hermetically sealed. Stivers 
contends not only that Pierce had a pecuniary interest 
in denying his license applications, but also that 
Pierce was actually biased against him and that he 
acted on this bias during the licensing proceedings. 
Thus, he raises both an appearance of partiality claim 
and an actual bias claim. 
On the present record, Pierce's personal and 
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings, 
standing alone, would probably be insufficient to 
support a claim that the appearance of partiality 
violated due process. See Aetna Life In.simnce Co. 
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825-26. 106 S.Ct. 1580, 
1587-88.89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986) (adjudicator's "slight 
pecuniary interest" in outcome of proceedings does 
not in itself violate due process). Nor would the 
Board's repeated unfavorable rulings, standing alone, 
be sufficient to support a claim that Pierce or any 
other member of "742 the Board was actually biased 
against him. See McCulden v. Culifornia Library 
Ass'n, 955 F.2d 1214. 1224 (9th Cir.1990) ("Adverse 
rulings alone are not sufficient to require recusal, 
even if the number of such rulings is extraordinarily 
high."), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957. 112 S.Ct. 2306, 
1 19 L.Ed.2d 227 (1992). However, when the 
evidence of Pierce's pecuniary interest is considered 
along with the evidence of discriminatory treatment 
by the Board, there is a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether the licensing proceedings were tainted by 
actual bias. Stivers has introduced sufficient 
evidence of bias on the part of Board member 
Richard Pierce to overcome the presumption of 
integrity. 
The evidence that Stivers has introduced can be 
divided into the following categories: (1) evidence of 
Pierce's pecuniary interest in the outcome of the 
licensing proceedings; (2) evidence concerning 
Pierce's past association with Russ Jones and 
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Associates; (3) evidence that Pierce made 
"extrajudicial" statements reflecting his personal 
hostility toward Stivers; (4) evidence that Stivers 
received unusually harsh and highly irregular 
treatment from the Board during the licensing 
hearings; and (5) evidence that the Board, through its 
employees, sought to impede and delay the plaintiffs' 
efforts to do business. The first category relates 
primarily to the appearance of bias, while the other 
categories pertain exclusively to Stivers' allegations 
that Pierce was actually biased against him. We 
examine each category separately, although we 
evaluate them collectively for purposes of 
determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists as 
to actual bias. As to the appearance of partiality, 
only the first category is relevant. 
1. Pierce's Pecuniary Interest 
Stivers has introduced evidence showing that Pierce 
had a pecuniary interest in ensuring that Stivers' 
license applications were denied. A short time 
before the licensing proceedings began, Stivers had 
entered into direct competition with Dick Pierce and 
Associates. Stivers asserts that Pierce's pecuniary 
interest in stifling competition rendered his 
participation in the licensing proceedings 
constitutionally objectionable. 
Among the cases in which the appearance of bias is 
"too high to be constitutionally tolerable" are those in 
which the adjudicator has a direct and substantial 
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case before 
him. Witfirow, 421 U.S. at 47. 95 S.Ct. at 1464. In 
such cases, the adjudicator's participation constitutes 
a per se violation of due process-the appearance of 
partiality in itself renders the proceedings 
objectionable, without any showing that the 
adjudicator was actually biased. Aetnu Life, 475 U.S. 
at 825, 106 S.Ct. at 1587; Utico Puckit12 Co. 11. 
Block. 78 1 F.2d 7 1, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1986). 
123 The Supreme Court has held that a state licensing 
tribunal violates due process when its members have 
a direct and substantial competitive interest in the 
outcome of the proceedings before them. Gibson, 
41 1 U.S. at 578-79, 93 S.Ct. at 1697-98. In Gibson, 
the Court considered the disciplinary proceedings of 
an optometry licensing board. The plaintiffs subject 
to license revocation proceedings were optometrists 
employed by an optometry company. All the 
members of the licensing board, h~wever, were self- 
employed optometrists. 41 1 U.S. at 571, 93 S.Ct, at 
1694. The district court found that, if the optometry 
-
company were forced to shut down, "the individual 
members of the Board, along with other private 
practitioners of optometry, would fall heir to this 
business." Id. Without requiring any showing that 
the board's decision was actually influenced by 
impermissible bias, the Court upheld the district 
court's conclusion that the board members' 
"substantial pecuniary interest" in denying licenses to 
competitors constituted a per se violation of the 
plaintiffs' right to due process. It/. at 579, 93 S.Ct, at 
1698. 
The Court's decision in Gibson did not invalidate all 
licensing boards that include industry representatives. 
After Gibson, the Court upheld a state statute 
requiring that a majority of optometry board 
members be drawn from an organization of 
professional optometrists. Frierln~an v. Rogers. 440 
U.S. 1, 18, 99 S.Ct. 887, 898, 59 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979). 
More recently, the Court has made clear that due 
process is not violated by the participation of 
adjudicators who "might conceivably"743 have had 
a slight pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the case 
before them. Aeti~a Life, 475 U.S. at 825, 106 S.Ct. 
at 1587 (1986). An adjudicator is, however, 
precluded from participating in decisions in which he 
has a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary 
interest." 475 U.S. at 822, 106 S.Ct. at 1585. 
The fact that Pierce and Stivers have in the past 
competed for a few specific contracts is not in itself 
sufficient to meet this standard. While under Stivers' 
management, Great Western outbid pierce's company 
for the convention business at Bally's and other 
business totalling $55,000, the contracts constituted a 
relatively small portion of Dick Pierce and 
Associates' $5 million annual receipts. Nevertheless, 
there may be a genuine issue as to whether Pierce had 
a sufficient interest in the denial of Stivers' 
application to necessitate his recusal. Unlike most 
other license applicants before the Board, who sought 
to do business in the more populous Southern Nevada 
region, Stivers intended to enter into business in the 
Reno area, where he would operate in direct 
competition with Pierce. See Wilkerson v. Johnson, 
699 F.2d 325, 328 (6th Cir.1983) (licensing board 
member's interest in preventing barber shop from 
opening next door to his own created 
"unconstitutional risk of bias"). There are other 
pertinent facts that do not appear in the record as 
developed thus far. We dc not know, for example, 
how many similar businesses are currently licensed in 
the Reno area, what effect one more business is likely 
to have, or even much about the nature of the market 
or the particular qualifications or attributes that 
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Stivers and Pierce may possess. Such facts may be 
critical in determining whether Pierce had a "direct" 
and "substantial" pecuniary interest that would 
constitute a per se due process violation. 
There are undoubtedly cases in which the appearance 
of partiality arising from competitive interests is 
sufficiently strong to warrant recusal. See Gibson. 
41 1 U.S. at 578-79. 93 S.Ct. at 1697-98. A lawyer 
in a one-lawyer town, for example, would probably 
have a "direct" and "substantial" pecuniary interest in 
the licensing of a competitor planning to hang a 
shingle across the street. On the other hand, it is 
unlikely that any attorney practicing in a city like Los 
Angeles would have a competitive interest 
sufficiently strong to require that he be disqualified 
from considering the licensing of an additional 
lawyer. 
We note that any per se rule governing the 
appearance of partiality must take into account the 
fact that the system of industry representation on 
governing or licensing bodies is an accepted practice 
throughout the nation. As the Supreme Court has 
pointed out, the Due Process Clause imposes "only 
broad limits ... on the exercise by the State of its 
authority to regulate its economic life, and 
particularly the conduct of its professions." 
Friedman, 440 U.S. at 18 n. 19, 99 S.Ct. at 898 n. 19. 
If members of a licensing board were disqualified 
whenever they have "some" competitive interest in 
the outcome of proceedings before them, 
practitioners in the field would as a practical matter 
be excluded from becoming members of such boards. 
There are, of course, advantages to the involvement 
of industry representatives in licensing decisions. 
Private investigators, for example, can bring a 
particular practical understanding and perspective to 
the proceedings. It is presumably for this reason that 
the Board, by statute, must include a private 
investigator, a private patrolman, and a polygraphic 
examiner. See Nev.Rev.Statute 16 648.020(1). 
Were we to hold Pierce's participation impermissible, 
based solely on the fact that there may on occasion be 
"some" competition for clients, we would call into 
question the composition not only of the Board 
involved in the case before us but many other boards 
throughout the circuit that include industry 
representatives among their membership. That we 
do not wish to do. 
Without more facts, it does not appear that Pierce's 
economic interest is such as to warrant a per se 
disqualification. Upon remand, however, Stivers is 
free to introduce evidence tending to show that 
Pierce's pecuniary interest is in fact sufficient to 
warrant application of the per se rule. On this 
appeal, we consider the evidence concerning Pierce's 
competitive interest for a different purpose. We 
consider it in connection with Stivers' *744 claim that 
Pierce was actually biased against him. It is that 
claim which we now examine. 
2. Pierce's Past Business Association 
JXJ Stivers contends that Pierce's relationship with 
Russ Jones and Associates during the 1970's rendered 
his participation in the decision to deny Stivers' 
applications constitutionally objectionable. We take 
as true the plaintiffs' charge that, upon Pierce's 
tumultuous departure from Russ Jones and 
Associates, he threatened to run the company out of 
business. Stivers contends that this statement reveals 
that Pierce had a bias against Russ Jones and 
Associates and that he should have recused himself 
from participating in the licensing proceedings for 
this reason. 
We agree that unconstitutional bias may be shown 
through evidence that the adjudicator "had it 'in' for 
the party for reasons unrelated to the officer's view of 
the. law." McLu~lnhlin v. Union Oil of' CaliL, 869 
F.2d 1039, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989). However, we do 
not believe that the particular inference that plaintiffs 
would have us draw is warranted. A number of 
years after Pierce's departure from Russ Jones and 
Associates, the company was sold to Tamblyn, who 
in turn sold the company's assets to Stivers and 
Ernsberger years later. While it might be reasonable 
to conclude that Pierce harbored a personal grudge 
against Jones, there is no rational basis for 
concluding that he retained a bias against the 
corporation that Jones had previously owned, 
particularly since Jones had sold it to a disinterested 
third party a number of years earlier. Pierce's past 
association with Russ Jones and Associates is wholly 
insufficient to overcome the "presumption of honesty 
and integrity in those serving as adjudicators." 
Withr-ow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. at 1464. Because 
the dispute between Pierce and the former owner of 
Russ Jones and Associates is so far removed from the 
events at issue in this case, we conclude as a matter 
of law that they have no relevance to the question 
whether the denial of the plaintiffs' license 
applications violated due process. 
3. Pierce's Statements About Stivers 
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JYJ In addition to alleging that Pierce had a pecuniary 
interest in the outcome of the licensing proceedings, 
Stivers has also introduced evidence that Pierce 
harbored a personal bias against him. A party 
alleging unconstitutional bias may prove this claim 
by introducing extrajudicial statements by the 
adjudicator that are inconsistent with the role of 
impartial decisionmaker. Jenkins v. Sterl(icci. 849 
F.2d 627,634 (D.C.Cir. 1988). 
An affidavit from Patty Bavol, the manager of an 
apartment complex in Reno, reports derogatory 
statements that Pierce made about Stivers during a 
business visit in the spring of 1989-while Stivers' 
application was pending before the Board. Stivers 
had recently been shot in the chest by an unknown 
attacker while investigating a burglary. Pierce, who 
was providing security services to Bavol's apartment, 
laughed about the shooting and remarked that 
"everybody knew Marty [Stivers] had shot himself." 
From this and other comments Pierce made that day, 
Bavol believed it clear that Pierce harbored "an 
extremely negative, biased, attitude toward Mr. 
Stivers." 
Pierce's derogatory statement lends some support to 
the view that his opposition to the plaintiffs' 
application was the consequence of h s  hostility 
toward Stivers. See Tavlor. 418 U.S. at 501, 94 
S.Ct. at 2704-05 (adjudicator's remarks demonstrated 
personal animus toward litigant violative of due 
process); Balialis v. Golernheski, 35 F.3d 318, 326 
17th Cir.1994) (running controversy between the 
plaintiff and the board showed that board had 
prejudged issue). The statement tends to support the 
allegation that Pierce's opposition to Stivers was the 
product of personal animosity, rather than the merits 
of his application. See McLuuphlin, 869 F.2d at 
1047. Standing alone, Bavol's affidavit would 
-
clearly be insufficient to demonstrate that Pierce 
prejudged Stivers' application. However, we do not 
view the hostile statement in isolation; instead, we 
examine it in connection with all the other evidence 
tending to establish or rebut the charge of bias. 
*745 4. The Licensing Hearings 
We also consider the treatment accorded to the 
plaintiffs by the Board. As the Sixth Circuit noted in 
Wilkerson v. Johnson, the "regular and impartial 
administration of public rules governing these 
interests [in occupational licenses], as required by 
due process, prohibits the subtle distortions of 
prejudice and bias as well as gross governmental 
violations ...." 699 F.2d at 328 (citing Gibson, 41 1 
U.S.  at 564. 93 S.Ct. at 1690-91 ). In Wilkerson, the 
plaintiffs offered evidence that one member of a 
barber's licensing board had a competitive interest in 
denying their application, that the board had delayed 
in acting upon their application, and that the board 
had harassed them during the application process. Id. 
at 328. In view of this evidence, the Sixth Circuit 
upheld the jury's conclusion that the board was 
motivated by impermissible bias. Id. 
LlOJ We agree with the Sixth Circuit that it is 
appropriate to look to irregularities in the treatment 
that a license applicant receives from the Board in 
determining whether the decision-malung' process 
was affected by impermissible bias on the part of one 
of its members. See Sinaloa Lake Owrlers Ass'n 11. 
Citv o f  Sirni Vullev, 882 F.2d 1398, 1409 (9th 
Cir.1989) ( "malicious, irrational and plainly 
arbitrary actions are not within the legitimate purview 
of the state's power"), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 
1 10 S.Ct. 13 17, 108 L.Ed.2d 493 (1990). In addition 
to the evidence of Pierce's pecuniary interest and 
personal animus, the record contains substantial 
evidence showing that the treatment Stivers and 
Chamar received from the Board as a whole-and 
from Pierce in particular-was unusually harsh. Me1 
Tate, an investigator who frequently attended Board 
meetings, testified that the Board's consideration of 
Stivers' application was very unusual. According to 
Tate, the Board appeared to have "made up their 
minds" to reject Stivers' application and "seemed to 
be harboring a grudge toward him." See Brr1culi.s. 35 
F.3d at 326 (evidence tended to show that some 
members of board had prejudged case before it). In 
particular, Tate recalled the "very negative attitude of 
Dick Pierce," who "seemed to be biased against 
Stivers." Tate contrasted the treatment Stivers 
received with that received by other applicants. 
While the Board ordinarily accepted the statements of 
other applicants and requested only general 
descriptions of their background, it "kept pushing 
Stivers" and refused to accept any of his statements. 
Stivers has also introduced evidence that the Board 
did not apply its licensing criteria in an evenhanded 
manner. See Wilket-sot?, 699 F.2d at 328. Minutes 
of other Board meetings corroborate Tate's 
observation that Stivers was treated markedly 
differently from other applicants. At meetings 
between 1985 and 1988, the Board granted licenses 
to at least 14 applicants without asking any questions. 
The Board has granted licenses to several people with 
criminal records, without raising any question as to 
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their integrity. Although Stivers has no criminal 
record, the Board continually challenged his integrity 
during the several Board meetings at which he 
appeared. Furthermore, the Board granted licenses 
to many individuals and companies despite their 
"unlicensed activity," and to others who lacked the 
required experience and qualifications. 
It is also noteworthy that the Board's members, 
including Pierce, disregarded the recommendations 
of its own legal counsel in denying Stivers' 
application. After the plaintiffs' filed suit in state 
court, the Board's counsel Sarnmons informed the 
Board that Russ Jones and Associates had been 
operating legally and recommended that the licenses 
be granted. The Board's decision to deny Stivers' 
application, despite counsel's advice, is circumstantial 
evidence of unconstitutional bias. See'Cunninphoni 
v. City o f  Over-land, 804 F.2d 1066, 1069 (8th 
(3.1986) (board violated due process in denying 
license, where city attorney had informed board that 
there were no legal grounds for denial); Blrschc v. 
Burkee. 649 F.2d 509. 520 (7th Cir.1981) (police 
chiefs' disregard of legal counsel's advice established 
malicious intent), cert. denied 454 U.S. 897, 102 
S.Ct. 396.70 L.Ed.2d 2 12 (198 1). 
Transcripts of the Board hearings also corroborate 
Tate's observations that Pierce played a prominent 
role in opposing Stivers' applications. Pierce 
accused Stivers of lying *746 about his credentials 
even after the Board's own investigator 
acknowledged that proof existed as to his hours of 
service. After the Board voted to deny Stivers' 
applications, Pierce persisted in opposing another 
member's suggestion that Russ Jones and Associates 
be permitted to continue doing business. These 
actions stand in contrast to the treatment Pierce 
accorded other prospective licensees; in most cases, 
he asked few if any question. Taken as a whole, the 
Board's proceedings provide strong-albeit 
circumstantial-support for Stivers' contention that 
Pierce was biased against him. 
5. Harassment and Delay 
J12ll13] Among the factors we take into account, in 
determining whether governmental action violated 
due process, is "whether the action was taken in good 
faith or for the purpose of causing harm." Sinalon 
Lake O~vnera Ass'n, 882 F.2d at 1409. As the Sixth 
Circuit observed in Wilkerson, evidence of 
"harassment and delay in allowing plaintiffs to 
pursue their occupation" is germane to the question 
of whether licensing proceedings violated due 
process. 699 F.2d at 328. 
Stivers has introduced substantial evidence of 
harassment and delay by the Board and its agents. In 
rejecting Stivers' application, the Board relied heavily 
on a report from its investigator, Robert Rodefer-a 
report that, by Rodefer's own admission, contains 
several incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading 
statements. Rodefer's report raised serious questions 
about Stivers' claimed experience and character. In 
his deposition, Rodefer testified that proof of Stivers 
past employment existed, but that he had failed to 
find it before completing his report. Additionally, 
Rodefer testified that there was "no problem" with 
Stivers' character. After admitting that the report 
could be viewed as containing "many inaccuracies," 
Rodefer stated that it was "not one of my greatest 
investigations." Rodefer's admissions provide strong 
support for Stivers' contention that the Board 
intended to prevent him from going into business. 
The plaintiffs have also produced evidence that the 
Board's investigators attempted to interfere with the 
operations of Russ Jones and Associates during the 
course of the licensing proceedings. According to 
one customer of Russ Jones and Associates, Lynne 
Keller of the Gold Dust West Casino, Rodefer falsely 
informed her that Russ Jones and Associates was 
doing business illegally. As a result of her 
conversation with Rodefer, the Gold Dust West 
cancelled the services of Russ Jones and Associates. 
Another investigator for the Board, Bill Bertram, 
approached Russ Jones and Associates' insurer. 
Bertram stated that the company was doing 
unlicensed work, prompting the insurance company 
to cancel its policy. The Board's executive secretary 
Widmer-Hanna then informed the plaintiffs that the 
license of Russ Jones and Associates would be 
revoked if they did not obtain insurance. 
Such evidence of harassment and delay is directly 
relevant to the question whether the Board's 
proceedings were affected by the impermissible bias 
of one of its members. Willierson, 699 F.2d at 328. 
Along with the evidence of Pierce's pecuniary 
interest, his hostile statements regarding Stivers, and 
the evidence of disparate treatment by the Board, the 
evidence of harassment and delay creates a triable 
issue of fact as to whether Stivers was denied a fair 
hearing before an impartial tribunal. 
C. Impact of One Member's Bias 
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r141 In support of their argument that the grant of 
summary judgment should be upheld, the defendants 
argue that the evidence at most demonstrates bias on 
the part of one member of the Board, not the denial 
of a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. As the 
defendants point out, the plaintiffs have produced no 
evidence that other members of the Board had a 
pecuniary interest in ensuring that Stivers' application 
was denied. Because the five-person Board 
unanimously rejected Stivers' application, the 
defendants argue that Pierce's. participation was 
irrelevant to the outcome. 
Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has 
addressed whether bias on the part of one member of 
a multi-person tribunal violates due process, without 
any showing that that member's bias affected the 
tribunal's "747 decision. In Aetna Life, the Supreme 
Court expressly declined to address this question. 
475 U.S. at 827 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. at 1588 n. 4. The 
Court first held that one justice of the Alabama 
Supreme Court was disqualified, by virtue of his 
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case before 
him, but that there was no constitutional bar to the 
participation of the other eight justices. Id. at 825, 
827. 106 S.Ct at 1587. 1588. Because the 
disqualified justice's vote was decisive, and because 
he wrote the majority opinion, there was no question 
that the Alabama Supreme Court's decision could not 
be permitted to stand. Icl. at 828, 106 S.Ct. at 1588- 
89. However, the majority expressed no view as to 
-
whether the same result would have been required if 
the biased justice's vote had not been decisive. 
827 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. at 1588 n. 4 (citing Ashu~anrler- 11. 
TVA. 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466,483.80 L.Ed. 
688 (1 936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
While concurring in the majority's opinion, Justice 
Brennan stated his view that the participation of one 
biased member would require that the tribunal's 
decision be vacated regardless of whether that 
member's vote was decisive. Referring to the 
collective process of deliberation, Justice Brennan 
observed that: 
[Wlhile the influence of a single participant in this 
process can never be measured with precision, 
experience teaches us that each member's 
involvement plays a part in shaping the court's 
ultimate disposition. The participation of a judge 
who has a substantial interest in the outcome of a 
case of which he knows at the time he participates 
necessarily imports a bias into the deliberative 
process. This deprives litigants of the impartiality 
that is the fundamental requirement of due process. 
Id. at 831, 106 S.Ct, at 1 5 9 0 . ~  
FN6. Justices Blackmun, who concurred 
only in the judgment, expressed a view 
similar to that of Justice Brennan. See 
831-33, 106 S.Ct. at 1590-91 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). Blackmun's opinion, in which 
Justice Marshall joined, states that the 
participation of one biased justice "posed an 
unacceptable danger of subtly distorting the 
decisionmaking process." Id. at 83 1, 106 
S.Ct. at 1590. Therefore, the fact that the 
biased justice cast the deciding vote was, in 
Justice Blackmun's view, "irrelevant" to the 
question whether the proceedings violated 
due process. Id. ' 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion as 
Justice Brennan. In Cinderella Career and 
Finishing Schools v. Federal Trade Comm'n, the 
District of Columbia Circuit expressed its view that 
there is no way of determining the extent to which 
one biased member's views affect the deliberations of 
a supposedly impartial tribunal. 425 F.2d 583, 592 
JD.C.Cir.1970) (citing Berk~hirc Emnlovec.~ Ass'n of' 
Berk~hire Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235, 239 
(3d Cir. 1941)). Accordingly, that court vacated the 
decision of an administrative tribunal, even though 
the biased member's vote was not necessary for a 
majority. In H i c h  v. Citv o f  Watonga. 942 F.2d 737, 
748 (10th Cir.19911, the Tenth Circuit likewise 
concluded that the plaintiff could make out a due 
process claim by showing bias on the part of only one 
member of the tribunal. Relying on Cinderella 
Career and Finishing Schools, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that the presence of one biased member on 
a six-person tribunal would "taint[ ] the tribunal" and 
thereby violate due process, regardless of whether 
that member cast the deciding vote. Finally, in 
Wilkerson v. Johnson. 699 F.2d 325, 328-29 (6th 
Cir.19831, the Sixth Circuit held that barbershop 
license applicants were denied due process, although 
only one member of the four-person board had a 
competitive interest in denying the plaintiffs' license 
application. 
We find the reasoning of these courts, and of Justice 
Brennan in Aetna Life, to be persuasive. Particularly 
on a small board like the Board before us, a single 
person's bias is likely to have a profound impact on 
the decisionmaking process. Cf: Lani 11. Ut~iversiti) 
o f  Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 (9th Cir.1994) 
(evidence of racial and gender bias on the part of one 
member of fifteen-person faculty precludes summary 
O 2006 ThomsonIWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. x ,: . 
i 5 
Page 18 
71 F.3d 732, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9034, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,866 
(Cite as: 71 F.3d 732) 
judgment in Title VII case). As Justice Brennan 
observed in Aetna Llfe, it is difficult if not impossible 
to measure the impact that one member's views have 
on the process of collective deliberation. Each 
member contributes not only his vote but also his 
voice to the deliberative process. Thus, the fact that 
the tribunal's vote was *748 unanimous does not 
mean that the bias of one member had no effect on 
the r e s ~ l t . ~  
FN7. The defendants cite Arroyo Vista 
-
Purtners v. County o f  Santu Brrrbaru, 732 
F.Supp. 1046 (C.D.Ca1.19901 and Flicl<inaer 
v. School Bd. o f  City ofNorfolli. 799 F.Supv. 
586 (E.D.Va.1992) in support of their 
argument that the evidence of Pierce's bias is 
insufficient to require reversal. Neither of 
these cases supports their position. The 
question in both Arroyo Vista and Flickinger 
was whether the evidence was sufficient to 
hold municipal entities liable under Monell 
v. De~artnlent o f  Social Svs.. 436 U.S. 658, 
98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 6 1 1 (1978). To 
hold municipal entities liable under Monell, 
the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the 
unlawful governmental action was part of 
the municipality's policy or custom. & 
Louis v. Pra~rotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 108 
S.Ct. 915, 924, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). In 
this case, however, the issue is not the 
liability of a municipal entity, but the 
liability of the individual members and 
employees of the Board. Monell's 
requirement that plaintiffs establish the 
existence of a policy or custom is thus 
inapplicable here. 
We therefore hold that where one member of a 
tribunal is actually biased, or where circumstances 
create the appearance that one member is biased, the 
proceedings violate due process. The plaintiff need 
not demonstrate that the biased member's vote was 
decisive or that his views influenced those of other 
members. Whether actual or apparent, bias on the 
part of a single member of a tribunal taints the 
proceedings and violates due process. 
Of course, we do not decide whether Pierce was 
actually biased against Stivers. We hold only that 
the evidence raises a triable issue of fact as to 
whether Stivers was deprived of the licenses he 
sought without due process. Stivers must still 
convince the trier of fact that Pierce was actually 
biased against him.FN8 However, while the Board's 
conduct may provide evidence favorable to Stivers' 
claim, Stivers is not required to show that Pierce's 
bias affected the Board's ultimate decision to deny his 
applications. 
FN8. As discussed supra part 1I.B. 1, Stivers 
-
may also attempt to develop the record 
further to show that Pierce's financial 
interest is such as to create an appearance of 
bias that would require his recusal. 
Although Stivers need not show that other members 
of the Board were influenced by Pierce's bias to make 
out a due process claim, the impact of Pierce's bias on 
the other members is germane to the question 
whether they may be held individually liable. We 
discuss that question below when we examine the 
issue of qualified immunity. See infra part 111. 
D. Waiver of Objection 
The defendants further contend that, even if a 
triable issue exists on the question of bias, Stivers 
waived any objection by failing to seek Pierce's 
recusal. See Pnrtinrtoi7 v. Gsdan. 880 F.2d 116. 127 
19th Cir. 19891 (no denial of impartial tribunal, where 
state statute permitted plaintiff to seek recusal), 
vacated, 497 U.S. 1020. 110 S.Ct. 3265, 11 1 L.Ed.2d 
776 (19901, re a p d ,  914 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.19901, 
rev'd on other grounds, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 199 1 )  
(en banc); Flanwas v. Stute Bar o f  Nevuiia. 655 F.2d 
946. 950 (9th Cir.1981) (plaintiffs failure to utilize 
statutorily prescribed disqualification procedures 
barred court from considering his bias claim). 
According to the defendants, Stivers was aware of the 
circumstances creating Pierce's alleged bias at the 
time of his hearings. The defendants argue that, 
because Stivers failed to ask that Pierce recuse 
himself, he waived his right to claim that due process 
was denied. 
We conclude that Stivers' failure to object to Pierce's 
participation in the Board proceedings did not 
constitute a waiver. Where state law provides a 
mechanism for seeking recusal, the litigant may be 
required to avail himself of that mechanism. 
POI-tinrrton, 880 F.2d at 127; Flan.r~rms, 655 F.2d at 
950. The statute governing the Board, however, 
-
imposes no such requirement. Nowhere in the 
statute is there any discussion of recusal or of the 
circumstances in which recusal is appropriate; nor is 
any procedure established for the making of recusal 
requests. Under the circumstances, it is easy to 
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understand why someone in Stivers' position would 
remain silent. To suggest the existence of a conflict 
would likely antagonize the Board, and might offer 
little if any hope for relief. We hold that, where 
there are no procedures specifically governing 
recusal, a failure to seek such action does not 
constitute a waiver. 
*749 111. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
The defendants contend that, even if the plaintiffs' 
due process rights were violated, the grant of 
summary judgment should be upheld on the ground 
that the Eleventh Amendment bars an action against 
either the Board or the individual defendants. While 
it is correct that the Eleventh Amendment shields the 
Board itself from liability, the individual defendants 
are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
J 161 r 1 71 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits 
against a state, and section 1983 does not abrogate 
this immunity. Will v. Michipan De~artment o f  State 
Police. 491 U.S. 58, 62. 109 S.Ct. 2304. 2307-08, 
105 L.Ed.2d 45 11989). In this case, the complaint 
names the Board as a defendant. As an agency of 
the state, the Board itself is shielded from liability 
under the Eleventh Amendment. Mitchell v. Los 
Anpeles Comn~unity Collepe Dist.. 86 1 F.2d 198, 20 1 
/9th Cir. 19882, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 108 1, 1 09 S.Ct. 
2 102. 104 L.Ed.2d 663 11989). Accordingly, we 
affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the 
Board. 
11 811 191r201 The Eleventh Amendment also prohibits 
damage actions against state officials in their oflcial 
capacities. Id. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 23 12. However, 
the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against 
state officials for prospective relief. Pennhurst v. 
Hulderman. 465 U.S. 89, 104-06, 104 S.Ct. 900, 910- 
1 1 ,  79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Nor does it bar damage 
actions against state officials in their personal 
capacities. Hafer. v. Melo, 502 U.S. 2 1.3 1.  1 12 S.Ct. 
358. 365, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). Personal 
capacity suits seek to impose liability on state 
officials for acts taken under color of state law. 
25-26. 112 S.Ct. at 362. In Hafer, the Court made 
clear that the Eleventh Amendment does not shield 
state officials from allegations that they violated a 
federal right while acting under color of state law. 
Id. at 29. 112 S.Ct. at 364. The Amendment only 
prohibits damage actions against the "official's 
office7'-actions that are in reality suits against the 
state itself, rather than its individual officials. 
29. 112 S.Ct. at 364; Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 
1211 Stivers has brought suit against the individual 
members of the Board, the executive secretary of the 
Board, and the Board's investigators in their personal 
capacities. Stivers asserts that, while acting under 
color of state law, the individual defendants deprived 
him of a protected property interest without due 
process. This is not an action against the "officials' 
office," but an action against the individuals who 
allegedly deprived Stivers of his right to due process 
by participating in an unfair decisionmaking process. 
The fact that the defendants were acting under color 
of state office does not shield them from personal 
liability under section 1983. Id. at 31, 112 S.Ct. at 
365. Because Stivers' action is against the 
defendants in their personal capacities for their own 
wrongdoing, and not in their official capacities, the 
Eleventh Amendment imposes no bar to his suit. 
IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
The defendants further contend that the doctrine of 
qualified immunity requires that we uphold the 
district court's grant of summary judgment. We 
disagree. 
1221[23] The qualified immunity doctrine shields 
government officials from liability, if "a reasonable 
government official could have believed that his 
conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established law 
and the information he possessed." Tllor.~ted v. Kelly, 
858 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.1988). This standard 
requires a two-part analysis: ( I )  whether the law 
prohibiting the official conduct was clearly 
established; and (2) whether a reasonable official 
could have believed that his conduct complied with 
the law. Act Uu!/Po~.tlund v. Bagle~l. 988 F.2d 868, 
871 (9th Cir.1993). If the law prohibiting the 
conduct was clearly established and a reasonable 
official could not have believed his conduct lawful, 
then the official is not immune. 
1241 Whether the law governing the conduct at issue 
was clearly established is a question of law for the 
court to decide. Id. at 873. In this case, Stivers 
asserts that the defendants denied him his 
constitutional right to a fair hearing by an unbiased 
tribunal. Specifically, he asserts that Pierce 
harbored"750 a bias against him and that this bias 
influenced the other Board members in their actions. 
The law is clearly established that the members of a 
licensing tribunal must be impartial and cannot act on 
the basis of personal bias. Witlzro~i: 42 1 U.S. at 46, 
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95 S.Ct. at 1464; Gih,von, 41 1 U.S. at 578-79, 93 
S.Ct. at 1697-98. Thus, the first prong of the 
qualified immunity test is satisfied. 
The remaining question is whether officials in the 
defendants' position could have believed that their 
conduct was reasonable. This is an objective and 
fact-specific test. Tllorsfed, 858 F.2d at 573. In 
order to answer that question at summary judgment, 
we must accept the plaintiffs version of the facts. If 
there is a dispute about facts that are material to the 
qualified immunity question, summary judgment is 
inappropriate. Act UD!, 988 F.2d at 872. 
We have little difficulty in concluding that 
Pierce is not entitled to assert a qualified immunity 
defense. If Pierce's opposition to Stivers' application 
was motivated by his own personal bias, then Pierce 
would clearly be foreclosed from asserting a qualified 
immunity defense-a reasonable official harboring 
actual bias against a license applicant could not have 
believed that his participation in the licensing 
proceedings was appropriate. See Hicks v. Citv o f  
Watonna. 942 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1991 ) (rejecting a 
board member's claim of qualified immunity, where 
there was evidence tending to show that she was 
improperly motivated). 
JXJ Whether the other individual defendants have a 
valid qualified immunity defense presents a 
somewhat more difficult question. In Hicks, the 
Tenth Circuit considered the circumstances under 
which members of a multi-person tribunal are entitled 
to qualified immunity, where one member is actually 
biased against the party before it. The court 
concluded that the plaintiff had introduced evidence 
of bias on the part of one council member, but had 
failed to come forward with any evidence of 
improper motivation or conduct on the part of the 
other defendants, aside from their votes against the 
plaintiff. Id. at 748. The court held that the other 
members had not violated any duty, saying that a 
contrary ruling would "place on all administrative 
tribunal members a duty to ferret out possible bias 
among their colleagues, or to face civil damages 
regardless of their own fairness and integrity." Id. 
Although we find the Tenth Circuit's analysis 
persuasive, we believe the circumstances of this case 
to be distinguishable. Where the evidence shows 
actual bias on the part of only one board member, and 
no improper conduct on the part of the other 
defendants, those other defendants are not liable. In 
this case, however, Stivers does not rely simply on 
the fact that the other Board members voted against 
him. Rather, he alleges that they all acted in an 
arbitrary and improper manner. He has introduced 
evidence that tends to show that the Board's 
members, executive secretary, and investigators 
prejudged his applications and acted together to 
deprive him of the licenses he sought. The hearing 
transcripts contain evidence that supports his claim 
that the entire Board, and not just Pierce, accorded 
the plaintiffs unusually harsh treatment. The 
transcript shows that, after the plaintiffs were 
informed that they could do business under the name 
Russ Jones and Associates, several of the Board's 
members accused them of operating illegally. Later, 
the Board rejected its attorney's advice and 
peremptorily refused to grant Stivers' license 
applications. Even after Stivers produced 
documentation of his hours of experience, the Board 
persisted in its hostility toward the plaintiffs, with 
one Board member deriding Stivers as a 
"professional victim" and others accused him of 
lying. As a witness to the hearings observed, all the 
Board's members appeared to have "made up their 
mind" ahead of time and "seemed to be harboring a 
grudge" toward Stivers. Finally, there is evidence 
that the Board's employees attempted to interfere 
with the plaintiffs' business by discouraging their 
customers. 
From this evidence, the trier of fact could conclude 
that all the defendants, influenced by Pierce's bias, 
prejudged Stivers' application or otherwise acted out 
of bias. See Wilker-son. 699 F.2d at 328-29 (even 
though only one member of board had pecuniary 
interest in denying licensing, evidence supported 
jury's finding that all board members were biased); 
cf: *751Woodr~mi I). Woodward Countj). 866 F.2d 
1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1989) (plaintiff may show 
conspiracy under 9 1983 by showing agreement to 
violate constitutional rights). If the defendants 
joined with Pierce in an effort to deny Stivers' 
applications, then they would be liable; moreover, in 
such circumstances, they would not be entitled to 
qualified immunity. No reasonable official in their 
position could believe that such conduct was lawful. 
Following Hiclcs, we decline to impose upon board 
members a duty to "ferret out" bias on the part of 
their colleagues. 942 F.2d at 750. We do, however, 
hold that they have a duty not to join with the biased 
member by acting improperly themselves. While the 
mere fact that decisions adverse to the applicants 
were rendered ,is not enough to defeat a qualified 
immunity defense, evidence of arbitrary and 
improper treatment by the Board's members and 
employees may be. Viewed in the light most 
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favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence supports the 
conclusion that all the defendants joined in Pierce's 
efforts to deny Stivers' applications without a fair 
hearing. Given these factual circumstances, we 
cannot say as a matter of law that the qualified 
immunity doctrine shields them from liability. 
V. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
After the "special board" awarded Stivers his 
licenses, and again after the grant of summary 
judgment, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's 
fees under 42 U.S.C. Ei 1988. The plaintiffs asserted 
entitlement to fees because they had obtained some 
of the relief sought by this action-namely, licenses 
permitting Stivers to work as a private investigator, 
private patrolman, and process server. ' The court 
rejected the fee application, reasoning that the 
plaintiffs could not be considered prevailing parties, 
because they lost their damages claim on the merits. 
We review factual findings underlying the 
district court's decision to deny fees for clear error. 
Sabfun v. Dent. ofFinance. 856 F.2d 13 17, 1324 (9th 
Cir.1988). However, we will reverse the fee 
determination if the district court applied an incorrect 
legal standard in arriving at its decision. Lummi  
Indian Tribe v. Oltnlan, 720 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th 
Cir. 1983). In this case, we conclude that the district 
court applied the wrong standard in determining 
whether or not there was a "legal basis" for Stivers' 
claim. Had the court applied the proper standard, it 
would have been compelled to award fees. 
A. Prevailing Party Status 
A plaintiff may only recover fees under section 
1988 if he is the "prevailing party." Hervift v. Helnis, 
-
482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 2675-76. 96 
L.Ed.2d 654 (1987). A litigant need not prevail on 
every issue, or even on the "central issue" in the case, 
to be considered the prevailing party. Texas State 
Teachers Ass'n v. Gorland Independent School Dist.. 
489 U.S. 782, 790, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1492-93, 103 
L.Ed.2d 866 (1989). It is enough that he succeed 
"on any significant claim affording some of the relief 
sought, eitherpendente life or at the conclusion of the 
litigation." Id. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 1493. 
[291[301 If the plaintiff is only partially successful in 
seeking the relief, and achieves only some of the 
benefit sought by the litigation, he is still considered 
the prevailing party. FC~WUI. V. Hohbv, 506 U.S. 103, 
11 1-12, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573. 12 1 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). 
The degree of success is irrelevant to the question 
whether the plaintiff is the prevailing party. 
112-14. 113 S.Ct. at 574. The relief afforded the 
plaintiff need not be "judicially decreed" to justify a 
fee award under section 1988-voluntary action, such 
as a change in conduct that addresses the grievance, 
is sufficient. Farrur, 506 U.S. at 1 1  1-12, 113 S.Ct. at 
573; Hovitt. 482 U.S. at 760-61. 107 S.Ct. at 2675- 
76. The focus is on the substance o f  the relief 
-
granted. Sahlrrn. 856 F.2d at 1324. 
The plaintiffs point out that, after this action was 
commenced, the defendants agreed to convene a 
"special board" meeting. At this meeting, the Board 
awarded Stivers some of the relief sought- 
specifically, his individual licenses to work as a 
private investigator, private patrolman, and process 
server. The plaintiffs subsequently dropped their 
claim for injunctive relief. They contend that their 
federal suit was the "catalyst" "752 for the decision 
to convene the special board that granted the licenses 
and, consequently, that they qualify as prevailing 
parties. 
Where the plaintiff asserts that his lawsuit was 
the "catalyst" for the relief awarded, the court must 
determine: (1) whether there is a "causal link" 
between the lawsuit and the relief awarded; and (2) 
whether there was a "legal basis" for the plaintiffs 
claim. Srrhlan, 856 F.2d at 1325. There can be no 
doubt that both criteria are satisfied here. 
1. Causal Link 
[331 The "causal link" prong of the catalyst test is an 
inquiry into factual causation. Id. In this case, the 
district court determined that there was a causal link 
between this suit and the relief obtained. We agree. 
The Board responded to the plaintiffs' lawsuit by 
convening "a special board" which reconsidered the 
denial of Stivers' application for "lack of integrity" 
and awarded him his licenses. Although the 
defendants now argue that the Board's 
reconsideration of the license application was 
"gratuitous," the evidence of record undermines their 
contention. In fact, during the district court 
proceedings, the defendants conceded that the special 
board meeting was convened in order to partially 
settle this suit. In her deposition, Board member 
Conrad admitted that the convening of the special 
board was "part and parcel of settlement 
negotiations." Furthermore, the defendants' brief in 
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support of their motion for a protective order 
strenuously argued that the special board meeting 
was a "settlement overture" aimed at resolving the 
injunctive relief portion of the plaintiffs suit. 
On appeal, the defendants have reversed their 
position; they now contend that the special board 
meeting was "gratuitous." We reject this abrupt and 
calculated change of position. As the district court 
recognized, the plaintiffs' federal action bore a direct 
causal connection to the relief obtained. 
2. Legal Basis 
The second prong of the "catalyst" test requires us to 
determine whether there was a "legal basis" for the 
plaintiffs' claims. We conclude that the district court 
committed an error of law in answering this question. 
j3J The district court reasoned that, because the 
plaintiffs lost on the merits of their damages claim, 
the "legal basis" prong was not satisfied. That is not, 
however, the law in this circuit. A plaintiff who 
obtains a favorable settlement is not required to 
demonstrate that he would have prevailed on the 
merits in order to be considered a prevailing party. 
For the purposes of determining entitlement to fees, a 
claim has a basis in law so long as it is not "frivolous, 
unreasonable, or groundless." Sf~blan, 856 F.2d at 
1327 (quoting Fifzhai.ris v. Wolff 702 F.2d 836. 836 
-
(9th Cir.1983)). EM Thus, even if the district court 
had been correct in granting summary judgment to 
the defendants on the merits, the plaintiffs would not 
necessarily have been foreclosed from obtaining 
attorney's fees for time spent pursuing injunctive 
relief. 
FN9. The defendants' brief, relying on 
-
Nadeau v. Helpemoe. 581 F.2d 275.28 1 (1 st 
Cir. 19781, contends that a plaintiff may not 
be considered the prevailing party unless the 
relief obtained was required by law. 
Defendants misstate Nadeau. As Sablan 
makes clear, this is not the correct legal test 
in this circuit. Nor is it the test in the First 
Circuit. The rule there, as here, is that even 
if the plaintiff would ultimately have been 
unsuccessful in obtaining the relief sought, 
he is entitled to attorney's fees so long as his 
claim is not frivolous, unreasonable, or 
groundless. On the other hand, a defendant 
is deemed to act gratuitously if prior to the 
assertion of the plaintiffs claim there has 
been a "judicial determination that 
defendant's conduct ... is not required by 
law." Sahlnn, 856 F.2d at 1327 (quoting 
Cnliforniu Ass 'n of  the Plr l~sica1lv 
Handicap~ed, lnc. v. FCC, 721 F.2d 667, 
671-72 (9th Cir.19831, cert. denied, 469 
U.S.  832, 105 S.Ct. 121, 83 L.Ed.2d 63 
(1 9841, quoting Nrrdeatr. 58 1 F.2d at 28 1 ). 
Here, the plaintiffs have raised substantial legal and 
factual questions. Their claims are by no means 
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Accordingly, 
there is no doubt that the plaintiffs have satisfied the 
"legal basis" prong. 
Because the action brought by plaintiffs was the 
catalyst for a settlement that obtained some of the 
injunctive relief they sought, and because the 
plaintiffs' claims *753 have a basis in law, they 
qualify as prevailing parties. 
B.  Impact of Farrar v. Hobby 
J3J Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Furrat. v. Hohhv. 506 U.S.  103, 1 13 S.Ct. 566, 12 1 
L.Ed.2d 494 11992J, the defendants contend that, 
even if the action was the catalyst for the relief 
provided, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any fees. 
We reject the defendants' contention that Farrar 
provides a basis for upholding the denial of fees in 
thls case. 
Farrar does not alter the test for determining when a 
litigant qualifies as a prevailing party. The Court 
explicitly affirmed its prior holding that the degree of 
success does not affect the prevailing party inquiry. 
Id. at 112-14, 113 S.Ct. at 574.w Farrar does, 
however, change the standard for determining when a 
prevailing party is entitled to recover fees. F a m r  
holds that a prevailing party may be denied fees 
where he obtains only a narrow, technical victory 
such as nominal damages. Id. at 1 14-16, 11 3 S.Ct. at 
575. In such cases, "the only reasonable fee is 
-
usually no fee at all." Id.; see also Romberz I J .  
Nichols, 48 F.3d 453. 455 (9th Cir. 1995) (district 
court did not err in denying fees to prevailing party 
who originally sought $2 million in damages but 
obtained only $1). 
FNIO. Farrar- also reaffirms the Court's 
prior holding that a plaintiff need not obtain 
a judicial decree to be considered the 
prevailing party. To qualify as a prevailing 
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party, "[tlhe plaintiff must obtain an 
enforceable judgment against the defendant 
from whom fees are sought, or comparable 
relieJ through a consent decree or 
settfement." Id. at 111-12, 113 S.Ct, at 573 
(citations omitted, emphasis added). A 
settlement that effects a material alteration 
in the legal relationship between plaintiff 
and defendant is sufficient to confer 
prevailing party status. Id. at 1 1 1-12, I 13 
S.Ct. at 573 (citing T e x ~ ~ s  State Teacher's 
Ass'n, 489 U.S .  782,792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 
1493-94, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1 989)). 
Farrar's holding is limited to cases in which the 
plaintiff seeks substantial monetary damages but 
obtains only a nominal award. This case is clearly 
not among those to which the Farrar rule applies. 
As the defendants point out, the plaintiffs did not 
obtain all the injunctive relief originally sought. The 
special board did not grant Chamar a license. Nor, 
of course, did it grant Emsberger and Stivers licenses 
as corporate officers or qualifying agents of Chamar. 
It did, however, grant Stivers individual licenses, 
permitting him to work as a private patrolman, 
process server, and investigator. The settlement 
obtained was more than a de minimis victory. While 
the plaintiffs did not obtain all the relief sought, they 
did obtain "tangible results," Wilcox v: Citv ofRetzo, 
42 F.3d 550. 555 (9th Cir.19941, and are therefore 
entitled to fees.w We remand for the district court 
to determine the appropriate amount of fees.w 
FNI 1. In fact, the tangible results in this 
case were substantial. For Stivers, they 
meant the difference between being able to 
work at his profession and having to find a 
new and different way of trying to earn a 
living-certainly not an easy task these days. 
FN 12. Although Ernsberger and Chamar did 
not receive the licenses they sought, this 
action did result in Stivers' receiving 
licenses. Because Stivers' licenses were a 
necessary component of the relief the 
plaintiffs were collectively seelung, they 
may be entitled to fees. However, we leave 
it to the district court to determine the 
amount that is reasonable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Stivers has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether 
his due process rights were violated. He has 
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produced evidence from which the trier of fact could 
infer that Pierce's bias affected the Board's 
deliberations and the actions of its members, thus 
violating Stivers' right to a fair hearing before an 
impartial tribunal. While the Eleventh Amendment 
shields the Board itself from liability, neither the 
Eleventh Amendment nor the qualified immunity 
doctrine prevents Stivers from proceeding against the 
individual defendants in their personal capacities. 
We thus affirm the grant of summary judgment as to 
the Board itself, but reverse the grant of summary 
judgment with respect to Stivers' claims for damages 
and declaratory relief against the individual 
defendants and remand these claims for trial. 
We also' conclude that the district court erred in 
denying the plaintiffs attorney's fees with respect to 
their claims for injunctive relief. This action was the 
catalyst for the special board meeting through which 
the *754 plaintiffs obtained significant relief. 
Whether or not the plaintiffs ultimately prevail on the 
merits, there can be no question that the plaintiffs' 
claims for injunctive relief had a legal basis. Thus, 
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover fees for time 
spent pursuing injunctive relief. We remand for 
determination of the appropriate amount of fees. 
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and 
REMANDED. 
NOONAN, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
I concur in the opinion and judgment of the court 
except that I do not believe it appropriate in Part I1 
B1 for the court to speculate as to the existence of a 
genuine issue as to the appearance of bias and as to 
the facts Stivers might conceivably prove; I do not 
believe that Stivers has shown that Rodefer's report 
was the result of any decision by the Board to harass 
him; in Part IV A2 n. 9, the court has mistakenly 
expanded Sablun, 856 F.2d at 1327 by prefacing the 
quote from Sablan with the words "if prior to the 
assertion of the plaintiffs claim;" and under Farrar. 
V .  Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, ----, 1 13 S.Ct. 566, 575, 121 
L.Ed.2d 494 ( 1992) the plaintiffs in the plural are not 
entitled to any counsel fees because only Stivers 
achieved success. 
C.A.9 (Nev.),1995. 
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Association of landowners brought action against 
regional planning agency, claiming that agency's 
temporary moratoria on development effected 
unconstitutional regulatory takmgs of property. The 
United States District Court for the District of 
Nevada, 34 F.Suuu.2d 1226,Edward C. Reed, Jr., J., 
found that moratoria constituted taking, and agency 
appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, 216 F.3d 764, held that moratoria did 
not constitute categorical taking. Certiorari was 
granted. The Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, held 
that: (1) moratoria did not constitute per se taking, 
and (2) question whether Takings Clause requires 
compensation when government enacts temporary 
regulation denying property owner all viable 
economic use of property is to be decided by 
applying factors of Penn Centml Transp. Co. v. New 
York Citv, not by applying any categorical rule. 
Affirmed. 
Chief Justice Rehncluist filed dissenting opinion in 
which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined. 
Justice Thoinas filed dissenting opinion in which 
Justice Scalia joined. 
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that caused landowners' alleged injuries, and those 
rulings were not encompassed within Supreme 
Court's limited grant of certiorari. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
-
148k2 What Constitutes a Talung; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
The Talungs Clause analysis of Penn Central Transv. 
Co. v. New York Cihl involves a complex of factors 
including the regulation's economic effect on the 
landowner, the extent to which the regulation 
interferes with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations, and the character of the government 
action. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
Eminent Domain 148 6==;32.10(1) 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Talung; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use; 
Building Codes 
1481<2.10(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 148k211.2)) 
The answer to the question whether a temporary 
moratorium effects a talung depends upon the 
particular circumstances of the case. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
J7J Eminent Domain 148 -70 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
14811 Compensation 
-
148II(A) Necessity and Sufficiency in General 
148k70 k. Constitutional Provisions. Most 
Cited Cases 
The plain language of the Fifth Amendment requires 
the payment of compensation whenever the 
government acquires private property for a public 
purpose, whether the acquisition is the result of a 
condemnation proceeding or a physical 
appropriation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
j48J Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
When the government condemns or physically 
appropriates property, the fact of a taking is typically 
obvious and undisputed, but when the owner 
contends a taking has occurred because a law or 
regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are 
tantamount to a .condemnation or appropriation, the 
predicate of a talung is not self-evident, and the 
analysis is more complex. U.S.C.A. Const.Anlend. 5. 
Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
-
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
When the government physically takes possession of 
an interest in property for some public purpose, it has 
a categorical duty under the Talungs Clause to 
compensate the former owner, regardless of whether 
the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or 
merely a part thereof. U.S.C.A. Const.Arnend. 5. 
Eminent Domain 148 -85 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
148II Compensation 
148II(B_) Talung or Injuring Property as 
Ground for Compensation 
148k8l Property and Rights Subject of 
Compensation 
148k85 k. Easements and Other Rights 
in Real Property. Most Cited Cases 
Eminent Domain 148 -114.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
Compensation 
14811(B) Talung or Injuring Property as 
Ground for Compensation 
148kl14 Temporary Use 
1481<114.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Compensation is mandated under the Takings Clause 
O 2006 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
122 S.Ct. 1465 Page 3 
535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465,54 ERC 1129, 152 L.Ed.2d 5 17,70 USLW 4260,32 Envtl. L. Reu. 20,627.02 Cal. 
Daily Op. Sew. 3495,2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4399, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 68 i 
(Cite as: 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465) 
when a leasehold is taken and the government 
occupies the property for its own purposes, even 
though that use is temporary. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Ainend. 5. 
1111 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
j48J Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Talung; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
The distinction between acquisitions of property for 
public use, on the one hand, and regulations 
prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it 
inappropriate to treat Takings Clause cases involving 
physical takings as controlling precedents for the 
evaluation of a claim that there has been a regulatory 
taking, and vice versa. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
j4tJ Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Talung; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2( 1)) 
If regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking. U.S.C. A. Const.Amend. 5. 
1151 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
Neither a physical appropriation nor a public use is a 
necessary component of a regulatory taking. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 1161 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
For the same reason that the Supreme Court does not 
ask whether a physical appropriation advances a 
substantial government interest or whether it deprives 
the owner of all economically valuable use, the 
Supreme Court does not apply its precedent from the 
physical takings context to regulatory takings claims. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
1131 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
-
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
Under Ltica.~ v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a 
narrow exception to the rules governing regulatory 
takings exists for the extraordinary circumstance of a 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
What Constitutes a Talung; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
The Supreme Court resists the temptation to adopt 
per se rules in cases involving partial regulatory 
takings, preferring to examine a number of factors 
rather than a simple mathematically precise formula. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
1171 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
-
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
Even though multiple factors are relevant in the 
analysis of regulatory takings claims, in such cases 
the Supreme Court must focus on the parcel as a 
whole. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
permanent deprivation of all beneficial use. U.S.C.A. 1181 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
Const.Ainend. 5. 
1141 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
1 48 Eminent Domain 
-
&l.!J Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148H What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
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Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2( 1)) 
Tahngs jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel 
into discrete segments and attempt to determine 
whether rights in a particular segment have been 
entirely abrogated; in deciding whether a particular 
governmental action has effected a taking, the 
Supreme Court focuses rather both on the character 
of the action and on the nature and extent of the 
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
1191 Eminent Domain 148 -2.10(1) 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
-
148k2 What Constitutes a Tahng; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use; 
Building Codes 
148k2.10(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
-
(Formerly 148k2( 1.2)) 
District court applied wrong standard for determining 
whether regulatory tahng had occurred when it 
disaggregated property in question into temporal 
segments corresponding to regulations at issue and 
then analyzed whether owners were deprived of all 
economically viable use during each period; starting 
point for court's analysis should have been to ask 
whether there was a total taking of entire parcel, and, 
if there was not, it should have applied factors of 
Penn Cen~ral Transu. Co, v. New Yorli C ~ I J ) .  
U.S.C.A. Const.hnend. 5. 
(201 Estates in Property 154 -1 
154 Estates in Property 
-
154kl k. Nature and Incidents in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
An interest in real property is defined by the metes 
and bounds that describe its geographic dimensions 
and the term of years that describes the temporal 
aspect of the owner's interest. Restatement of 
Pro~ertv 8 6 7-9. 
1211 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
14 8 Eminent Domain 
-
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
-
148k2 What Constitutes a Tahng; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
348k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
For a court to view an interest in property in its 
entirety, as required for consideration of a regulatory 
tahngs claim, a court must consider both the metes 
and bounds that describe the property's geographic 
dimensions and the term of years that describes the 
temporal aspect of the owner's interest. U.S.C. A. 
Const.Aniend. 5; Restatement of Propertv 4 6 7-9. 
1221 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
-
148k2 What Constitutes a Tahng; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
The categorical rule of regulatory tahngs in Lucas v. 
South Cnrolinu Consfal Cotlncil was carved out for 
the extraordinary case in which a regulation 
permanently deprives property of all value; the 
default rule remains that, in the regulatory taking 
context, a more fact specific inquiry is required. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
1231 Federal Courts 170B -460.1 
Federal Courts 
170BVII Supreme Court 
170BVII(B) Review of Decisions of Courts of 
Appeals 
170Bk460 Review on Certiorari 
170Bk460.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Theory that environmental planning agency enacted 
"rolling moratoria" that were functional equivalent of 
permanent taking was not available to landowners' 
association in Takings Clause action, where 
association had presented such theory in its petition 
for certiorari, but order granting certiorari did not 
encompass that issue. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
1241 Federal Courts 170B -460.1 
170B Federal Courts 
-
170BVII Supreme Court 
170BVII(B) Review of Decisions of Courts of 
Appeals 
170Bk460 Review on Certiorari 
170Bk460.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Recovery on bad faith theory or theory that state 
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interests were insubstantial was foreclosed in Takings 
Clause action by district court's unchallenged 
findings of fact. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
1251 Federal Courts 170B -460.1 
170B Federal Courts 
-
17OBVII Supreme Court 
170BVII(B) Review of Decisions of Courts of 
Appeals 
170Bk460 Review on Certiorari 
170Bk460.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Recovery by landowners' association under analysis 
of Penn Cenlrul  trans^. Co. v. New York City was 
foreclosed in Tahngs Clause action where 
association expressly disavowed that theory and 
failed to appeal from district court's conclusion that 
the evidence would not support it. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
1261 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
The question whether the Takings Clause requires 
compensation when the government enacts a 
temporary regulation that, while in effect, denies a 
property owner all viable economic use of her 
property is to be decided by applying the factors of 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, not by 
applying any categorical rule. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
1271 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
-
What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
A claim that a regulation has effected a temporary 
taking requires careful examination and weighing of 
all the relevant circumstances. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
1281 Eminent Domain 148 6k32.10(1) 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
148I Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Talung; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use; 
Building Codes 
148k2.10(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1.2)) 
The temporary nature of a land-use restriction does 
not necessarily preclude a finding that it effects a 
taking; rather, it should not be given exclusive 
significance one way or the other. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
1291 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1 
148 Eminent Domain 
-
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
-
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 148k2(1)) 
The duration of the restriction is one of the important 
factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a 
regulatory takings claim, but with respect to that 
factor as with respect to other factors, the temptation 
to .adopt what amount to per se rules in either 
direction must be resisted. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
5. 
- 
**I468 *302 Syllabus FNI 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court but has been prepared 
by the Reporter of Decisions for the 
convenience of the reader. See Uniled 
Slates v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 
U.S. 321,337.26 S.Ct. 282,50 L.Ed. 499. 
Respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 
(TRPA) imposed two moratoria, totaling 32 months, 
on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while 
formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the 
area. Petitioners, real estate owners affected by the 
moratoria and an association representing such 
owners, filed parallel suits, later consolidated, 
claiming that TRPA's actions constituted a talung of 
their property without just compensation. The 
District Court found that TRPA had not effected a 
"partial taking" under the analysis set out in Perm 
Cenlral Trunsp. Co. v. New York Citv, 438 U.S. 104, 
98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 6 3 1  however, it 
concluded that the moratoria did constitute a taking 
under the categorical rule announced in Ltrctis 11. 
). + ,  . 
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Soutlr Crrrolina Coosfal Council, 505 U.S. 1003. 112 
S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798, because TRPA 
temporarily deprived petitioners of all economically 
viable use of their land. On appeal, TRPA 
successfully challenged the District Court's takings 
determination. Finding that the only question in this 
facial challenge was whether Lrrcus' rule applied, the 
Ninth Circuit held that because the regulations had 
only a temporary impact on petitioners' fee interest, 
no categorical taking had occurred; that Lucas 
applied to the relatively rare case in which a 
regulation permanently denies all productive use of 
an entire parcel, whereas the moratoria involved only 
a temporal slice of the fee interest; and that F A  
Enalish Evannelical Ltr lheran Cl~urch o f  Glendale v. 
Countv ofLos Anneles. 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 
96 L.Ed.2d 250, concerned the question whether 
compensation is an appropriate remedy for a 
temporary taking, not whether or when such a taking 
has occurred. The court also concluded that 
Central's ad hoc balancing approach was the proper 
framework for analyzing whether a taking had 
occurred, but that petitioners had not challenged the 
District Court's conclusion that they could not make 
out a claim under Penn Central's factors. 
Held: The moratoria ordered by TRPA are notper se 
takings of property requiring compensation under the 
Takings Clause. Pp. 1478-1490. 
(a) Although this Court's physical takings 
jurisprudence, for the most part, involves the 
straightforward application of per se rules, its 
regulatory takings jurisprudence is characterized by 
"essentially ad hoc, *303 factual inquiries," Perm 
Centrc~I, 438 U.S.. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, designed to 
allow "careful examination and weighing of all the 
relevant circumstances," Prrlazzolo 1,. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606, 636, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). The longstanding 
distinction between physical and regulatory takings 
makes it inappropriate to treat precedent from one as 
controlling on the other. Petitioners rely on 
E~tnlish and b - b o t h  regulatory takings cases-to 
argue for a categorical rule that whenever the 
government imposes a deprivation of all 
economically viable use of property, no matter how 
brief, it effects a taking. In First E~~,~l i .d t .  482 U.S., 
at 315. 318,321, 107 S.Ct. 2378, the Court addressed 
the separate remedial question of how compensation 
is measured once a regulatory taking is established, 
but not the different and prior question whether the 
temporary regulation was in fact a taking. To the 
extent that the Court referenced that ante**1469 
cedent question, it recognized that a regulation 
temporarily denying an owner all use of her property 
might not constitute a taking if the denial was part of 
the State's authority to enact safety regulations, or if 
it were one of the normal delays in obtaining building 
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and 
the like. Thus, Firsf Enpli.sh did not approve, and 
implicitly rejected, petitioners' categorical approach. 
Nor is L~rcas dispositive of the question presented. 
Its categorical rule-requiring compensation when a 
regulation permanently deprives an owner of "aN 
economically beneficial uses" of his land, 505 U.S., 
at 1019. 1 12 S.Ct. 2886-does not answer the question 
whether a regulation prohibiting any economic use of 
land for 32 months must be compensated. 
Petitioners attempt to bring this case under the rule in 
Lucas by focusing exclusively on the property during 
the moratoria is unavailing. This Court has 
consistently rejected such an approach to the 
"denominator" question. See, e.g., Kevsfone 
Bituminorrs Coal Assn. v. DeBcnedictis, 480 U.S. 
470,497, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d 472. To sever 
a 32-month segment from the remainder of each fee 
simple estate and then ask whether that segment has 
been taken in its entirety would ignore Penn Ce~ztral's 
admonition to focus on "the parcel as a whole," 43R 
U.S., at 130-131.98 S.Ct. 2646. Both dimensions of 
a real property interest-the metes and bounds 
describing its geographic dimensions and the term of 
years describing its temporal aspect-must be 
considered when viewing the interest in its entirety. 
A permanent deprivation of all use is a taking of the 
parcel as a whole, but a temporary restriction causing 
a diminution in value is not, for the property will 
recover value when the prohibition is lifted. Ltlcas 
was carved out for the "extraordinary case" in which 
a regulation permanently deprives property of all use; 
the default rule remains that a fact specific inquiry is 
required in the regulatory taking context. 
Nevertheless, the Court will consider petitioners' 
argument that the interest in protecting property 
owners "304 from bearing public burdens "which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole," Arn?stronp v. U~ritedStates. 364 U . S .  40, 
49. 80 S.Ct. 1563.4 L.Ed.2d 1554, justifies creating a 
new categorical rule. Pp. 1478-1484. 
(b) "Fairness and justice" will not be better served by 
a categorical rule that any deprivation of all 
economic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a 
compensable taking. That rule would apply to 
numerous normal delays in obtaining, e.g., building 
permits, and would require changes in practices that 
have long been considered permissible exercises of 
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the police power. Such an important change in the 
law should be the product of legislative rulemaking, 
not adjudication. More importantly, for the reasons 
set out in Justice O'CONNOR's concurring opinion in 
Palazzolo. 533 US., at 636, 121 S.Ct. 2448, the 
better approach to a temporary regulatory taking 
claim requires careful examination and weighing of 
all the relevant circumstances-only one of which is 
the length of the delay. A narrower rule excluding 
normal delays in processing permits, or covering only 
delays of more than a year, would have a less severe 
impact on prevailing practices, but would still impose 
serious constraints on the planning process. 
Moratoria are an essential tool of successful 
development. The interest in informed 
decisionmalung counsels against adopting a per se 
rule that would treat such interim measures as takings 
regardless of the planners' good faith, the landowners' 
reasonable expectations, or the moratorium's actual 
impact on property values. The financial constraints 
of compensating property owners during a 
moratorium may force officials to rush through the 
planning process or abandon the practice altogether. 
And the interest in protecting the decisional process 
is even stronger when an agency is developing a 
regional plan than when it is considering a permit for 
a single parcel. Here, TRPA obtained the benefit of 
comments and criticisms**1470 from interested 
parties during its deliberations, but a categorical rule 
tied to the deliberations' length would likely create 
added pressure on decisionmakers to quickly resolve 
land-use questions, disadvantaging landowners and 
interest groups less organized or familiar with the 
planning process. Moreover, with a temporary 
development ban, there is less risk that individual 
landowners will be singled out to bear a special 
burden that should be shared by the public as a 
whole. It may be true that a moratorium lasting 
more than one year should be viewed with special 
skepticism, but the District Court found that the 
instant delay was not unreasonable. The restriction's 
duration is one factor for a court to consider in 
appraising regulatory takings claims, but with respect 
to that factor, the temptation to adopt per se rules in 
either direction must be resisted. Pp. 1484-1490. 
2 16 F.3d 764, affirmed. 
"305 STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the 
Court, in which O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTEK, 
GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. 
REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which SCALIA, J., and THOMAS, J., joined, pos~, p. 
1490. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which SCALIA, J., joined,post, p. 1496. 
Micheal M. Berrzer, Los Angeles, CA, for petitioners. 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Washington, DC, for 
respondents. 
Theodore B. Olson, for United States as amicus 
curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting 
respondents.For U.S. Supreme Court briefs, see:2001 
WL 169201 1 (Pet.BrieQ200 1 WL 1480565 
(Resp.BrieQ200 1 WL 1663776 (Reply.BrieQ 
"306 Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
111[21[31 The question presented is whether a 
moratorium on development imposed during the 
process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan 
constitutes a per se talung of property requiring 
compensation under the Takings Clause of the United 
States ~ o n s t i t u t i o n . ~  This case actually involves 
two moratoria ordered by respondent Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency (TRPA) to maintain the status quo 
while studying the impact of development on Lake 
Tahoe and designing a strategy for environmentally 
sound growth. The first, Ordinance 81-5, was 
effective from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 
1983, whereas the second more restrictive Resolution 
83-21 was in effect from August 27, 1983, until April 
25, 1984. As a result of these two directives, 
virtually all development on a substantial portion of 
the property subject to TRPA's jurisdiction was 
prohibited for a period of 32 months. Although the 
question we decide relates only to that 32-month 
period, a brief description of the events leading up to 
the moratoria and a comment on the two 
permanent*307 plans that TRPA adopted thereafter 
will clarify the narrow scope of our holding. 
FNl.  Often referred to as the "Just 
P
Compensation Clause," the final Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment provides: "... nor shall 
private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation." It applies to 
the States as well as the Federal 
Government. Chicano, B. & O.R. Co. v. 
Chicapo, 166 U.S. 226. 239, 241, 17 S.Ct. 
581.41 L.Ed. 979 (1897); Webb's Fahulo~(.r 
Plzarn~acies. Inc. v. Beckwith. 449 U.S. 155, 
160, 101 S.Ct. 446. 66 L.Ed.2d 358 (1980). 
The relevant facts are undisputed. The Court of 
Appeals, while reversing the District Court on a 
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question of law, accepted all of its findings of fact, 
and no party challenges those findings. All agree 
that Lake Tahoe is "uniquely beautiful," 3 
F.Suv~.2d 1226, 1230 (D.Nev. 19991, that President 
Clinton was right to call it a " 'national treasure that 
must be protected and preserved,' " ihirl., and that 
Mark **I471 Twain aptly described the clarity of its 
waters as " 'not merely transparent, but dazzlingly, 
brilliantly so,' " ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting M. 
Twain, Roughing It 174-1 75 (1 872)). 
Lake Tahoe's exceptional clarity is attributed to the 
absence of algae that obscures the waters of most 
other lakes. Historically, the lack of nitrogen and 
phosphorous, which nourish the growth of algae, has 
ensured the transparency of its  water^.^ 
Unfortunately, the lake's pristine state has 
deteriorated rapidly over the past 40 years; increased 
land development in the Lake Tahoe Basin (Basin) 
has threatened the " 'noble sheet of blue water' " 
beloved by Twain and countless others. 34 
F.Su~v.2d. at 1230. As the District Court found, 
"[dlramatic decreases in clarity first began to be 
noted in the late 1950'slearly 1960ts, shortly after 
development at the lake began in earnest." Id., at 
1231. The lake's unsurpassed beauty, it seems, is the 
wellspring of its undoing. 
FN2. According to a Senate Report: "Only 
-
two other sizable lakes in the world are of 
comparable quality-Crater Lake in Oregon, 
which is protected as part of the Crater Lake 
National Park, and Lake Baikal in the 
[former] Soviet Union. Only Lake Tahoe, 
however, is so readily accessible from large 
metropolitan centers and is so adaptable to 
urban development." S.Rep. No. 91-5 10, 
pp. 3-4 (1969). 
"308 The upsurge of development in the area has 
caused "increased nutrient loading of the lake largely 
because of the increase in impervious coverage of 
land in the Basin resulting from that development." 
Ib id. 
-
"Impervious coverage-such as asphalt, concrete, 
buildings, and even packed dirt-prevents precipitation 
from being absorbed by the soil. Instead, the water 
is gathered and concentrated by such coverage. 
Larger amounts of water flowing off a driveway or a 
roof have more erosive force than scattered raindrops 
falling over a dispersed area-especially one covered 
with indigenous vegetation, which softens the impact 
of the raindrops themselves." Ihid. 
Given this trend, the District Court predicted that 
"unless the process is stopped, the lake will lose its 
clarity and its trademark blue color, becoming green 
and opaque for eternity." 
FN3. The District Court added: "Or at least, 
-
for a very, very long time. Estimates are 
that, should the lake turn green, it could take 
over 700 years for it to return to its natural 
state, if that were ever possible at all." 3 
F.Suvp.2d. at 123 1 .  
Those areas in the Basin that have steeper slopes 
produce more runoff; therefore, they are usually 
considered "high hazard" lands. Moreover, certain 
areas near streams or wetlands known as "Stream 
Environment Zones" (SEZs) are especially 
vulnerable to the impact of development because, in 
their natural state, they act as filters for much of the 
debris that runoff carries. Because "[tlhe most 
obvious response to this problem ... is to restrict 
development around the lake-especially in SEZ lands, 
as well as in areas already naturally prone to runoff," 
id., at 1232, conservation efforts have focused on 
controlling growth in these high hazard areas. 
In the 1960ts, when the problems associated with the 
burgeoning development began to receive significant 
attention,*309 jurisdiction over the Basin, which 
occupies 501 square miles, was shared by the States 
of California and Nevada, five counties, several 
municipalities, and the Forest Service of the Federal 
Government. In 1968, the legislatures of the two 
States adopted the Tahoe Regional Planning 
Compact, see 1968 Cal. Stats., no. 998, p. 1900, Ej 1; 
1968 Nev. Stats. p. 4, which Congress approved in 
1969, Pub.L. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360. The compact set 
goals for the protection and preservation of the lake 
and created TRPA as the agency assigned "to 
coordinate and regulate development in the Basin and 
to conserve its natural resources." **1472& 
Counay Eslales, Inc. v. Tuhoe Regional Planninz 
Agency. 440 U.S. 391, 394, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 
L.Ed.2d 401 (1979). 
Pursuant to the compact, in 1972 TRPA adopted a 
Land Use Ordinance that divided the land in the 
Basin into seven "land capability districts," based 
largely on steepness but also tahng into 
consideration other factors affecting runoff. Each 
district was assigned a "land coverage coefficient-a 
recommended limit on the percentage of such land 
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that could be covered by impervious surface." 
Those limits ranged from 1% for districts 1 and 2 to 
30% for districts 6 and 7. Land in districts 1, 2, and 3 
is characterized as "high hazard" or "sensitive," 
while land in districts 4, 5, 6, and 7 is "low hazard" 
or "non-sensitive," The SEZ lands, though often 
treated as a separate category, were actually a 
subcategory of district 1. 34 F.Suvu.2d. at 1232. 
Unfortunately, the 1972 ordinance allowed numerous 
exceptions and did not significantly limit the 
construction of new residential housing. California 
became so dissatisfied with TRPA that it withdrew its 
financial support and unilaterally imposed stricter 
regulations on the part of the Basin located in 
California. Eventually the two States, with the 
approval of Congress and the President, adopted an 
extensive amendment to the compact that became 
effective on December 19, 1980. Pub.L. 96-55 1, 94 
Stat. 3233; Cal. *310 Govt. Code Ann. 4 66801 
(West Supp.2002); Nev.Rev.Stat. 4 277.200 (1980). 
The 1980 Tahoe Regional Planning Compact 
(Compact) redefined the structure, functions, and 
voting procedures of TRPA, App. 37, 94 Stat. 3235- 
3238; 34 F.Suv~.2d, at 1233, and directed it to 
develop regional "environmental threshold carrying 
capacitiesw-a term that embraced "standards for air 
quality, water quality, soil conservation, vegetation 
preservation and noise." 94 Stat. 3235, 3239. The 
Compact provided that TRPA "shall adopt" those 
standards within 18 months, and that "[wlithin 1 year 
after" their adoption (i.e., by June 19, 1983), it 
"shall" adopt an amended regional plan that achieves 
and maintains those carrying capacities. Id., at 3240. 
The Compact also contained a finding by the 
legislatures of California and Nevada "that in order to 
make effective the regional plan as revised by 
[TRPA], it is necessary to halt temporarily works of 
development in the region which might otherwise 
absorb the entire capability of the region for further 
development or direct it out of harmony with the 
ultimate plan." Id., at 3243. Accordingly, for the 
period prior to the adoption of the final plan ("or until 
May 1, 1983, whichever is earlier"), the Compact 
itself prohibited the development of new 
subdivisions, condominiums, and apartment 
buildings, and also prohibited each city and county in 
the Basin from granting any more permits in 1981, 
1982, or 1983 than had been granted in 1 9 7 8 . ~  
FN4. App. 104-107. 
  his moratorium did 
not apply to rights that had vested before the 
effective date of the 1980 Compact. Id., at 
107-108. Two months after the 1980 
Compact became effective, TRPA adopted 
its Ordinance 8 1-1 broadly defining the term 
"project" to include the construction of any 
new residence and requiring owners of land 
in districts 1, 2, or 3, to get a permit from 
TRPA before beginning construction of 
homes on their property. 34 F.Suvu.2d 
1226, 1233 (D.Nev. 1999). 
During this period TRPA was also working on the 
development of a regional water quality plan to 
comply with the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. R 1288 
(1994 ed.). Despite "311 the fact that TRPA 
performed these obligations in "good faith and to the 
best of its ability," 34 F.Suuu.2d. at 1233, after a few 
months it concluded that it could not meet the 
deadlines in the Compact. On June 25, 1981, it 
therefore enacted Ordinance 8 1-5 imposing the first 
of the two moratoria on development that petitioners 
challenge in this proceeding. The ordinance 
provided that it would become effective on August 
24, 1981, and remain in effect pending the adoption 
of the permanent plan required by the Compact. 
App. 159, 191. 
**I473 The District Court made a detailed analysis 
of the ordinance, noting that it might even prohibit 
hiking or picnicking on SEZ lands, but construed it as 
essentially banning any construction or other activity 
that involved the removal of vegetation or the 
creation of land coverage on all SEZ lands, as well as 
on class 1, 2, and 3 lands in California. 34 
F.Suvu.2d. at 1233-1235. Some permits could be 
obtained for such construction in Nevada if certain 
findings were made. Id., at 1235. It is undisputed, 
however, that Ordinance 8 1-5 prohibited the 
construction of any new residences on SEZ lands in 
either State and on class 1, 2, and 3 lands in 
California. 
Given the complexity of the task of defining 
"environmental threshold carrying capacities" and the 
division of opinion within TRPA's governing board, 
the District Court found that it was "unsurprising" 
that TRPA failed to adopt those thresholds until 
August 26, 1982, roughly two months after the 
Compact deadline. Under a liberal reading of 
the Compact, TRPA then had until August 26, 1983, 
to adopt a new regional plan. 94 Stat. 3240. 
"Unfortunately, but again not surprisingly, no 
regional plan was in place as of that date." 34 
F.Supp.2d. at 1235. TRPA therefore adopted 
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Resolution 83-21, "which completely suspended all 
project reviews and approvals, including the 
acceptance of new proposals," and which remained in 
effect until a new regional plan was adopted on April 
26, 1984. Thus, Resolution*312 83-21 imposed an 
8-month moratorium prohibiting all construction on 
high hazard lands in either State. In combination, 
Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 effectively 
prohibited all construction on sensitive lands in 
California and on all SEZ lands in the entire Basin 
for 32 months, and on sensitive lands in Nevada 
(other than SEZ lands) for eight months. It is these 
two moratoria that are at issue in this case. 
On the same day that the 1984 plan was adopted, the 
State of California filed an action seeking to enjoin 
its implementation on the ground that it failed to 
establish land-use controls sufficiently stringent to 
protect the Basin. Id.. at 1236. The District Court 
entered an injunction that was upheld by the Court of 
Appeals and remained in effect until a completely 
revised plan was adopted in 1987. Both the 1984 
injunction and the 1987 plan contained provisions 
that prohibited new construction on sensitive lands in 
the Basin. As the case comes to us, however, we 
have no occasion to consider the validity of those 
provisions. 
Approximately two months after the adoption of the 
1984 plan, petitioners filed parallel actions against 
TRPA and other defendants in federal courts in 
Nevada and California that were ultimately 
consolidated for trial in the District of Nevada. The 
petitioners include the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc., a nonprofit membership corporation 
representing about 2,000 owners of both improved 
and unimproved parcels of real estate in the Lake 
Tahoe Basin, and a class of some 400 individual 
owners of vacant lots located either on SEZ lands or 
in other parts of districts 1,2, or 3. Those individuals 
purchased their properties prior to the effective date 
of the 1980 Compact, App. 34, primarily for the 
purpose of constructing "at a time of their choosing" 
a single-family home "to serve as a permanent, 
retirement or "313 vacation residence," id., at 36. 
When they made those purchases, they did so with 
the understanding that such construction was 
authorized provided that "they complied with all 
reasonable requirements for building."  bid.^ 
FN5. As explained supra, at 1471-1472, the 
-
petitioners who purchased land after the 
1972 compact did so amidst a heavily 
regulated zoning scheme. Their property 
was already classified as part of land 
capability districts 1, 2, and 3, or SEZ land. 
And each land classification was subject to 
regulations as to the degree of artificial 
disturbance the land could safely sustain. 
**I474 Lffl Petitioners' complaints gave rise to 
protracted litigation that has produced four opinions 
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and 
several published District Court opinions.FN" For 
present purposes, however, we need only describe 
those courts' disposition of the claim that three 
actions taken by TRPA-Ordinance 8 1-5, Resolution 
83-2 1, and the 1984 regional plan-constituted takings 
of petitioners' property without just c ~ m ~ e n s a t i o n . ~  
Indeed, the challenge to the 1984 plan is not before 
us because both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals held that it was the federal injunction against 
implementing that plan, rather than the plan itself, 
that caused the post-1984 injuries that petitioners 
allegedly suffered, and those rulings are not 
encompassed within our limited grant of certiorari. 
I:N8 
- Thus, "314 we limit our discussion to the lower 
courts' disposition of the claims based on the 2-year 
moratorium (Ordinance 8 1-5) and the ensuing 8- 
month moratorium (Resolution 83-21). 
FN7. In 1991, petitioners amended their 
complaint to allege that the adoption of the 
1987 plan also constituted an 
unconstitutional talung. Ultimately both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals held 
that this claim was barred by California's 1- 
year statute of limitations and Nevada's 2- 
year statute of limitations, See 216 F.3d, at 
785-789. Although the validity of the 1987 
plan is not before us, we note that other 
litigants have challenged certain applications 
of that plan. See Suilun7 v. Tahoe Regional 
Plat7ninn Apencv, 520 U.S. 725, 117 S.Ct. 
1659, 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997). 
FN8. In his dissent, THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
O 2006 ThomsonNdest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
' 7 -;\
-3 L- 
Page 11 
535 U.S. 302,122 S.Ct. 1465,54 ERC 1129, 152 L.Ed.2d 517, 70 USLW 4260,32 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,627,02 ~ a l .  
Daily Op. Sew. 3495,2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4399, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 681 
(Cite as: 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct 1465) 
contends that the 1984 plan is before us 
because the 1980 Compact is a proximate 
cause of petitioners' injuries, post, at 1490- 
149 1. Petitioners, however, do not 
challenge the Court of Appeals' holding on 
causation in their briefs on the merits, 
presumably because they understood when 
we granted certiorari on the question 
"[wlhether the Court of Appeals properly 
determined that a temporary moratorium on 
land development does not constitute a 
taking of property requiring compensation 
under the Talungs Clause of the United 
States Constitution," 533 U.S. 948, 121 
S.Ct. 2589, 150 L.Ed.2d 749 (20011, we 
were only interested in the narrow question 
decided today. Throughout the District 
Court and Court of Appeals decisions the 
phrase "temporary moratorium" refers to 
two things and two things only: Ordinance 
8 1-5 and Resolution 83-21. The dissent's 
novel theory of causation was not briefed, 
nor was it discussed during oral argument. 
'The District Court began its constitutional 
analysis by identifying the distinction between a 
direct government appropriation of property without 
just compensation and a government regulation that 
imposes such a severe restriction on the owner's use 
of her property that it produces "nearly the same 
result as a direct appropriation." 34 F.Suvp.2d. at 
1238. The court noted that all of the claims in this 
case "are of the 'regulatory takings' variety." I u  
1239. Citing our decision in Aains 1). City o f  
Tibltron, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 
106 (19801, it then stated that a "regulation will 
constitute a taking when either: (1) it does not 
substantially advance a legitimate state interest; or 
(2) it denies the owner economically viable use of her 
land." 34 F.Sum.2d, at 1239. The District Court 
rejected the first alternative based on its finding that 
"hrther development on high hazard lands such as 
[petitioners'] would lead to significant additional 
damage to the lake." Id.. at 1 2 4 0 . ~ ~ ~  With **I475 
respect "315 to the second alternative, the court first 
considered whether the analysis adopted in & 
Ccntr.al Transp. Co. 1). New York Cin~, 438 U.S. 104, 
98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (19781, would lead to 
the conclusion that TRPA had effected a "partial 
taking," and then whether those actions had effected 
a "total taking." 
FN9. As the District Court explained: 
"There is a direct connection between the 
potential development of plaintiffs' lands 
and the harm the lake would suffer as a 
result thereof. Further, there has been no 
suggestion by the plaintiffs that any less 
severe response would have adequately 
addressed the problems the lake was facing. 
Thus it is difficult to see how a more 
proportional response could have been 
adopted. Given that TRPA's actions had 
widespread application, and were not aimed 
at an individual landowner, the plaintiffs 
would appear to bear the burden of proof on 
this point. They have not met this burden- 
nor have they really attempted to do so. 
Although unwilling to stipulate to the fact 
that TRPA's actions substantially advanced a 
legitimate state interest, the plaintiffs did not 
seriously contest the matter at trial." 3 
F.Supp.2d. at 1240 (citation omitted). 
FNIO. The Perzn Central analysis involves 
"a complex of factors including the 
regulation's economic effect on the 
landowner, the extent to which the 
regulation interferes with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the government action." 
Pahzzolo v. Rhade Island, 533 U.S. 606, 
617, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 
(2001). 
Emphasizing the temporary nature of the regulations, 
the testimony that the "average holding time of a lot 
in the Tahoe area between lot purchase and home 
construction is twenty-five years," and the failure of 
petitioners to offer specific evidence of harm, the 
District Court concluded that "consideration of the 
Penn Cmtrull factors clearly leads to the conclusion 
that there was no talung." 34 F.Su~v.2d. at 1240. In 
the absence of evidence regarding any of the 
individual plaintiffs, the court evaluated the 
"average" purchasers' intent and found that such 
purchasers "did not have reasonable, investment- 
backed expectations that they would be able to build 
single-family homes on their land within the six-year 
period involved in this lawsuit." Id., at 124 1 
FN11. The court stated that petitioners "had 
plenty, of time to build before the restrictions 
went into effect-and almost everyone in the 
Tahoe Basin knew in the late 1970s that a 
crackdown on development was in the 
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works." In addition, the court found "the 
fact that no evidence was introduced 
regarding the specific diminution in value of 
any of the plaintiffs' individual properties 
clearly weighs against a finding that there 
was a partial taking of the plaintiffs' 
property." 34 F.Suuu.2d. at 1241. 
*316 The District Court had more difficulty with the 
"total taking" issue. Although it was satisfied that 
petitioners' roperty did retain some value during the 
moratoria,& it found that they had been temporarily 
deprived of "all economically viable use of their 
land." Id., at 1245. The court concluded that those 
actions therefore constituted "categorical" tahngs 
under our decision in Lucns V .  South Cnrolinu 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 
L.Ed.2d 798 (1992. It rejected TRPA's response 
that Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 were 
"reasonable temporary planning moratoria" that 
should be excluded from L ~ ' c a t e g o r i c a 1  approach. 
The court thought it "fairly clear" that such interim 
actions would not have been viewed as tahngs prior 
to our decisions in Lucas and First English 
Evanpelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Counh~ 
of'Los Anpeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 
L.Ed.2d 250 (19871, because "[zloning boards, cities, 
counties and other agencies used them all the time to 
'maintain the status quo pending study and 
governmental decision making.' " 34 F.Supv.2d. at 
1248-1 249 (quoting Williams v. Central, 907 P.2d 
70 1,  706 (Colo.Avu. 1995)). After expressing 
uncertainty as to whether those cases required a 
holding that moratoria on development automatically 
effect takings, the court concluded that TRPA's 
actions did so, partly because neither the ordinance 
nor the resolution, even though intended to be 
temporary **I476 from the beginning, contained an 
*317 express termination date. 34 F.Sum.2d. at 
1250-1 25 1 .'N13 Accordingly, it ordered TRPA to pay 
damages to most petitioners for the 32-month period 
from August 24, 198 1, to April 25, 1984, and to those 
owning class 1, 2, or 3 property in Nevada for the 8- 
month period from August 27, 1983, to April 25, 
1984. Id., at 1255. 
average price of over $19,000 and 45 parcels 
in Nevada at an average price of over 
$39,000; during the ensuing 8-month 
period, it purchased 167 California parcels 
at an average price of over $29,000 and 27 
Nevada parcels at an average price of over 
$4 1,000. App. 76-77. Moreover, during 
those periods some owners sold sewer and 
building allocations to owners of higher 
capability lots "for between $15,000 and 
$30,000." Id., at 77. 
FN13. Ordinance 81-5 specified that it 
would terminate when the regional plan 
became finalized. And Resolution 83-2 1 
was limited to 90 days, but was renewed for 
an additional term. Nevertheless, the 
District Court distinguished these measures 
from true "temporary" moratoria because 
there was no fixed date for when they would 
terminate. 34 F.Suup.2d. at 1250- 125 1. 
Both parties appealed. TRPA successfully 
challenged the District Court's takings determination, 
and petitioners unsuccessfully challenged the 
dismissal of their claims based on the 1984 and 1987 
plans. Petitioners did not, however, challenge the 
District Court's findings or conclusions concerning its 
application of Penn Centrtrl. With respect to the two 
moratoria, the Ninth Circuit noted that petitioners had 
expressly disavowed an argument "that the 
regulations constitute a taking under the ad hoc 
balancing approach described in Penn Central " and 
that they did not "dispute that the restrictions 
imposed on their properties are appropriate means of 
securing the purpose set forth in the Compact." 
Accordingly, the only question before the court was 
"whether the rule set forth in Lucas applies-that is, 
whether a categorical*318 taking occurred because 
Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 denied the 
plaintiffs 'all economically beneficial or productive 
use of land.' " 216 F.3d 764, 773 (C.A.9 2000). 
Moreover, because petitioners brought only a facial 
challenge, the narrow inquiry before the Court of 
Appeals was whether the mere enactment of the 
regulations constituted a taking. 
FN 12. The pretrial order describes purchases 
by the United States Forest Service of FN14. 216 F.3d. at 773. "Below, the district 
private lots in environmentally sensitive court ruled that the regulations did not 
areas during the periods when the two constitute a taking under Pain  central:^ ad 
moratoria were in effect. During the 2-year hoc approach, but that they did constitute a 
period ending on August 26, 1983, it categorical taking under Lucas Tv. So~cth 
purchased 215 parcels in California at an Cumlinu Coustal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
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112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) 1. 
See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 34 
F.Sup~.2d at 1238-1245. The defendants 
appealed the district court's latter holding, 
but the plaintiffs did not appeal the former. 
And even if arguments regarding the Perm 
Centrcll test were fairly encompassed by the 
defendants' appeal, the plaintiffs have stated 
explicitly on this appeal that they do not 
argue that the regu1ations.constitute a taking 
under the ad hoc balancing approach 
described in Penn Central." 216 F.3d, at 
773. 
Contrary to the District Court, the Court of Appeals 
held that because the regulations had only a 
temporary impact on petitioners' fee interest in the 
properties, no categorical taking had occurred. It 
reasoned: 
"Property interests may have many different 
dimensions. For example, the dimensions of a 
property interest may include a physical dimension 
(which describes the size and shape of the property in 
question), a functional dimension (which describes 
the extent to which an owner may use or dispose of 
the property in question), and a temporal dimension 
(which describes the duration of the property 
interest). At base, the plaintiffs' argument is that we 
should conceptually sever each plaintiffs fee interest 
into discrete segments in at least one of these 
dimensions-the temporal one-and treat each of those 
segments as separate and distinct property interests 
for purposes of takings analysis. Under this theory, 
they argue that there was a categorical talung of one 
of those temporal segments." Id., at 774. 
Putting to one side "cases of physical invasion or 
occupation," ibid., the court read our cases involving 
regulatory taking claims to focus on the impact of a 
regulation on the parcel as a whole. In its view a 
"planning regulation that prevents the development 
of a parcel for a temporary period of time is 
conceptually no different than a land-use restriction 
that permanently denies all use on a discrete portion 
of property, or that permanently restricts ""1477 a 
type "319 of use across all of the parcel." Id., at 
776. In each situation, a regulation that affects only 
-
a portion of the parcel-whether limited by time, use, 
or space-does not deprive the owner of all 
economically beneficial use.w 
FN 15. The Court of Appeals added: 
"Each of these three types of regulation will 
have an impact on the parcel's value, 
because each will affect an aspect of the 
owner's 'use' of the property-by restricting 
when the 'use' may occur, where the 'use' 
may occur, or how the 'use' may occur. 
Prior to Awins 1v. Citv o f  Tihuron. 447 U.S. 
255. 100 S.Ct. 2138. 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980) 
1, the Court had already rejected takings 
challenges to regulations eliminating all 
'use' on a portion of the property, and to 
regulations restricting the type of 'use' 
across the breadth of the property. See 
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-3 IT, 98 S.Ct. 
26461 ... : Kevstone Bituminous Coal Ass'rz, 
480 U.S. at 498-991. 107 S.Ct. 12321 ...; 
VilIagr o f  E~~clirl v. Arnbler Realty Co.. 272 
U.S. 365. 384, 3971, 47 S.Ct. 114. 71 L.Ed. 
3031 ... (19261 (75% diminution in value 
caused by zoning law); see also William C. 
Haus & Co. v. Citv & Conntv o f  Sun 
Francisco, 605 F.2d 1 117, 1 120 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (value reduced from $2,000,000 to 
$100,000). In those cases, the Court 
'uniformly reject[ed] the proposition that 
diminution in property value, standing 
alone, can establish a "talung.' " & 
Central. 438 U.S. at 13 11.98 S.Ct. 26461 ...; 
see also Concrete P i ~ e  and Producfs, Ir?c, v. 
Cons truction Laborers Pen.sion Trzut, 508 
U.S. 602,6451, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 
5391 ... (1993). There is no plausible basis 
on which to distinguish a similar diminution 
in value that results from a temporary 
suspension of development." Id.. at 776- 
777. 
-
The Court of Appeals distinguished L~rccrs as 
applying to the " 'relatively rare' " case in which a 
regulation denies all productive use of an entire 
parcel, whereas the moratoria involve only a 
"temporal 'slice' " of the fee interest and a form of 
regulation that is widespread and well established. 
216 F.3d. at 773-774. It also rejected petitioners' 
argument that our decision in First English was 
controlling. According to the Court of Appeals, 
First Enplish concerned the question whether 
compensation is an appropriate remedy for a 
temporary taking and not whether or when such a 
taking has occurred. 216 F.3d. at 778. Faced 
squarely with the question whether a taking had 
occurred, the court held that Penn Cenrral was the 
appropriate framework for analysis. Petitioners, 
however, had failed to challenge the District "320 
Court's conclusion that they could not make out a 
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taking claim under the Penn Central factors. 
Over the dissent of five judges, the Ninth Circuit 
denied a petition for rehearing en banc. 228 F.3d 998 
fC.A.9 2000). In the dissenters' opinion, the panel's 
holding was not faithful to this Court's decisions in 
First English and Lzrcrrs, nor to Justice Holmes 
admonition in Pennsvlvanirr Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 416, 43 S.Ci. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (19221, 
that " 'a strong public desire to improve the public 
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the 
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of 
paying for the change.' " 228 F.3d, at 1003. 
Because of the importance of the case, we granted 
certiorari limited to the question stated at the 
beginning of this opinion. 533 U.S. 948. 12 1 S.Ct. 
2589.150 L.Ed.2d 749 (2001). We now affirm. 
Petitioners make only a facial attack on Ordinance 
8 1-5 and Resolution 83-21. They contend that the 
mere enactment of a temporary regulation that, while 
in effect, denies a property owner all viable economic 
use of her property gives rise to an unqualified 
constitutional obligation to compensate her for the 
value of its use during that period. Hence, they "face 
an uphill battle," Kevstonc. Bituminous Coal As.vn. 1). 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470.495, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 
L.Ed.2d 472 (1987), that is made especially steep by 
their desire for a categorical rule requiring 
compensation whenever the government imposes 
such a moratorium on development. Under their 
proposed rule, there is no need to evaluate the 
landowners' investment-backed expectations, the 
actual impact of the regulation on any individual, the 
importance of the public interest served by the 
regulation, or **I478 the reasons for imposing the 
temporary restriction. For petitioners, it is enough 
that a regulation imposes a temporary deprivation-no 
matter how brief-of all economically viable use to 
trigger a per se rule that a taking has occurred. 
Petitioners assert that our opinions in First Er?plish 
and Lucas have "321 already endorsed their view, 
and that it is a logical application of the principle that 
the Takings Clause was "designed to bar Government 
from forcing some people alone to bear burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole." Armstrone v. United States, 
364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 
(1960). 
support their proposed categorical rule-indeed, fairly 
read, they implicitly reject it. Next, we shall explain 
why the Armstrong principle requires rejection of that 
rule as well as the less extreme position advanced by 
petitioners at oral argument. In our view the answer 
to the abstract question whether a temporary 
moratorium effects a taking is neither "yes, always" 
nor "no, never"; the answer depends upon the 
particular circumstances of the Resisting 
"[tlhe temptation to adopt what amount to per se 
rules in either direction," Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606, 636, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 
(2001) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), we conclude 
that the circumstances in this case are best analyzed 
within the Penn Cerztrwl framework. 
FN 16. Despite our clear refusal to hold that 
a moratorium never effects a taking, THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE accuses us of "allow[ing] 
the government to '... take private property 
without paying for it,' "post,  at 1493. It may 
be true that under a Perm Central analysis 
petitioners' land was taken and 
compensation would be due. But 
petitioners failed to challenge the District 
Court's conclusion that there was no talung 
under Penn Central. Supra, at 1476, and n. 
14. 
The text of the Fifth Amendment itself 
provides a basis for drawing a distinction between 
physical takings and regulatory talungs. Its plain 
language requires the payment of compensation 
whenever the government acquires private property 
for a public purpose, whether the acquisition is the 
result of a condemnation proceeding or a physical 
appropriation. But the Constitution contains no 
comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a 
property owner from *322 making certain uses of 
FN17 her private property. - Our jurisprudence 
involving condemnations and physical talungs is as 
old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves 
the straightforward application of per- se rules. Our 
regulatory takings jurisprudence, in contrast, is of 
more recent vintage and is characterized by 
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries," Penn Ccntt.al, 
438 U.S.. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, designed to allow 
"careful examination and weighing of all the relevant 
circumstances." Pulazzolo, 533 U.S., at 636, 12 1 
S.Ct. 2448 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). 
We shall first explain why our cases do not 
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FN 17. In determining whether govenunent 
action affecting property is an 
unconstitutional deprivation of ownership 
rights under the Just Compensation Clause, 
a court must interpret the word "taken." 
When the government condemns or 
physically appropriates the property, the fact 
of a talung is typically obvious and 
undisputed. When, however, the owner 
contends a taking has occurred because a 
law or regulation imposes restrictions so 
severe that they are tantamount to a 
condemnation or appropriation, the 
predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and 
the analysis is more complex. 
1911101 When the government physically takes 
possession of an interest in property for some public 
purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the 
former owner, United States v. Pewee Coal Co.. 341 
U.S. 114, 115, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951), 
regardless of whether the interest that is taken 
constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof. 
Thus, compensation is mandated when a leasehold is 
taken and the government occupies **I479 the 
property for its own purposes, even though that use is 
temporary. Urzited States I). General Motors Coru., 
323 U.S. 373, 65 S.Ct. 357. 89 L.Ed. 31 1 (19451; 
United Stclte.~ v. Pet01 Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 66 
S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946). Similarly, when the 
government appropriates part of a rooftop in order to 
provide cable TV access for apartment tenants, 
Lorelto 1). Teleoron~pter Mf~nhattan CATV Gorp., 458 
U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164.73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); or 
when its planes use private airspace to approach a 
government airport, United States 1). Cnusby, 328 
U.S. 256. 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (19461, it is 
required to pay for that share no matter how small. 
But a government regulation that merely prohibits 
landlords from evicting *323 tenants unwilling to 
pay a higher rent, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 
S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921); that bans certain 
private uses of a portion of an owner's property, 
Villaae ofE11clid 11. Anzbler Reultv Co.. 272 U.S. 365, 
47 S.Ct. 114. 71 L.Ed. 303 (19261; Kevstone 
Bitvnlinous Coal A.ssn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470. 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987); or that 
forbids the private use of certain airspace, 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York Ciw. 438 U.S. 104, 
98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (19781, does not 
constitute a categorical taking. "The first category of 
cases requires courts to apply a clear rule; the second 
necessarily entails complex factual assessments of 
the purposes and economic effects of government 
actions." Yee v. Escondido, 503 U . S .  5 19, 523, 1 12 
S.Ct. 1522. 1 18 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992). See also 
Lor-etto. 458 U.S., at 440, 102 S.Ct. 3164; KeysfoneL 
480 U.S.. at 489, n. 18, 107 S.Ct. 1232. 
Jlllr121r133 This longstanding distinction between 
acquisitions of property for public use, on the one 
hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the 
other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving 
physical talungs as controlling precedents for the 
evaluation of a claim that there has been a 
"regulatory taking," and vice versa. For the 
same reason that we do not ask whether a physical 
appropriation advances a substantial government 
interest or whether it deprives the owner of all 
economically valuable use, we do not apply our 
precedent from the physical takings context*324 to 
regulatory takings claims. Land-use regulations are 
ubiquitous and most of them impact property values 
in some tangential way-often in completely 
unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se 
takings would transform government regulation into 
a luxury few governments could afford. By contrast, 
physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily 
identified, and usually represent a greater affront to 
individual property rightsw **I480 "This case 
does not present the 'classi[c] taking' in which the 
government directly appropriates private property for 
its own use," Eustern Enterl~rises v. Al~fkI, 524 U.S. 
498. 522. 118 S.Ct. 2131, 141 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998); 
instead the interference with property rights "arises 
from some public program adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic*325 life to promote the 
common good," Perm Central, 438 U.S., at 124. 98 
S.Ct. 2646. 
FN18. To illustrate the importance of the 
distinction, the Court in Lorctto, 458 U S . ,  at 
430, 102 S.Ct. 3 164, compared two wartime 
talungs cases, United States v. Pewee Coal 
Co., 341 U.S. 114, 116, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 
L.Ed. 809 (19511, in which there had been 
an "actual taking of possession and control" 
of a coal mine, and United States v. Central 
Eureli~ Mininn Co., 357 U.S. 155, 78 S.Ct. 
1097. 2 L.Ed.2d 1228 (19581, in which, "by 
contrast, the Court found no taking where 
the Government had issued a wartime order 
requiring nonessential gold mines to cease 
operations ...." 458 U.S.. at 43 1, 102 S.Ct. 
3 164. Loretto then relied on this distinction 
--
in dismissing the argument that our 
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discussion of the physical taking at issue in 
the case would affect landlord-tenant laws. 
"So long as these regulations do not require 
the landlord to suffer the physical 
occupation of a portion of his building by a 
third party, they will be analyzed under the 
multifactor inquiry generally applicable to 
nonpossessory governmental activity." Id., 
at 440. 102 S.Ct. 3164 (citing Pent1 Central 
1, 
FN19. According to THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE'S dissent, even a temporary, use- 
prohibiting regulation should be governed 
by our physical takings cases because, under 
Lircas v. Sozrtll Carolina Coustal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003. 1017. 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 
L.Ed.2d 798 (19921, "from the landowner's 
point of view," the moratorium is the 
functional equivalent of a forced leasehold, 
post, at 1493. Of course, from both the 
landowner's and the government's standpoint 
there are critical differences between a 
leasehold and a moratorium. 
Condemnation of a leasehold gives the 
government possession of the property, the 
right to admit and exclude others, and the 
right to use it for a public purpose. A 
regulatory taking, by contrast, does not give 
the government any right to use the 
property, nor does it dispossess the owner or 
affect her right to exclude others. 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE stretches Lucas' 
"equivalence" language too far. For even a 
regulation that constitutes only a minor 
infringement on property may, from the 
landowner's perspective, be the functional 
equivalent of an appropriation. L m  
carved out a narrow exception to the rules 
governing regulatory takings for the 
"extraordinary circumstance" of a 
permanent deprivation of all beneficial use. 
The exception was only partially justified 
based on the "equivalence" theory cited by 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S dissent. It was 
also justified on the theory that, in the 
"relatively rare situations where the 
government has deprived a landowner of all 
economically beneficial uses," it is less 
realistic to assume that the regulation will 
secure an "average reciprocity of 
advantage," or that govemment could not go 
on if required to pay for every such 
restriction. 505 U.S., at 1017-1018, 112 
S.Ct. 2886. But as we explain, infiu, at 
1487-1489, these assumptions hold true in 
the context of a moratorium. 
Perhaps recognizing this fundamental distinction, 
petitioners wisely do not place all their emphasis on 
analogies to physical takings cases. Instead, they 
rely principally on our decision in Luctrs v. Solrth 
Curnlitiu Coastul Council, 505 U.S. 1003. 1 12 S.Ct. 
2886. 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)-a regulatory takings 
case that, nevertheless, applied a categorical rule-to 
argue that the Penn Cenlml framework is 
inapplicable here. A brief review of some of the 
cases that led to our decision in Lucas, however, will 
help to explain why the holding in that case.does not 
answer the question presented here. 
J141r151 As we noted in Ltlcas, it was Justice 
Holmes' opinion in Pennsvlvunin Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393.43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1 922),"" 
that gave birth to our regulatory takings 
jurisprudence. "326 In subsequent opinions we 
have repeatedly and consistently endorsed Holmes' 
observation that "if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking." Id.. at 415. 43 S.Ct. 158. 
Justice Holmes did not provide a standard for 
determining when a regulation goes "too far," but he 
did reject the view expressed **I481 in Justice 
Brandeis' dissent that there could not be a talung 
because the property remained in the possession of 
the owner and had not been appropriated or used by 
the After Muhotz, neither a physical 
appropriation nor a public use has ever been a 
necessary component of a "regulatory taking." 
FN20. The case involved "a bill in equity 
brought by the defendants in error to prevent 
the Pennsylvania Coal Company from 
mining under their property in such way as 
to remove the supports and cause a 
subsidence of the surface and of their 
house." Mahon, 260 U.S., at 412, 43 S.Ct. 
158. Mahon sought to prevent 
Pennsylvania Coal from mining under his 
property by relying on a state statute, which 
prohibited any mining that could undermine 
the foundation of a home. The company 
challenged the statute as a talung of its 
interest in the coal without compensation. 
FN21. In Luca.~, we explained: "Prior to 
Justice Holmes's exposition in Pennsvh~anicr 
Corrl Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 3931, 43 S.Ct. 
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158. 67 L.Ed. 3221 (19221, it was generally 
thought that the Takings Clause reached 
only a 'direct appropriation' of property, 
L e d  Tender Cases. 12 Wall. 457. 5511. 20 
L.Ed. 2871 (1871), or the functional 
equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the 
owner's] possession,' Trun.snortution Co. v. 
Chiccrao. 99 U.S. 635. 6421. 25 L.Ed. 3361 
(1879). ... Justice Holmes recognized in 
Muhon, however, that if the protection 
against physical appropriations of private 
property was to be meaningfully enforced, 
the govenunent's power to redefine the 
range of interests included in the ownership 
of property was necessarily constrained by 
constitutional limits. 260 U.S., at 414-4151, 
43 S.Ct. 1581. If, instead, the uses of 
private property were subject to unbridled, 
uncompensated qualification under the 
police power, 'the natural tendency of 
human nature [would be] to extend the 
qualification more and more until at last 
private property disappear[ed]. ' Id., at 4 151, 
43 S.Ct. 1581. These considerations gave 
birth in that case to the oft-cited maxim that, 
'while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking.' u' 505 
U.S.. at 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (citation 
omitted). 
FN22. Justice Brandeis argued: "Every 
restriction upon the use of property imposed 
in the exercise of the police power deprives 
the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, 
and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the 
State of rights in ,property without making 
compensation. But restriction imposed to 
protect the public health, safety or morals 
from dangers threatened is not a talung. 
The restriction here in question is merely the 
prohibition of a noxious use. The property 
so restricted remains in the possession of its 
owner. The State does not appropriate it or 
make any use of it. The State merely 
prevents the owner from making a use 
which interferes with paramount rights of 
the public." Mahoiz. 260 U.S., at 417, 43 
S.Ct. 158 (dissenting opinion). 
11 611 1711 1 81 In the decades following that decision, 
we have "generally eschewed" any set formula for 
determining how far is too far, choosing instead to 
engage in " 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.' " 
Lucas. 505 U.S.. at 1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (quoting 
Perm Central, 438 U.S., at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646). 
Indeed, we still resist the temptation to adopt per se 
rules in our cases involving partial regulatory takings, 
preferring to examine "a number of factors" rather 
than a simple "mathematically precise" formula. 
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in *327&g  
Centrrrl did, however, make it clear that even though 
multiple factors are relevant in the analysis of 
regulatory takings claims, in such cases we must 
focus on "the parcel as a whole": 
FN23.. In her concurring opinion in 
Palazzolo, 533 U.S., at 633. 121 S.Ct. 2448, 
Justice O'CONNOR reaffirmed this 
approach: "Our polestar instead remains the 
principles set forth in Pen11 Central itself 
and our other cases that govern partial 
regulatory takings. Under these cases, 
interference with investment-backed 
expectations is one of a number of factors 
that a court must examine." Ibid. "Penn 
Central does not supply mathematically 
precise variables, but instead provides 
important guideposts that lead to the 
ultimate determination whether just 
compensation is required." Id., at 634. 12 1 
S.Ct. 2448. "The temptation to adopt what 
amount to per se rules in either direction 
must be resisted. The Talungs Clause 
requires careful examination and weighing 
of all the relevant circumstances in this 
context." Id., at 636, 121 S.Ct. 2448. 
" 'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single 
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to 
determine whether rights in a particular segment have 
been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a 
particular governmental action has effected a taking, 
this Court focuses rather both on the character of the 
action and on the nature and extent of the interference 
with rights in the parcel as a whole-here, the city tax 
block designated as the 'landmark site.' " Id.. at 130- 
13 1.98 S.Ct. 2646. 
This requirement that "the aggregate must be viewed 
in its entirety" explains why, for example, a 
regulation that prohibited commercial transactions in 
eagle feathers, but did not bar other uses or impose 
any physical invasion or restraint upon them, was not 
a taking. Andr~is v. Allard 444 U.S. 5 1 ,  66, 100 
S.Ct. 3 18, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). It also clarifies 
why restrictions on the use of only limited portions of 
the parcel, such as setback ordinances, Goric~h v. Fox, 
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274 U.S. 603.47 S.Ct. 675, 71 L.Ed. 1228 (19271, or 
a requirement that coal pillars be left in place to 
prevent mine subsidence, Keystone Bituminous Con1 
Assn. v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S.. at 498. 107 S.Ct. 
1232. were not considered regulatory takings. In 
each of these cases, we affirmed that "where an 
owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the 
destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a 
taking." Andnrs, 444 U.S.. at 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 3 18. 
*328 While the foregoing cases considered whether 
particular regulations had "gone too far" and were 
therefore invalid, none **I482 of them addressed the 
separate remedial question of how compensation is 
measured once a regulatory talung is established. In 
his dissenting opinion in Sun Diego Gas & Elec. Co. 
v. Sun Diego. 450 U.S. 621, 636, 101 S.Ct. 1287, 67 
L.Ed.2d 55 1 (198 11, Justice Brennan identified that 
question and explained how he would answer it: 
"The constitutional rule I propose requires that, once 
a court finds that a police power regulation has 
effected a 'taking,' the government entity must pay 
just compensation for the period commencing on the 
date the regulation first effected the 'taking,' and 
ending on the date the government entity chooses to 
rescind or otherwise amend the regulation." 
658, 1-01 S.Ct. 1287. 
Justice Brennan's proposed rule was subsequently 
endorsed by the Court in First Enalish, 482 U.S., at 
315. 318, 321. 107 S.Ct. 2378. First English was 
certainly a significant decision, and nothing that we 
say today qualifies its holding. Nonetheless, it is 
important to recognize that we did not address in that 
case the quite different and logically prior question 
whether the temporary regulation at issue had in fact 
constituted a taking. 
In First English, the Court unambiguously and 
repeatedly characterized the issue to be decided as a 
"compensation question" or a "remedial question." 
Id., at 31 1. 107 S.Ct. 2378 ("The disposition of the 
case on these grounds isolates the remedial question 
for our consideration"); see also id.. at 313,3 18, 107 
S.Ct. 2378. And the Court's statement of its holding 
was equally unambiguous: "We merely hold that 
where the government's activities have already 
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent 
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to 
provide compensation for the period during which the 
talung was effective." M., at 321, 107 S.Ct. 2378 
(emphasis added). In fact, First English expressly 
disavowed any ruling on the *329 merits of the 
talungs issue because the California courts had 
decided the remedial question on the assumption that 
a taking had been alleged. Id ,  at 3 12-3 13. 107 S.Ct. 
2378 ("We reject appellee's suggestion that ... we 
must independently evaluate the adequacy of the 
complaint and resolve the talungs claim on the merits 
before we can reach the remedial question"). After 
our remand, the California courts concluded that 
there had not been a taking, First Enalish Evanr.elicu1 
Church o f  Glendule v. Cot~ntv o f  Los Ange/e.s. 2 1 0 
Cal.Avp.3d 1353, 258 Cal.Rvtr. 893 (19891, and we 
declined review of that decision, 493 U.S. 1056, 1 10 
S.Ct. 866. 107 L.Ed.2d 950 (19901. 
To the extent that the Court in First Encrlish 
referenced the antecedent takings question, we 
identified two reasons why a regulation temporarily 
denying an owner all use of her property might not 
constitute a taking. First, we recognized that "the 
county might avoid the conclusion that a 
compensable taking had occurred by establishing that 
the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the 
State's authority to enact safety regulations." 482 
U.S., at 3 13. 107 S.Ct. 2378. Second, we limited our 
holding "to the facts presented" and recognized "the 
quite different questions that would arise in the case 
of normal delays in obtaining building permits, 
changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like 
which [were] not before us." Id., at 321, 107 S.Ct. 
2378. Thus, our decision in First English surely did 
not approve, and implicitly rejected, the categorical 
submission that petitioners are now advocating. 
Similarly, our decision in Lucas is not dispositive of 
the question presented. Although LEICUS endorsed 
and applied a categorical rule, it was not the one that 
petitioners propose. Lucas purchased two residential 
lots in 1988 for $975,000. These lots were rendered 
"valueless" by a statute enacted two years later. The 
trial court found that a taking had occurred and 
ordered compensation of $1,232,387.50, representing 
the value of the fee simple estate, plus interest. As 
the statute read **I483 at the time of the trial, it 
effected a talung that "was unconditional and 
permanent." "330505 US. ,  at 1012. 112 S.Ct. 
2886. While the State's appeal was pending, the 
statute was amended to authorize exceptions that 
might have allowed Lucas to obtain a building 
permit. Despite the fact that the amendment gave 
the State Supreme Court the opportunity to dispose of 
the appeal on ripeness grounds, it resolved the merits 
of the permanent takings claim and reversed. Since 
"Lucas had no reason to proceed on a 'temporary 
taking' theory at trial," we decided the case on the 
permanent talung theory that both the trial court and 
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the State Supreme Court had addressed. Ihid. 
The categorical rule that we applied in Lucas states 
that compensation is required when a regulation 
deprives an owner of "aN economically beneficial 
uses" of his land. Id.. at 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886. 
Under that rule, a statute that "wholly eliminated the 
value" of Lucas' fee simple title clearly qualified as a 
taking. But our holding was limited to "the 
extraordinary circumstance when no productive or 
economically beneficial use of land is permitted." 
Id., at 1017. 1 12 S.Ct. 2886. The emphasis on the 
word "no" in the text of the opinion was, in effect, 
reiterated in a footnote explaining that the categorical 
rule would not apply if the diminution in value were 
95% instead of 100%. Id.. at 1019, n. 8. 112 S.Ct. 
2886.FN24 Anything less than a "complete elimination 
of value," or a "total loss," the Court acknowledged, 
would require the lund of analysis applied in Penrl 
Central. Lucas, 505U.S.. at 1019-1020. n. 8, 112 
S.Ct. 2886.FN25 
FN24. Justice KENNEDY concurred in the 
judgment on the basis of the regulation's 
impact on "reasonable, investment-backed 
expectations." 505 U.S., at 1034, 112 S.Ct. 
2886. 
FN25. It is worth noting that L- 
underscores the difference between physical 
and regulatory talungs. See supra, at 1478- 
1480. For under our physical takings cases 
it would be irrelevant whether a property 
owner maintained 5% of the value of her 
property so long as there was a physical 
appropriation of any of the parcel. 
Certainly, our holding that the permanent 
"obliteration of the value" of a fee simple estate 
constitutes a categorical taking does not answer the 
question whether a regulation "331 prohibiting any 
economic use of land for a 32-month period has the 
same legal effect. Petitioners seek to bring this case 
under the rule announced in Lzicas by arguing that we 
can effectively sever a 32-month segment from the 
remainder of each landowner's fee simple estate, and 
then ask whether that segment has been taken in its 
entirety by the moratoria. Of course, defining the 
property interest taken in terms of the very regulation 
being challenged is circular. With property so 
divided, every delay would become a total ban; the 
moratorium and the normal permit process alike 
would constitute categorical takings. Petitioners' 
''conceptual severance" argument is unavailing 
because it ignores Penn Centrull.s admonition that in 
regulatory takings cases we must focus on "the parcel 
as a whole." 438 U.S., at 130-131. 98 S.Ct. 2646. 
We have consistently rejected such an approach to 
the "denominator" question. See Kc>vstone, 480 
U.S., at 497. 107 S.Ct. 1232. See also Concrete Pipe 
& Pt.odticts o f  Crll., Inc. v. Construction Lnhorcrs 
Pension Trilsf fbr Soiithern C(r1.. 508 U.S. 602, 644, 
113 S.Ct. 2264. 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (19931 ("To the 
extent that any portion of property is taken, that 
portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant 
question, however, is whether the property taken is 
all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question"). 
Thus, the District Court erred when it disaggregated 
petitioners' property into temporal segments 
corresponding to the regulations at issue and then 
analyzed whether petitioners were deprived of all 
economically viable use during each period. 34 
F.Suvp.2d. at 1242-1245. The starting point for the 
court's analysis should have been to ask whether 
there was a total taking of the ""1484 entire parcel; 
if not, then Pcizn Ccntl-a1 was the proper 
f r a m e w ~ r k . ~  
FN26. THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S dissent 
makes the same mistake by carving out a 6- 
year interest in the property, rather than 
considering the parcel as a whole, and 
treating the regulations covering that 
segment as analogous to a total taking under 
L~rcrts, post, at 1494. 
[201[21] An interest in real property is defined by the 
metes and bounds that describe its geographic 
dimensions and the *332 term of years that describes 
the temporal aspect of the owner's interest. See 
Restatement of Provertv 6 6 7 9  1 9 3 6  Both 
dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be 
viewed in its entirety. Hence, a permanent 
deprivation of the owner's use of the entire area is a 
taking of "the parcel as a whole," whereas a 
temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution 
in value is not. Logically, a fee simple estate cannot 
be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on 
economic use, because the property will recover 
value as soon as the prohibition is lifted. Cf. A* 
v. City of '  T i b u ~ m .  447 U.S.. at 263. n. 9, I00 S.Ct. 
2138 ("Even if the appellants' ability to sell their 
-
property was limited during the pendency of the 
condemnation proceeding, the appellants were free to 
sell or develop their property when the proceedings 
ended. Mere fluctuations in value during the process 
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of governmental decisionmaking, absent 
extraordinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership. 
They cannot be considered as a "talung" in the 
constitutional sense' " (quoting Darzforth v. United 
States. 308 U.S. 27 1.285.60 S.Ct. 23 1.84 L.Ed. 240 
(1939))). 
Neither Lucus, nor First English, nor any of our 
other regulatory takings cases compels us to accept 
petitioners' categorical submission. In fact, these 
cases make clear that the categorical rule in Lucus 
was cawed out for the "extraordinary case" in which 
a regulation permanently deprives property of all 
value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory 
taking context, we require a more fact specific 
inquiry. Nevertheless, we will consider whether the 
interest in protecting individual property owners from 
bearing public burdens "which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole," 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.. at 49, 80 S.Ct. 
1563, justifies creating a new rule for these 
 circumstance^.^ 
FN27. Arn~.rtmnrr, like Lucas, was a case 
that involved the "total destruction by the 
Government of all value" in a specific 
property interest. 364 U.S., at 48-49. 80 
S.Ct. 1563. It is nevertheless perfectly clear 
that Justice Black's oft-quoted comment 
about the underlying purpose of the 
guarantee that private property shall not be 
taken for a public use without just 
compensation applies to partial talungs as 
well as total takings. 
Considerations of "fairness and justice" arguably 
could support the conclusion that TRPA's moratoria 
were takings of petitioners' property based on any of 
seven different theories. First, even though we have 
not previously done so, we might now announce a 
categorical rule that, in the interest of fairness and 
justice, compensation is required whenever 
government temporarily deprives an owner of all 
economically viable use of her property. Second, we 
could craft a narrower rule that would cover all 
temporary land-use restrictions except those "normal 
delays in obtaining building permits, changes in 
zoning ordinances, variances, and the like" which 
were put to one side in our opinion in First English, 
482 U.S., at 321, 107 S.Ct. 2378. Third, we could 
adopt a rule like the one suggested by an amicus 
supporting petitioners that would "allow a short fixed 
period for deliberations to take place without 
compensation-say maximum one year-after which the 
just compensation requirements" would "kick in." 
Fourth, **I485 with the benefit of hindsight, we 
might characterize the successive actions of TRPA as 
a "series of rolling moratoria" that were the 
functional equivalent of a permanent taking. 
Fifth, were it not for the findings of the District Court 
that TRPA acted diligently and in good faith, we 
might have concluded that the agency was stalling in 
order to avoid promulgating the environmental 
threshold carrying capacities and regional plan 
mandated by the 1980 Compact. Cf. *334Monterev 
1). Del Monte Dunes nt Monterev. Ltd.. 526 U.S. 
687, 698. 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). 
Sixth, apart from the District Court's finding that 
TRPA's actions represented a proportional response 
to a serious risk of harm to the lake, petitioners might 
have argued that the moratoria did not substantially 
advance a legitimate state interest, see Apins and 
Monterev. Finally, if petitioners had challenged the 
application of the moratoria to their individual 
parcels, instead of making a facial challenge, some of 
them might have prevailed under a Penn Central 
analysis. 
FN28. Brief for the Institute for Justice as 
Amicus Curiae 30. Although anlicus 
describes the 1-year cutoff proposal as the 
"better approach by far," ibid., its primary 
argument is that Penn Centrzll should be 
overruled, id., at 20 ("AN partial takings by 
way of land use restriction should be subject 
to the same prima facie rules for 
compensation as a physical occupation for a 
limited period of time"). 
FN29. Brief for Petitioners 44. See also 
Pet. for Cert. i. 
1231[241[251 As the case comes to us, however, none 
of the last four theories is available. The "rolling 
moratoria" theory was presented in the petition for 
certiorari, but our order granting review did not 
encompass that issue, 533 U.S. 948, 121 S.Ct. 2589, 
150 L.Ed.2d 749 (2001); the case was tried in the 
District Court and reviewed in the Court of Appeals 
on the theory that each of the two moratoria was a 
separate taking, one for a 2-year period and the other 
for an 8-month period. 2 16 F.3d. at 769. And, as we 
have already noted, recovery on either a bad faith 
theory or a theory that the state interests were 
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insubstantial is foreclosed by the District Court's 
unchallenged findings of fact. Recovery under a 
Penn Central analysis is also foreclosed both because 
petitioners expressly disavowed that theory, and 
because they did not appeal from the District Court's 
conclusion that the evidence would not support it. 
Nonetheless, each of the three per se theories is fairly 
encompassed within the question that we decided to 
answer. 
With respect to these theories, the ultimate 
constitutional question is whether the concepts of 
"fairness and justice" that underlie the Takings 
Clause will be better served by one of these 
categorical rules or by a Penn Central inquiry into all 
of the relevant circumstances in particular cases. 
From that perspective, the extreme categorical rule 
that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter 
how brief, constitutes a compensable taking surely 
cannot be sustained. Petitioners' broad submission 
would apply to numerous *335 "normal delays in 
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning 
ordinances, variances, and the like," 482 U.S., at 321, 
107 'S.Ct. 2378, as well as to orders temporarily 
prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that 
violate health codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other 
areas that we cannot now foresee. Such a rule would 
undoubtedly require changes in numerous practices 
that have long been considered permissible exercises 
of the police power. As Justice Holmes warned in 
Muhon, "[g]ovemment hardly could go on if to some 
extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in 
the general law." 260 U.S.. at 41 3, 43 S.Ct. 158. A 
rule that required compensation for every delay in the 
use of property would render routine government 
processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty 
decisionmaking. Such an important change in the 
law should be the product of legislative rulemaking 
rather than a d j u d i c a t i ~ n . ~  
FN30. In addition, we recognize the 
anomaly that would be created if we were to 
apply Penn Central when a landowner is 
permanently deprived of 95% of the use of 
her property, Luca,~, 505 U.S., at 10 19, n. 8, 
112 S.Ct. 2886, and yet find a per- se taking 
anytime the same property owner is 
deprived of all use for only five days. Such 
a scheme would present an odd inversion of 
Justice Holmes' adage: "A limit in time, to 
tide over a passing trouble, well may justify 
a law that could not be upheld as a 
permanent change." Block v. Hirsh, 256 
U.S. 135, 157. 41 S.Ct. 458. 65 L.Ed. 865 
(1921). 
**I486 12711281 More importantly, for reasons set 
out at some length by Justice O'CONNOR in her 
concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 
U.S.. at 636. 121 S.Ct. 2448, we are persuaded that 
the better approach to claims that a regulation has 
effected a temporary taking "requires careful 
examination and weighing of all the relevant 
circumstances." In that opinion, Justice O'CONNOR 
specifically considered the role that the "temporal 
relationship between regulatory enactment and title 
acquisition" should play in the analysis of a takings 
claim. Id,, at 632, 121 S.Ct. 2448. We have no 
occasion to address that particular issue in this case, 
because it involves a different*336 temporal 
relationship-the distinction between a temporary 
restriction and one that is permanent. Her comments 
on the "fairness and justice" inquiry are, nevertheless, 
instructive: 
"Today's holding does not mean that the timing of the 
regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of 
title is immaterial to the Penn Central analysis. 
Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this 
consideration from the talungs inquiry as it would be 
to accord it exclusive significance. Our polestar 
instead remains the principles set forth in P- 
Central itself and our other cases that govern partial 
regulatory talungs. Under these cases, interference 
with investment-backed expectations is one of a 
number of factors that a court must examine. ... 
"The Fifth Amendment forbids the taking of private 
property for public use without just compensation. 
We have recognized that this constitutional guarantee 
is ' "designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as 
a whole." ' Penn Centr.al, I438 U.S.1, at 123-1241, 
98 S.Ct. 26461 (quoting Aianzstrong v. United Slataq 
364 U.S. 40, 49[, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 15541 
(1960)). The concepts of 'fairness and justice' that 
underlie the Takings Clause, of course, are less than 
fully determinate. Accordingly, we have eschewed 
'any "set formula" for determining when "justice and 
fairness" require that economic injuries caused by 
public action be compensated by the government, 
rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on 
a few persons.7 P a m  Centr-al, s ~ ~ p r n ,  at 124[, 98 
S.Ct. 26461 (quoting Goldhlntt 1,. Henz~stead. 369 
U.S. 590, 594r. 82 S.Ct. 987. 8 L.Ed.2d 1301 (1 962)). 
The outcome instead 'depends largely "upon the 
particular circumstances [in that] case.' " Pc.nn 
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Cet~tr.aI, supro. at 124[, 98 S.Ct. 26461 (quoting 
United States v. Central Etuoka Mining Co.. 357 U.S. 
155. 168r. 78 S.Ct. 1097. 2 L.Ed.2d 12281 (1958))." 
Id., at 633. 12 1 S.Ct. 2448. 
*337 In rejecting petitioners' per se rule, we do not 
hold that the temporary nature of a land-use 
restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking; 
we simply recognize that it should not be given 
exclusive significance one way or the other. 
A narrower rule that excluded the normal delays 
associated with processing permits, or that covered 
only delays of more than a year, would certainly have 
a less severe impact on prevailing practices, but it 
would still impose serious financial constraints on the 
planning process.m Unlike **I487 the 
"extraordinary circumstance" in which the 
government deprives a property owner of all 
economic use, Oicas, 505 U.S., at 1017, 112 S.Ct. 
2886, moratoria like Ordinance 8 1-5 and Resolution 
83-21 are used widely among land-use planners to 
preserve the status quo while formulating a more 
permanent development strategy.w In fact, the 
consensus in the planning communityk338 appears 
to be that moratoria, or "interim development 
controls" as they are often called, are an essential tool 
of successful d e v e ~ o ~ m e n t . ~  Yet even the weak 
version of petitioners' categorical rule would treat 
these interim measures as talungs regardless of the 
good faith of the planners, the reasonable 
expectations of the landowners, or the actual impact 
of the moratorium on property  value^.^ 
FN3 1. Petitioners fail to offer a persuasive 
explanation for why moratoria should be 
treated differently from ordinary permit 
delays. They contend that a permit 
applicant need only comply with certain 
specific requirements in order to receive one 
and can expect to develop at the end of the 
process, whereas there is nothing the 
landowner subject to a moratorium can do 
but wait, with no guarantee that a permit 
will be granted at the end of the process. 
Brief for Petitioners 28. Setting aside the 
obvious problem with basing the distinction 
on a course of events we can only know 
after the fact-in the context of a facial 
challenge-petitioners' argument breaks down 
under closer examination because there is no 
guarantee that a permit will be granted, or 
that a decision will be made within a year. 
See, e.g., Dufbu v. United Stoles. 22 CI.Ct. 
156 (1990) (holding that 16-month delay in 
granting a permit did not constitute a 
temporary taking). Moreover, under 
petitioners' modified categorical rule, there 
would be no per se taking if TRPA simply 
delayed action on all permits pending a 
regional plan. Fairness and justice do not 
require that TRPA be penalized for 
achieving the same result, but with full 
disclosure. 
FN32. See, e.g., S u n t ~  Fe Vill(~pe Ventitre v. 
Albtiuuer~uue, 914 F.Suvv. 478, 483 
(D.N.M. 1995) (30-month moratorium on 
development of lands within the Petroglyph 
National Monument was not a taking); 
Williams v. Central, 907 P.2d 70 1. 703-706 
JColo.Avu. 1995) (I 0-month moratorium on 
development in gaming district while 
studying city's ability to absorb growth was 
not a compensable tahng); Woodburv Place 
Partners v. Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258 
JMinn.At>o. 19921 (moratorium pending 
review of plan for land adjacent to interstate 
highway was not a taking even though it 
deprived property owner of all economically 
viable use of its property for two years); 
Zilher v. Town o f  Mor-anu, 692 F.Supp. 1 195 
/N.D.Cal. l98Q (1 8-month development 
moratorium during completion of a 
comprehensive scheme for open space did 
not require compensation). See also 
Wayman, Leaders Consider Options for 
Town Growth, Charlotte Observer, Feb. 3, 
2002, p. 15M (describing 1 0-month building 
moratorium imposed "to give town leaders 
time to plan for development"); Wallman, 
City May Put Reins on Beach Projects, Sun- 
Sentinel, May 16, 2000, p. 1B (2-year 
building moratorium on beachfront property 
in Fort Lauderdale pending new height, 
width, and dispersal regulations); Foderaro, 
In Suburbs, They're Cracking Down on the 
Joneses, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2001, p. A1 
(describing moratorium imposed in 
Eastchester, New York, during a review of 
the town's zoning code to address the 
problem of oversized homes); Dawson, 
Commissioners recommend Aboite 
construction ban be lifted, Fort Wayne News 
Sentinel, May 4, 2001, p. 1A (3-year 
moratorium to allow improvements in the 
water and sewage treatment systems). 
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FN33. See J. Juergensmeyer & T. Roberts, 
Land Use Planning and Control Law tj tj 
5.28(G) and 9.6 (1998); Garvin & Leitner, 
Drafting Interim Development Ordinances: 
Creating Time to Plan, 48 Land Use Law & 
Zoning Digest 3 (June 1996) ("With the 
planning so protected, there is no need for 
hasty adoption of permanent controls in 
order to avoid the establishment of 
nonconforming uses, or to respond in an ad 
hoc fashion to specific problems. Instead, 
the planning and implementation process 
may be permitted to run its full and natural 
course with widespread citizen input and 
involvement, public debate, and full 
consideration of all issues and points of 
view"); Freilich, Interim Development 
Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing 
Flexible Planning and Zoning, 49 J. Urb. L. 
65 (1971). 
FN34. THE CHIEF JUSTICE offers another 
alternative, suggesting that delays of six 
years or more should be treated as per se 
talungs. However, his dissent offers no 
explanation for why 6 years should be the 
cutoff point rather than 10 days, 10 months, 
or 10 years. It is worth emphasizing that 
we do not reject a categorical rule in this 
case because a 32-month moratorium is just 
not that harsh. Instead, we reject a 
categorical rule because we conclude that 
the Penn Centrrrl framework adequately 
directs the inquiry to the proper 
considerations-only one of which is the 
length of the delay. 
*339 The interest in facilitating informed 
decisionmaking by regulatory agencies counsels 
against adopting a per se rule that would impose such 
severe costs on their deliberations. Otherwise, the 
financialx*1488 constraints of compensating 
property owners during a moratorium may force 
officials to rush through the planning process or to 
abandon the practice altogether. To the extent that 
communities are forced to abandon using moratoria, 
landowners will have incentives to develop their 
property quickly before a comprehensive plan can be 
enacted, thereby fostering inefficient and ill- 
conceived growth. A finding in the 1980 Compact 
itself, which presumably was endorsed by all three 
legislative bodies that participated in its enactment, 
attests to the importance of that concern. 94 Stat. 
3243 ("The legislatures of the States of California 
and Nevada find that in order to make effective the 
regional plan as revised by the agency, it is necessary 
to halt temporarily works of development in the 
region which might otherwise absorb the entire 
capability of the region for further development or 
direct it out of harmony with the ultimate plan"). 
As Justice KENNEDY explained in his opinion for 
the Court in Palazzolo, it is the interest in informed 
decisionmaking that underlies our decisions imposing 
a strict ripeness requirement on landowners asserting 
regulatory talungs claims: 
"These cases stand for the important principle that a 
landowner may not establish a taking before a land- 
use authority has the opportunity, using its own 
reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the 
reach of a challenged regulation. Under our ripeness 
rules a talungs claim based on a law or regulation 
which is alleged to go too far in burdening property 
depends upon the landowner's first having followed 
reasonable *340 and necessary steps to allow 
regulatory agencies to exercise their full discretion in 
considering development plans for the property, 
including the opportunity to grant any variances or 
waivers allowed by law. As a general rule, until 
these ordinary processes have been followed the 
extent of the restriction on property is not known and 
a regulatory talung has not yet been established. See 
Suitl~ni Ill. Tahoe Regional Planninp Apencv. 520 
U.S.  725, 736, and n. 10, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 137 
L.Ed.2d 980 (1997) ] (noting difficulty of 
demonstrating that 'mere enactment' of regulations 
restricting land use effects a taking)." 533 U.S.. at 
620-62 1, 121 S.Ct. 2448. 
We would create a perverse system of incentives 
were we to hold that landowners must wait for a 
takings claim to ripen so that planners can make well- 
reasoned decisions while, at the same time, holding 
that those planners must compensate landowners for 
the delay. 
Indeed, the interest in protecting the decisional 
process is even stronger when an agency is 
developing a regional plan than when it is 
considering a permit for a single parcel. In the 
proceedings involving the Lake Tahoe Basin, for 
example, the moratoria enabled TRPA to obtain the 
benefit of comments and criticisms from interested 
parties, such as the petitioners, during its 
 deliberation^.^ Since a categorical rule tied to the 
length of deliberations would likely create added 
pressure on decisionmakers to reach a quick 
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resolution of land-use questions, it would only serve 
to disadvantage those landowners and interest groups 
who are not as organizedx341 or familiar wit'h the 
planning process. Moreover, with a temporary ban 
on development there is a lesser risk that individual 
landowners will be "singled out" to bear a special 
burden that should be shared by the public as a 
whole. **1489Nollun v. Culifornia Coastal 
Comm'n. 483 U.S. 825, 835. 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 
L.Ed.2d 677 (1987i At least with a moratorium 
there is a clear "reciprocity of advantage," Malton, 
260 U.S., at 415.43 S.Ct. 158, because it protects the 
interests of all affected landowners against immediate 
construction that might be inconsistent with the 
provisions of the plan that is ultimately adopted. 
"While each of us is burdened somewhat by such 
restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the 
restrictions that are placed on others." Kevstonc, 480 
U.S.. at 491, 107 S.Ct. 1232. In fact, there is reason 
to believe property values often will continue to 
increase despite a moratorium. See, e.g., Gro~~tlz 
Proaerties, Inc. v, Klinabeil Holding Co., 4 19 
F.SUUR. 212. 218 (D.Md.19761 (noting that land 
values could be expected to increase 20% during a 5- 
year moratorium on development). Cf. Fat-e.~t 
Prqperties. h c .  v. United States. 177 F.3d 1360, 
1367 rC.A.Fed. 1999) (record showed that market 
value of the entire parcel increased despite denial of 
permit to fill and develop lake-bottom property). 
Such an increase makes sense in this context because 
property values throughout the Basin can be expected 
to reflect the added assurance that Lake Tahoe will 
remain in its pristine state. Since in some cases a 1- 
year moratorium may not impose a burden at all, we 
should not adopt a rule that assumes moratoria 
always force individuals to bear a special burden that 
should be shared by the public as a whole. 
FN35. Petitioner Preservation Council, 
"through its authorized representatives, 
actively participated in the entire TRPA 
regional planning process leading to the 
adoption of the 1984 Regional Plan at issue 
in this action, and attended and expressed its 
views and concerns, orally and in writing, at 
each public hearing held by the Defendant 
TRPA in connection with the consideration 
of the 1984 Regional Plan at issue herein, as 
well as in connection with the adoption of 
Ordinance 81-5 and the Revised 1987 
Regional Plan addressed herein." App. 24. 
It may well be true that any moratorium that 
lasts for more than one year should be viewed with 
special skepticism. But given the fact that the 
District Court found that the 32 months required by 
TRPA to formulate the 1984 Regional Plan was not 
unreasonable, we could not possibly conclude that 
every delay of over one year is constitutionally *342 
u n a c ~ e ~ t a b l e . ~  Formulating a general rule of this 
kind is a suitable task for state legislatures.m In our 
view, the duration of the restriction is one of the 
important factors that a court must consider in the 
appraisal of a regulatory talungs claim, but with 
respect to that factor as with respect to other factors, 
the "temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules 
in either direction must be resisted." P~zlozzolo, 533 
U.S., at 636, 121 S.Ct. 2448 (O'CONNOR, J., 
concurring). There may be moratoria that last longer 
than one year which interfere with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, but as the District 
Court's opinion illustrates, petitioners' proposed rule 
is simply "too blunt an instrument" for identifying 
those cases. Id., at 628. 121 S.Ct. 2448. We 
conclude, therefore, that the interest in "fairness and 
justice" will be best served by relying on the familiar 
Penn Centrnl approach when deciding cases like this, 
rather than by attempting to craft a new categorical 
rule. 
FN36. We note that the temporary 
restriction that was ultimately upheld in the 
First Enalish case lasted for more than six 
years before it was replaced by a permanent 
regulation. First Englisl~ Evclnpelicnl 
Lzltheron Ch~it-ch o f  Glendale v. Cot l t l~  of' 
Los An.yeles, 210 Cal.Aup.3d 1353, 258 
Cal.R~tr. 893 (1989). 
FN37. Several States already have statutes 
authorizing interim zoning ordinances with 
specific time limits. See Cal. Govt.Code 
Ann. 65858 (West Supp.2002) 
(authorizing interim ordinance of up to two 
years); Colo.Rev.Stat. 4 30-28-1 21 (200 1) 
(six months); Kv.Rev.Stat. Ann. 6 100.201 
(2001) (one year); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
125.215 (West 2001) (three years); 
Minn.Stat. d 394.34 (2000) (two years); 
N.H.Rev.Stat. AM. 6 674:23 (West 2001) 
(one year); 0re.Rev.Stat. AM. 6 197.520 
(1997) (10 months); S.D. Codified Laws P 
1 1-2- 10 (2001 ) (two years); Utah Code 
Ann. 6 17-27-404 (1995) (18 months); 
Wash. Rev.Code 6 35.63.200 12001 ); Wis. 
Stat. 6 62.23(7)(d) (2001) (two years). 
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Other States, although without specific 
statutory authority, have recognized that 
reasonable interim zoning ordinances may 
be enacted. See, e.g., S.E. W. Friel v. 
Triangle Oil Co., 76 Md.App. 96, 543 A.2d 
863 (1 988); New Jetsev Shorc) Builders 
Assn. v.  Dover TWD. Comnz.. 1 9 1 N.J.S uper. 
627. 468 A.2d 742 (1983); SCA Chemical 
Wustc~ Sotvs.. Inc. v. kilni~.shem. 636 
S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1982); Sturges v. 
Chihark, 380 Mass. 246. 402 N.E.2d 1346 
(1980); Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 
215 A.2d 112 (1965). 
**I490 "343 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
Chief Justice REHNOUIST, with whom Justice 
SCALIA and Justice THOMAS join, dissenting. 
For over half a decade petitioners were prohibited 
from building homes, or any other structures, on their 
land. Because the Talungs Clause requires the 
government to pay compensation when it deprives 
owners of all economically viable use of their land, 
see Luca.r v. Sotith Carolina Coastal Cotincil. 505 
U.S. 1003. 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (19921, 
and because a ban on all development lasting almost 
six years does not resemble any traditional land-use 
planning device, I dissent. 
"A court cannot determine whether a regulation has 
gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation 
goes." MucDonald, Sommer & Frutes v.  Yolo 
Cottntv. 477 U.S. 340, 348, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91 
L.Ed.2d 285 (1986) (citing Pennsvlvanicr Coal Co. 1,. 
Mahorz. 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 
322 ( 1 9 2 2 ' l ) . ~  In failing to undertake this inquiry, 
the Court *344 ignores much of the impact of 
respondent's conduct on petitioners. Instead, it relies 
on the flawed determination of the Court of Appeals 
that the relevant time period lasted only from August 
1981 until April 1984. Ante, at 1473, 1474. During 
that period, Ordinance 81-5 and Regulation 83-21 
prohibited development pending the adoption of a 
new regional land-use plan. The adoption of the 
1984 Regional Plan (hereinafter Plan or 1984 Plan) 
did not, however, change anything from petitioners' 
standpoint. After the adoption of the 1984 Plan, 
petitioners still could make no use of their land. 
FNI. We are not bound by the Court of 
Appeals' determination that petitioners' 
claim under 42 U.S. C B 1983 (1 994 ed., 
SUPU. V) permitted only challenges to 
Ordinance 8 1-5 and Regulation 83-2 1. 
Petitioners sought certiorari on the Court of 
Appeals' ruling that respondent Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency (hereinafter 
respondent) did not cause petitioners' injury 
from 1984 to 1987. Pet. for Cert. 27-30. 
We did not grant certiorari on any of the 
petition's specific questions presented, but 
formulated the following question: 
"Whether the Court of Appeals properly 
determined that a temporary moratorium on 
land development does not constitute a 
taking of property requiring compensation 
under the Talungs Clause of the United 
States Constitution?" 533 U.S. 948, 949, 
121 S.Ct. 2589. 150 L.Ed.2d 749 (2001). 
This Court's Rule 14(l)(a) provides that a 
"question presented is deemed to comprise 
every subsidiary question fairly included 
therein." The question of how long the 
moratorium on land development lasted is 
necessarily subsumed within the question 
whether the moratorium constituted a taking. 
Petitioners did not assume otherwise. Their 
brief on the merits argues that respondent 
"effectively blocked all construction for the 
past two decades." Brief for Petitioners 7. 
The Court of Appeals disregarded this post-April 
1984 deprivation on the ground that respondent did 
not "cause" it. In a 42 U.S.C. 4 1983 action, "the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's 
conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed 
injury." 216 F.3d 764, 783 (C.A.9 2000). Applying 
this principle, the Court of Appeals held that the 1984 
Plan did not amount to a taking because the Plan 
actually allowed permits to issue for the construction 
of single-family residences. Those permits were 
never issued because the District Court immediately 
issued a temporary restraining order, and later a 
permanent injunction that lasted until 1987, 
prohibiting the approval of any building projects 
under the 1984 Plan. Thus, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the "1984 Plan itself could not have 
constituted a taking," because it was the injunction, 
not the Plan, that prohibited development during this 
period. Id., at 784. The Court of Appeals is correct 
that the 1984 Plan did not cause petitioners' injury. 
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But that is the right answer to the wrong question. 
The causation question is not limited to whether the 
1984 Plan caused petitioners' **I491 injury; the 
question is whether respondent caused petitioners' 
injury. 
We have never addressed the 5 1983 causation 
requirement in the context of a regulatory takings 
claim, though language in Penn Central Truns~.  Co. 
V .  New Yorli Citv, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646. 57 
L.Ed.2d 63 1 ( 1978h suggests that ordinary principles 
of proximate cause *345 govern the causation 
inquiry for takings claims. Id., at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646. 
The causation standard does not require much 
elaboration in this case, because respondent was 
undoubtedly the "moving force" behind petitioners' 
inability to build on their land from August 1984 
through 1987. Monell v. New York Citv D e ~ t .  o f  
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. 56 
L.Ed.2d 61 1 (1978) (j 1983 causation established 
when government action is the "moving force" 
behind the alleged constitutional violation). The 
injunction in this case issued because the 1984 Plan 
did ' not comply with the 1980 Tahoe Regional 
Planning Compact (Compact) and regulations issued 
pursuant to the Compact. And, of course, 
respondent is responsible for the Compact and its 
regulations. 
On August 26, 1982, respondent adopted Resolution 
82-1 1. That resolution established "environmental 
thresholds for water quality, soil conservation, air 
quality, vegetation preservation, wildlife, fisheries, 
noise, recreation, and scenic resources." Ccilifiv-nio 
v. Tuhoe Rezional P1annin.g Agency, 766 F.2d 1308, 
13 1 1 (C.A.9 1985). The District Court enjoined the 
1984 Plan in part because the Plan would have 
allowed 42,000 metric tons of soil per year to erode 
from some of the single-family residences, in excess 
of the Resolution 82-1 1 threshold for soil 
conservation. Id., at 1315; see also id., at 1312. 
Another reason the District Court enjoined the 1984 
Plan was that it did not comply with article V(g) of 
the Compact, which requires a finding, "with respect 
to each project, that the project will not cause the 
established [environmental] thresholds to be 
exceeded." Ihid. Thus, the District Court enjoined 
the 1984 Plan because the Plan did not comply with 
the environmental requirements of respondent's 
regulations and of the Compact itself. 
Respondent is surely responsible for its own 
regulations, and it is also responsible for the Compact 
as it is the governmental agency charged with 
administering the Compact. Compact, Art. I(c), 94 
Stat 3234. It follows that respondent was the 
"moving force" behind petitioners' inability to 
develop*346 their land from April 1984 through the 
enactment of the 1987 plan. Without the 
environmental thresholds established by the Compact 
and Resolution 82-11, the 1984 Plan would have 
gone into effect and petitioners would have been able 
to build single-family residences. And it was 
certainly foreseeable that development projects 
exceeding the environmental thresholds would be 
prohibited; indeed, that was the very purpose of 
enacting the thresholds. 
Because respondent caused petitioners' inability to 
use their land from 198 1 through 1987, that is the 
appropriate period of time from which to consider 
their takings claim. 
I now turn to determining whether a ban on all 
economic development lasting almost six years is a 
taking. L m  reaffirmed our "frequently expressed" 
view that "when the owner of real property has been 
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial 
uses in the name of the common good, that is, to 
leave his property economically idle, he has suffered 
ataking." 505U.S..at 1019, 112S.Ct. 2886. See 
also Agins v. Cihj of'Tihumn. 447 U.S. 255, 258-259, 
100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980). The District 
Court in this case held that the ordinances and 
resolutions in effect between August 24, 1981, and 
April 25, 1984, "did in fact deny the plaintiffs all 
economically viable use of their land." 34 F.Suvp.2d 
1226,1245 (D.Nev. 1999). The Court of Appeals did 
not overturn this ""1492 finding. And the 1984 
injunction, issued because the environmental 
thresholds issued by respondent did not permit the 
development of single-family residences, forced 
petitioners to leave their land economically idle for at 
least another three years. The Court does not dispute 
that petitioners were forced to leave their land 
economically idle during this period. See ante, at 
1473. But the Court refuses to apply L ~ ~ c a s  on the 
ground that the deprivation was "temporary." 
Neither the Talungs Clause nor our case law supports 
such a distinction. For one thing, a distinction 
between *347 "temporary" and "permanent" 
prohibitions is tenuous, The "temporary" 
prohibition in this case that the Court finds is not a 
taking lasted almost six years.E The "permanent" 
,- - > 
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prohibition that the Court held to be a talung in Lucas 
lasted less than two years. See 505 U.S.. at 101 1 -  
10 12. 112 S.Ct. 2886. The "permanent" prohibition 
in L- lasted less than two years because the law, 
as it often does, changed. The South Carolina 
Legislature in 1990 decided to amend the 1988 
Beachfront Management Act to allow the issuance of 
" 'special permits' for the construction or 
reconstruction of habitable structures seaward of the, 
baseline." Id., at 101 1-1012. 1 12 S.Ct 2886. Land- 
use regulations are not irrevocable. And the 
government can even abandon condemned land. See 
United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26, 78 S.Ct 1039, 
2 L.Ed.2d 1 109 (1958). Under the Court's decision 
today, the talungs question turns entirely on the initial 
label given a regulation, a label that is often without 
much meaning. There is every incentive for 
government to simply label any prohibition on 
development "temporary," or to fix a set number of 
years. As in this case, this initial designation does 
not preclude the government from repeatedly 
extending the "temporary" prohibition into a long- 
term ban on all development. The Court now holds 
that such a designation by the government is 
conclusive even though in fact the moratorium 
greatly exceeds the time initially specified. 
Apparently, the Court would not view even a 10-year 
moratorium as a taking under Luca.r because the 
moratorium is not "permanent." 
FN2. Even under the Court's mistaken view 
-
that the ban on development lasted only 32 
months, the ban in this case exceeded the 
ban in Lucus. 
Our opinion in First English Evanaelical Lutheran 
Church o f  Glendale v. Cortntv o f  Los Anaeles. 482 
U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987), 
rejects any distinction between temporary and 
permanent takings when a landowner is deprived of 
all economically beneficial use of his land. Fir,d 
En~lish stated that "temporary takings which, as here, 
deny a landowner all use of his property, are not 
different in kind from permanent *348 takings, for 
which the Constitution clearly requires 
compensation." Id.. at 318. 107 S.Ct. 2378. 
Because of First Enplish's rule that "temporary 
deprivations of use are compensable under the 
Takings Clause," the Court in L x  found nothing 
problematic about the later developments that 
potentially made the ban on development temporary. 
505 U.S.. at 1011-1012. 112 S.Ct. 2886 (citing First 
Englislz, srruru 1; see also 505 U.S., at 1033, 112 
S.Ct. 2886 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment) 
("It is well established that temporary takings are as 
protected by the Constitution as are permanent ones" 
(citing First Enrrlisk. sti~l'a, at 318, 107 S.Ct. 2378)). 
More fundamentally, even if a practical distinction 
between temporary and permanent deprivations were 
plausible, to treat the two differently in terms of 
talungs law would be at odds with the justification for 
the Lztcu.s rule. The Lzicas rule is derived from the 
fact that a "total deprivation of beneficial use is, from 
the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a 
physical approp~jation." 505 U.S.. at 1017, 112 S.Ct. 
2886. The regulation in Lticos was the "practical 
equivalence" of a long-term physical appropriation, 
i.e., a condemnation, so the Fifth Amendment 
required **I493 compensation. The "practical 
equivalence," from the landowner's point of view, of 
a "temporary" ban on all economic use is a forced 
leasehold. For example, assume the following 
situation: Respondent is contemplating the creation 
of a National Park around Lake Tahoe to preserve its 
scenic beauty. Respondent decides to take a 6-year 
leasehold over petitioners' property, during which any 
human activity on the land would be prohibited, in 
order to prevent any further destruction to the area 
while it was deciding whether to request that the area 
be designated a National Park. 
.Surely that leasehold would require compensation. 
In a series of World War 11-era cases in which the 
Government had condemned leasehold interests in 
order to support the war effort, the Government 
conceded that it was required *349 to pay 
compensation for the leasehold i n t e r e ~ t . ~  See 
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372. 66 
S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946); United States v. 
Generul Motors Corn, 323 U.S. 373. 376, 65 S.Ct. 
357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945). From petitioners' 
standpoint, what happened in this case is no different 
than if the government had taken a 6-year lease of 
their property. The Court ignores this "practical 
equivalence" between respondent's deprivation and 
the deprivation resulting from a leasehold. In so 
doing, the Court allows the government to "do by 
regulation what it cannot do through eminent 
domain-i.e., take private property without paying for 
it." 228 F.3d 998, 999 (C.A.9 2000) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
FN3. There was no dispute that just 
compensation was required in those cases. 
The disagreement involved how to calculate 
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that compensation. In United Statea v. 
Gencr*al Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65 
S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 31 1 (19451, for example, 
the issues before the Court were how to 
value the leasehold interest (i. e., whether the 
"long-term rental value [should be] the sole 
measure of the value of such short-term 
occupancy," id., at 380, 65 S.Ct. 357). 
whether the Government had to pay for the 
respondent's removal of personal property 
from the condemned warehouse, and 
whether the Government had to pay for the 
reduction in value of the respondent's 
equipment and fixtures left in the 
warehouse. Id., at 380-38 1. 65 S.Ct. 357. 
Instead of acknowledging the "practical equivalence" 
of this case and a condemned leasehold, the Court 
analogizes to other areas of takings law in which we 
have distinguished between regulations and physical 
appropriations, see ante, at 1478-1479. But 
whatever basis there is for such distinctions in those 
contexts does not apply when a regulation deprives a 
landowner of all economically beneficial use of his 
land. In addition to the "practical equivalence" from 
the landowner's perspective of such a regulation and 
a physical appropriation, we have held that a 
regulation denying all productive use of land does not 
implicate the traditional justification for 
differentiating between regulations and physical 
appropriations. In "the extraordinary circumstance 
when no productive or economically beneficial use of 
land is permitted," it is less likely that "the legislature 
is simply *350 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life' ... in a manner that secures an 
'average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone 
concerned," Lucas, strpra. at 10 17-1018, 1 12 S.Ct. 
2886 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. 11. New York 
Cit,~. 438 U.S., at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, and 
Pennsyhjania Coul Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 415, 
43 S.Ct. 1582 and more likely that the property "is 
being pressed into some form of public service under 
the guise of mitigating serious public harm," Lllcas, 
strpra, at 1018. 112 S.Ct. 2886. 
The Court also reads L a  as being fundamentally 
concerned with value, ante, at 1482-1484, rather than 
with the denial of "all economically beneficial or 
productive use of land," 505 U.S., at 1015, 112 S.Ct. 
2886. But L m  repeatedly discusses its holding as -
applying where "no productive or economically 
beneficial use of land is permitted." Id., at 101 7, 1 12 
S.Ct 2886; see also ihid. ("[Tlotal deprivation of 
beneficial use is, from the landowner's **I494 point 
of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation"); 
id.. at 1016. 112 S.Ct. 2886 ("[Tlhe Fifth 
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation ... 
denies an owner economically viable use of his 
land'y; id., at 1018, 112 S.Ct. 2886 ("[Tlhe 
functional basis for permitting the government, by 
regulation, to affect property values without 
compensation ... does not apply to the relatively rare 
situations where the government has deprived a 
landowner of all economically beneficial uses"); 
ibid. ("[Tlhe fact that regulations that leave the 
-
owner of land without economically beneficial or 
productive options for its use ... carry with them a 
heightened risk that private property is being pressed 
into some form of public service"); id.. at 1019. 112 
S.Ct. 2886 ("[Wlhen the owner of real property has 
been called upon to sacrifice all economically 
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that 
is, to leave his property economically idle, he has 
suffered a talung"). Moreover, the Court's position 
that value is the sine qua non of the Lucas rule proves 
too much. Surely, the land at issue in Lucas retained 
some market value based on the contingency, which 
soon came to fruition (see supra, at 1492), that the 
development ban would be amended. 
*351 Liicas is implicated when the government 
deprives a landowner of "all economically beneficial 
or productive use of land." 505 U.S., at 10 15. 1 12 
S.Ct. 2886. The District Court found, and the Court 
agrees, that the moratorium "temporarily" deprived 
petitioners of " 'all economically viable use of their 
land.' "Ante, at 1475. Because the rationale for the 
L a  rule applies just as strongly in this case, the 
"temporary" denial of all viable use of land for six 
years is a talung. 
The Court worries that applying Lucas here compels 
finding that an array of traditional, short-term, land- 
use planning devices are takings. Ante, at 1485, 
1486-1487. But since the beginning of our 
regulatory takings jurisprudence, we have recognized 
that property rights "are enjoyed under an implied 
limitation." Mahon, .supra, at 413, 43 S.Ct. 158. 
Thus, in Lucas, after holding that the regulation 
prohibiting all economically beneficial use of the 
coastal land came within our categorical takings rule, 
we nonetheless inquired into whether such a result 
"inhere[d] in the title itself, in the restrictions that 
background principles of the State's law of property 
and nuisance already place upon land ownership." 
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505 U.S.. at 1029. 112 S.Ct. 2886. Because the 
regulation at issue in Llrcas purported to be 
permanent, or at least long term, we concluded that 
the only implied limitation of state property law that 
could achieve a similar long-term deprivation of all 
economic use would be something "achieved in the 
courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely 
affected persons) under the State's law of private 
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary 
power to abate nuisances that affect the public 
generally, or otherwise." I& 
When a regulation merely delays a final land-use 
decision, we have recognized that there are other 
background principles of state property law that 
prevent the delay from being deemed a taking. We 
thus noted in First English that our discussion of 
temporary takings did not apply "in the case *352 of 
normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes 
in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like." 482 
U.S.. at 321, 107 S.Ct. 2378. We reiterated this last 
Term: "The right to improve property, of course, is 
subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority, 
including the enforcement of valid zoning and land- 
use restrictions." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 627. 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 
(2001). Zoning regulations existed as far back as 
colonial Boston, see Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takin~s Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 Colum. L.Rev. 782. 789 
(19951, and New York City enacted the first 
comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1916, see 1 
**I495 Anderson's American Law of Zoning $ 3.07, 
p. 92 (K. Young rev. 4th ed.1995). Thus, the short- 
term delays attendant to zoning and permit regimes 
are a longstanding feature of state property law and 
part of a landowner's reasonable investment-backed 
expectations. See Lucus. srrarcl, at 1034. 112 S.Ct. 
2886 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment). 
-
But a moratorium prohibiting all economic use for a 
period of six years is not one of the longstanding, 
implied limitations of state property 
Moratoria are "interim controls on the use of land 
that seek to maintain the status quo with respect to 
land development in an area by either 'fi-eezing' 
existing land uses or by allowing the issuance of 
building permits for only certain land uses that would 
not be inconsistent with a contemplated zoning plan 
or zoning change." 1 E. Ziegler, Rathkopfs The 
Law of Zoning and *353 Planning 3 13:3, p. 13-6 
(4th ed.2001). Typical moratoria' thus prohibit only 
certain categories of development, such as fast-food 
restaurants, see Schufer I). New 01-leclns, 743 F.2d 
1086 (C.A.5 19841, or adult businesses, see Renfon v.  
Plavtinzc Theafres, Inc.. 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 
89 L.Ed.2d 29 (19861, or all commercial 
development, see Arnold Bernhard & Co. 1). 
Planninp & Zoninp Comm'n, 194 Conn. 152, 479 
A.2d 801 (19841. Such moratoria do not implicate 
Lltccls because they do not deprive landowners of all 
economically beneficial use of their land. As for 
moratoria that prohibit all development, these do not 
have the lineage of permit and zoning requirements 
and thus it is less certain that property is acquired 
under the "implied limitation" of a moratorium 
prohibiting all development. Moreover, unlike a 
permit system in which it is expected that a project 
will be approved so long as certain conditions are 
satisfied, a moratorium that prohibits all uses is by 
definition contemplating a new land-use plan that 
would prohibit all uses. 
FN4. Six years is not a "cutoff point," ante, 
at 1487, n. 34; it is the length involved in 
this case. And the "explanation" for the 
conclusion that there is a taking in this case 
is the fact that a 6-year moratorium far 
exceeds any moratorium authorized under 
background principles of state property law. 
See inji-a, 1495, 1496. This case does not 
require us to undertake a more exacting 
study of state property law and discern 
exactly how long a moratorium must last 
before it no longer can be considered an 
implied limitation of property ownership 
(assuming, that is, that a moratorium on all 
development is a background principle of 
state property law, see infra, this page). 
But this case does not require us to decide as a 
categorical matter whether moratoria prohibiting all 
economic use are an implied limitation of state 
property law, because the duration of this 
"moratorium" far exceeds that of ordinary moratoria. 
As the Court recognizes, ante, at 1489, n. 37, state 
statutes authorizing the issuance of moratoria often 
limit the moratoria's duration. California, where 
much of the land at issue in this case is located, 
provides that a moratorium "shall be of no further 
force and effect 45 days from its date of adoption," 
and caps extension of the moratorium so that the total 
duration cannot exceed two years. Cal. Govt.Code 
Ann. 3 65858(a) (West Supp.2002); see also 
Mini~Stat. 5 462.355, subd. 4 (2000) (limiting 
moratoria to 18 months, with one permissible 
extension, for a total of two years). Another State 
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limits moratoria to 120 days, with the possibility of a 
single 6-month extension. 0re.Rev.Stat. Ann. tj 
197.520(4) (19971. Others limit moratoria to six 
"354 months without any possibility of an extension. 
See Colo.Rev.Stat. 6 30-28-1 2 1 (2001 ); N.J. Stat. 
Ann. 6 40:55D-90(b) /1991).m Indeed, it has long 
been understood that moratoria on development 
exceeding these short time periods are not **I496 a 
legitimate planning device. See, e.g., Hold.s~vorth v. 
Huzue. 9 N.J.Misc. 715, 155 A. 892 (1931). 
FN5. These are just some examples of the 
state laws limiting the duration of moratoria. 
There are others. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. \ .  17-27-404(3)(b)(i)-(ii) (1995) 
(temporary prohibitions on development 
"may not exceed six months in duration," 
with the possibility of extensions for no 
more than "two additional six-month 
periods"). See also ante, at 1486-1487, n. 
31. 
Resolution 83-2 1 reflected this understanding of the 
limited duration of moratoria in initially limiting the 
moratorium in this case to 90 days. But what 
resulted-a "moratorium" lasting nearly six years- 
bears no resemblance to the short-term nature of 
traditional moratoria as understood from these 
background examples of state property law. 
Because the prohibition on development of nearly six 
years in this case cannot be said to resemble any 
"implied limitation" of state property law, it is a 
taking that requires compensation. 
Lake Tahoe is a national treasure, and I do not doubt 
that respondent's efforts at preventing further 
degradation of the lake were made in good faith in 
furtherance of the public interest. But, as is the case 
with most governmental action that furthers the 
public interest, the Constitution requires that the costs 
and burdens be borne by the public at large, not by a 
few targeted citizens. Justice Holmes' admonition of 
80 years ago again rings true: "We are in danger of 
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the 
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving 
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way 
of paying for the change." Muhon. 260 U.S., at 416, 
43 S.Ct. 158. 
"355 Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice SCALIA 
joins, dissenting. 
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S dissent. I write 
separately to address the majority's conclusion that 
the temporary moratorium at issue here was not a 
taking because it was not a "taking of 'the parcel as a 
whole.' " Ante, at 1484. While this questionable 
rule FNI has been applied to various alleged regulatory 
takings, it was, in my view, rejected in the context of 
temporal deprivations of property by First Enzlish 
Evunac~licul Lutheran Cl~urch o f  Glc.nd(rl~ v. County 
a f l o s  Anaeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318. 107 S.Ct. 2378, 
96 L.Ed.2d 250 (19871, which held that temporary 
and permanent takings "are not different in kind" 
when a landowner is deprived of all beneficial use of 
his land. I had thought that F i m  English put to rest 
the notion that the "relevant denominator" is land's 
infinite life. Consequently, a regulation effecting a 
total deprivation of the use of a so-called "temporal 
slice" of property is cornpensable under the Talungs 
Clause unless background principles of state property 
law prevent it from being deemed a talung; "total 
deprivation of use is, from the landowner's point of 
view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation." 
Lucas v. Solith Carolino Coa.sla1 Council, 505 U.S. 
1003. 1017, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). 
FN* The majority's decision to embrace the 
"parcel as a whole" doctrine as settled is 
puzzling. See, e.g., P[~luzzolo v. Rhorle 
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 63 1, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 
150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001j (noting that the 
Court has "at times expressed discomfort 
with the logic of [the parcel as a whole] 
rule"); Lucas v. Solith Corolinu Coustul 
Council. 505 U.S. 1003, 1017, n. 7, 112 
S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) 
(recognizing that "uncertainty regarding the 
composition of the denominator in [the 
Court's] 'deprivation' fraction has produced 
inconsistent pronouncements by the Court," 
and that the relevant calculus is a "difficult 
question"). 
A taking is exactly what occurred in this case. No 
one seriously doubts that the land-use regulations at 
issue rendered petitioners' land unsusceptible of any 
economically beneficial use. This was true at the 
inception of the moratorium,*356 and it remains true 
today. These individuals and families were deprived 
of the opportunity to build single-family homes as 
permanent, retirement, or vacation residences on land 
upon which such construction was authorized when 
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purchased. The Court assures them that "a 
temporary prohibition on economic use" cannot be a 
taking because **I497 "[l]ogically ... the property 
will recover value as soon as the prohibition is 
lifted." Anfe, at 1484. But the "logical" assurance 
that a "temporary restriction ... merely causes a 
diminution in value," ibzd., is cold comfort to the 
property owners in this case or any other. After all, 
"[Gn the long run we are all dead." J. Keynes, 
Monetary Reform 88 (1924). 
I would hold that regulations prohibiting all 
productive uses of property are subject to Lucas ' per 
se rule, regardless of whether the property so 
burdened retains theoretical useful life and value if, 
and when, the "temporary" moratorium is lifted. To 
my mind, such potential future value bears on the 
amount of compensation due and has nothing to do 
with the question whether there was a taking in the 
first place. It is regrettable that the Court has charted 
a markedly different path today. 
u.s.,2002. 
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